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The thesis uses an analytical typology to show how the conflict over European 
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within the Thatcherite grouping. 
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pursue an Atlanticist or Europeanist foreign policy. The thesis will show that foreign 
policy developments over the last forty years have widened the divide between the 
Tory groupings on this issue. 
The Thatcherite Nationalists' hostility to European integration intensified once the 
integrationist dynamics within the European Union became apparent. These dynamics 
were incompatible with the concept of a Europe of free trading nation states. The 
Nationalists became committed to reversing these integrationist developments. 
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more effective means of attaining traditional Thatcherite objectives of price stability 
and sound finance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The controversy is now beginning to crack the old Party alignments (Harold Macmillan quoted in 
Home 1989: 358). 
Britain has become ever more dependent on an economic system that lies beyond our immediate 
control (Geoffrey Howe - HC Debates, 19/12/91, Vol. 201, Col. 511). 
We are floating and we will set monetary policy in this country to meet our objectives and it will be a 
British economic policy and a British monetarypolicy (Rt Hon Norman Lamont MP 18/9/92). 
Last time round the Empire was ours. We were not part of it. This time we will not run it: we will 
merely be part of it. Decisions - the decisions of our union will not be made at Westminster; they will 
be made in Brussls. Instead of ruling a large part of the world we will be supplicants at a court several 
hundreds of miles away (Oliver Letwin, Drift To Union. 1989). 
The European controversy has convulsed the Conservative Party throughout the 
1990s. Europe has stimulated unprecedented backbench dissidence and been a direct 
cause of two party leadership challenges. John Major was forced to twice threaten his 
party with a general election in order to secure his European policies. The European 
issue now has the potential to split the Conservative Party. 
The conflict over European integration seems all the more remarkable considering the 
Conservative Party's reputation as the'party of Europe'. This reputation was cultivated 
by a succession of Tory leaders including Thatcher and Heath. It was a Conservative 
Government which successfully negotiated Britain's entry into the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in 1973. Thatcher also negotiated and secured 
ratification of the Single European Act which intensified European integration. 
This thesis will focus on why the European Union (EU) has become so divisive for 
the Conservative Party. It will analyse why leading Conservative politicians, like 
Margaret Thatcher became so antagonistic to the EU. This thesis will also focus on 
the significance of the fracturing of the Thatcherite grouping on the European issue. 
The thesis will argue that the European controversy has been brought about by an 
ideological realignment of the Conservative Party. This realignment has been driven 
by the interaction of central Conservative ideological disputes with the strong 
integrationist direction taken by the EU from the end of the 1980s onwards. 
The thesis will use an analytical typology to examine the party's European divisions. 
The typology shows how disputes over the Anglo-American alliance; the future of 
Thatcherite economic policy and the Tory ideology of nationhood, have been re- 
opened as a result of the heightened pace of European integration. The post-1988 
period was the key turning point in the European controversy because it was at this 
time that integrationist pressures in the EU intensified and leading Conservatives 
placed themselves in opposition to these pressures. 
The thesis will identify the conflict over European integration as part on a recurring 
Tory conflict over national sovereignty in foreign economic policy. At each stage of 
this conflict the party leadership has either sought to mediate between Conservatives 
or it has taken a stance which identifies with one set of protagonists. Thatcher became 
a partisan in the European controversy and so intensified party divisions. Major 
sought to maintain a precarious middle position on Europe. 
The central factor in this recurring conflict over sovereignty is the role of nationhood 
in Conservative ideology. Nationhood has been a core ideological commitment for 
Conservatives. Conservative leaders conceived of nationhood as the central element 
of a strategy to universalise the Conservatives' appeal in an industrial society. The 
ideology of nationhood in addition to stressing a common identity and institutions, 
also placed a premium on Britain's global power and identity. The globalist 
conception of nationhood was principally expressed through the glorification of 
empire. For many Tories, EEC membership represented a retreat from Britain's global 
identity to a confined continental role. The other aspect of nationhood was the 
Conservative Party's commitment to the sovereignty of the Westminster parliament.. 
The European groupings within the party have contested Atlanticist and Europeanist 
conceptions of Conservative foreign policy. Since the Second World War the 
Conservative leadership came to terms with American leadership in international 
relations. The Tory leadership felt itself forced to engage with the EEC in order to 
maintain the alliance with the United States (US). 
Some Conservatives now argue that the Government should develop a more 
independent European foreign policy. They believe that Britain's past dependence on 
America was unhealthy. However other Tories deeply distrust European security and 
economic instincts and wish to perpetuate American leadership. The end of the Cold 
War has further polarised the Europeanist and Atlanticist dispute in the party. 
Another trigger for the emergence of the divisions over Europe was the conflict 
between Thatcherite deregulation and the EU model of `social capitalism' centred on 
France and Germany. The Major Government extended Thatcher's deregulation 
project in order to enhance national competitiveness. Deregulation is the one unifying 
European issue in the party. The Conservative Party as a whole is united in its 
opposition to interventionist European policies and to the EU social dimension. 
However some Conservatives believe that Britain can only pursue an unfettered 
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deregulation policy if the UK withdraws from the European Union. Pro-Europeans 
however believe that EMU would enhance the free market project. Many 
Conservatives oppose EMU in principle because they believe it can never command 
popular legitimacy. 
The combination of the core commitment of nationhood and the free market project is 
united in the concept of a Europe of nation states. Thatcher was prepared to enhance 
supranational power in order to promote her free market project (Thatcher 1993: 
553). However the integrationist dynamic within the EU is ultimately incompatible 
with a Europe of nation states. As EU competence has increased, so many Tories 
desire to restore Westminster's policy independence. Major attempted to confine 
integration to the single market sphere through devices like subsidiarity. However he 
failed to reassure party dissidents that the free trading project can prevail in the EU. 
The thesis will focus solely on the debate within the Conservative parliamentary party 
in its analysis of the European controversy. This focus is appropriate because of the 
pre-eminence of the parliamentary party in Tory politics. The Conservatives are a 
leadership and not a members' party. The key policy struggles which have taken place 
have been between leadership elites. When other individuals and interest groups are 
mentioned in this thesis, they will be discussed in relation to their influence on the 
parliamentary party's debate. 
The following chapter will show how a typology of the Conservative European 
divisions can be constructed through an assessment of primary and secondary 
accounts about the party. The typology will show that the European divisions have 
been driven by key ideological disputes. The typology is also based on a reappraisal 
of previous typologies of Conservative European divisions, in order to show the new 
dynamics which developed over the issue in the late 1980s. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE REALIGNMENT OF CONSERVATISM -A TYPOLOGY 
OF THE PARLIAMENTARY PARTY'S DIVISIONS OVER EUROPE 
Since the late 1980s, the European issue has brought about an ideological 
realignment within the parliamentary Conservative Party. This realignment has 
resulted in a split amongst the Thatcherite grouping. It also led to a change in the 
party leadership's attitude to European integration. This thesis will use an analytical 
typology to show how the European divisions have been driven by key ideological 
disputes within the party, especially in relation to the Thatcher project. 
In the 1960s and 70s divisions emerged in the Tory parliamentary party on the core 
issue of British membership of the EEC but they did not at this stage have a 
fundamental effect on party alignments. The divisions over EEC membership were 
followed by the far more dominant line of division between the "wets" versus 
"dries" in the conflict over Margaret Thatcher's macroeconomic and social policy. 
Europe's re-emergence as a source of conflict in the party in the second half of the 
1980s had a far more fundamental impact on the Conservatives than the early 
membership debates. The post-1988 European controversy realigned the 
parliamentary party, superceding the `wets' versus `dries' conflict. 
This thesis will argue that the integrationist trends which intensified in the EU after 
1988 were the trigger for the re-opening of the European issue in the Conservative 
Party. This year was a watershed because of the relaunching of the single currency 
project. It was the interaction between an acceleration in European integration and 
key Tory ideological disputes which brought about a realigned parliamentary party. 
One of these key ideological disputes was the future of Thatcherite economic policy. 
These core disputes have been identified through an assessment of primary sources 
and arguments contained in secondary accounts of Conservatism. This chapter will 
also re-evaluate earlier typologies of Conservative European divisions, in order to 
show how the integrationist developments of the post-1988 period have changed the 
nature of the party's European debate. The new factors influencing Conservative 
European debates in this period require the development of a new typology of the 
parliamentary party. 
This chapter will present an analytical typology in order to show how the 
ideological disputes on nationhood, Atlanticism and Thatcherite economics, have 
created new alignments in the parliamentary party. The typology will show the 
centrality of monetary union in creating renewed divisions on Europe. 
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The typology in the thesis serves the purpose of identifying the key contributory 
factors which have brought about the current European divisions. The typology is 
not put forward as the basis for identifying the numerical strength of party European 
groupings or the scale of dissidence on the European issue. Instead the typology 
identifies the distinct groupings which have emerged as a result of the key 
ideological conflicts mentioned above. The focus of the research is the ideological 
conflicts created by developments in the post-1988 European debate and not the 
extent of factionalism in the parliamentary party. 
Constructing The Typology 
This typology is informed by three sources of material: an assessment of the 
primary evidence provided by the participants in the European controversy; 
secondary accounts of the Thatcher Governments and previous typologies of the 
Conservative parliamentary party. 
Primary Evidence 
The first stage in constructing the typology was an assessment of the primary 
sources available for the study, including parliamentary speeches, factional 
literature and policy statements. An analysis of these sources identified the 
recurrence of key themes in the discourse of Conservative politicians on the 
European issue. It showed that the importance of British sovereignty and the threats 
posed to the Thatcher free market project by the EU were the key arguments 
advanced by many Conservatives opposed to European integration. 
The most important phenomenon which was clear from the primary sources, 
especially from the accounts of Tory participants in the European controversy, is 
that the Conservatives who had previously formed a cohesive `Thatcherite' grouping 
in the party became divided on the European issue. A key focus in the research 
which formed this thesis is to identify why European integration provoked this 
bifurcation of views amongst the Thatcherites. What political events and 
developments fractured the unity of the Thatcherite grouping. 
Further assessment of the primary sources clearly identified European monetary 
union as a watershed in re-opening the Conservative debate on Europe. EMU also 
became a very divisive issue amongst Thatcherites. The key events which created 
this watershed were the 1988 Hanover summit which re-opened the single currency 
issue and Jacques Delors' speech to the European Parliament and to the TUC in the 
autumn of 1988. These events showed that European integration was accelerating. 
Thatcher's hostile response to these developments in the September 1988 Bruges 
speech clearly represented a point of departure in Conservative European policy. In 
his memoirs, Lord Howe argues that Thatcher's Bruges speech marked a turning 
point in the Conservative Party's European policy (Howe 1994: 537-8). 
At Bruges Thatcher deliberately placed herself in direct opposition to the European 
Union's post-1988 integrationist push. Sir Charles Powell says that the Bruges 
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speech was deliberately conceived as an attempt to halt an unwelcome change in the 
EU's institutional and economic development (Powell 1994). 
After Thatcher had emphasised the proclamation of monetary union as a key turning 
point, many backbench Conservatives followed her lead. In speech after speech the 
pursuit of a single currency was cited by Conservatives as the point at which 
European integration was, no longer a legitimate or desirable process. The `re- 
proclamation' of monetary union in 1988 clearly marks a new chronological stage in 
the relationship of the Conservative Party with European integration. The external 
factor of the Franco-German commitment to monetary union transformed both the 
intensity and the nature of the debate within the Conservative parliamentary party. 
A comparison between these arguments and those advanced by Tories who opposed 
Britain's membership of the EEC in the early 1970s is also an important historical 
reference point. This comparison clearly showed that the `British deregulation 
versus EU social dimension' conflict was a new issue and one which explained why 
many Tories who had been supporters of the EEC had become hostile to European 
integration by the 1990s. An initial survey of the primary literature showed that the 
Anglo-American alliance was also also a factor in the controversy. 
However the comparison also indicated a number of continuities between early 
resistance to European membership and the 1990s debates on further integration. 
Rhetoric stressing national identity and sovereignty is common to the discourse of 
Conservatives in both periods. The political rhetoric of Conservative opponents of 
European integration continually emphasises the threat posed to national identity 
and sovereignty by European integration. Many Tories insist that this threat strikes 
at the heart of their party's traditions and doctrines. Norman Lamont's insistence in 
his 1994 Conservative Party conference speech that the Conservatives were `the 
party of the nation' is an example of these sentiments (Lamont 1994). 
Both the early 1970s and the 1990s also saw a number of Conservative MPs engage 
in unprecedented defiance of their frontbench over Europe. This political behaviour 
is evidence of the fundamental nature of the European issue to modern 
Conservatism. 
The next stage in constructing a typology of Conservative European divisions was 
to explore the themes which emerged from the primary sources through elite 
interviews with some of the participants in the controversy. The interviews were 
chosen carefully in order to provide a representative source of material for the 
purpose of assessing the dynamics identified from the survey of the primary 
literature. Interviewees were selected to provide a generational and ideological 
balance of Conservative MPs. These selection criteria were important in assessing 
whether the discourse of some Conservatives was representative of views held by 
clear constituencies within the parliamentary party. For example the interviews 
conducted for the thesis with Tory opponents of European integration, such as 
Bernard Jenkin and Lord Parkinson, provided strong evidence that attitudes towards 
Britain's relations with the United States were a major factor influencing the 
Conservative Party's divisions. 
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Secondary Sources: Thatcherism As A Strategic Project 
Having identified key phenomena in the Conservative European debate, the next 
stage in developing the typology of the Conservative Party and Europe was an 
assessment of whether the secondary literature could contribute to analysing these 
phenomena. The secondary accounts which are most relevant to the analysis of the 
European controversy are those which analysed Thatcherism as a strategic project. 
Many political scientists have argued that Thatcherism pursued a strategic project 
designed to reshape the British economy and society. As has been discussed above, 
primary accounts show that the interplay between European integration and the 
`Thatcher project' is a key dynamic in the European controversy. It is therefore 
important to focus on studies which have evaluated the nature of this political 
project. 
Several accounts of the Thatcher Governments stress that policy in this period was 
governed by a clear ideological project. In particular Andrew Gamble and Shirley 
Letwin emphasise the coherence and intellectual consistency of this project. William 
Wallace argues that this project was not merely domestic but was linked more 
broadly to Britain's external relations with the wider world, in particular the United 
States. Both Jim Bulpitt and David Judge see the Conservatives as committed to a 
defence of executive independence against the expanding competence of the 
European Union. 
Europe As A Threat To Thatcherism 
Andrew Gamble and Shirley Letwin's contributions provide further support for the 
evidence that European integration was seen by many Conservatives as a threat to 
the Thatcher economic project in Britain. Gamble's studies emphasise the strategic 
view of the Thatcher project. Letwin sees Thatcher's reassertion of national 
sovereignty as an instrument to protect British free market reforms against 
interventionist policies threatened by European integration. Michel Albert places 
this conflict between British free market model and European interventionism into a 
deeper conceptual context. 
Gamble argued that Thatcher was committed to a `free economy', one which 
reasserted the traditional openness of the UK economy, involving policies which 
liberated capital movements, reduced the public sector's size and deregulated the 
labour market. Gamble saw the free economy as a hegemonic project, one which 
would institutionalise free market disciplines and thereby constrain any future left- 
of-centre governments. Lawson for example, stressed that these disciplines would 
prove a check on the ambitions of a Labour Government if the Tories ever fell from 
power (Lawson 1992: 871). 
The single market was initially viewed by most Thatcherites as a key part of this 
free economy project. However, many Thatcherites now see the continuing drive to 
European integration as placing new policy constraints on market liberalisation. An 
analysis of the primary literature shows that many Tories see the EU as a threat to 
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the Thatcher project (Cash 1991 and Spicer 1992: 72). Many Tories hoped that the 
single market would institutionalise their agenda across Europe (Grahl & Teague 
1989: 34). However these Tories now see that the single market did not bring about 
a uniform free economy regime in the EU, with many British companies still at a 
disadvantage because of the persistence of interventionist state aids and large 
continential public corporations in other member states. 
Thatcher's support for the creation of the single market did not bring about the 
ideological homogeneity in Europe, which she had anticipated. Instead it was the 
basis for renewed conflict over economic and industrial policy. The enhanced social 
dimension after 1988 was seen by many Thatcherites as a threat to the free 
economy. 
Letwin also argues that Thatcher saw the principle of national sovereignty as an 
essential device to defend the integrity of Britain's free market reforms. Here her 
analysis coincides with that of Gamble in his later study of Tory European divisions 
(Gamble 1990: 34). Letwin sees the Thatcher project as more deeply rooted in 
British culture and history and argues that Thatcherism was a revival of an older 
British tradition of individualism. 
Michel Albert puts the argument over the social dimension in a broader conceptual 
context by arguing that two distinct and opposing models of capitalism exist in the 
industrialised world - the Rhine model and the Anglo-Saxon. The former model 
limits freedom of exchange and is driven by consensual economic policy and is 
prevalent in Germany and France. The Anglo-Saxon model is based on free markets' 
and a limited state and is dominant in the United States and Britain (Albert 1992). 
Europe In Conflict With Atlanticism 
The importance of the Atlantic relationship for Thatcherism, and in particular the 
priority many Conservatives give to relationships with the United States, rather than 
with Europe, has been highlighted by William Wallace and Shirley Letwin. These 
arguments are supported by the primary evidence from the interview material with 
Conservative politicians, as was stated above. The role of Anglo-America in the 
European debate emerges clearly from factional literature, particularly from those 
Tories opposed to further integration. What it demonstrates is that Europe is the 
expression of a deep divide over foreign policy within the parliamentary party. 
William Wallace has made a clear link between the Conservative's domestic 
economic agenda and their foreign policy aims in assessing the Tory conception of 
`the special relationship'. Wallace argues that the very terms `Atlanticist' and 
`European' now embrace a dual meaning encompassing both economic and security 
policy. Wallace says that incidents like the Westland affair show the tension 
between Conservatives who are interventionist advocates of European integration 
and those who are Anglo-Saxon free marketeers. 
Like Wallace, Shirley Letwin stresses that Thatcher believed in kinship between 
Britain and America (Letwin 1992: 302). Letwin argues that Britain would naturally 
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have a greater affinity with its free trading Anglo-Saxon cousin than with dirigiste 
continental European countries. 
Europe As A Threat To Policy Independence 
The primary accounts of Tory European debates show how Conservatives fear that 
British sovereignty is threatened by European integration. Jim Bulpitt and David 
Judge's arguments show how Conservative policy independence was eroded by the 
expanding competence of the European Union. Jim Bulpitt's analysis sees 
Thatcherism as seeking to reimpose an older form of Conservative statecraft (Bulpitt 
1985) which is incompatible with European integration. David Judge argues that the 
Tories are committed to maintaining executive independence within the British 
state, an independence which is challenged by the European Union. 
Bulpitt argues that the Tory leadership has always sought to defend an autonomous 
sphere of `high politics' in areas like foreign policy and macroeconomics. Bulpitt 
sees the monetarist experiment of the early 1980s as indicative of the party 
leadership's desire to reassert its autonomy from popular pressures. 
Bulpitt argues that European integration is a further threat to Tory high politics. He 
sees Tory politicians as dragged along by an integrationist ratchet (Bulpitt 1992). 
Bulpitt insists that the EU is different from other treaty arrangements because it has 
the power to continuously interpenetrate British domestic life, bringing home to 
voters the extent to which the British state has lost competence in so many policy 
areas. Bulpitt's analysis accords with the sentiments expressed by many Tories. 
These Conservatives are bitterly critical of the way in which EU competence has 
steadily increased at Westminster's expense. For example, Bernard Jenkin MP 
argues that the Government must identify a point at which the European consensus 
is no longer acceptable in institutional matters (Jenkin 1994). Jenkin clearly fears 
that the Conservative Party is being dragged along by such an integrationist ratchet. 
Bulpitt sets out a series of options available to Tory leaders in their relations with 
Europe. Bulpitt's `option D' identifies the Conservative leadership's attempt to 
reconcile its free market policies with the Rhine capitalist policies which prevail in 
the EU. Option D in fact describes the attempts by the party leadership to insulate 
the UK from the EU social dimension, through Britain's opt-out from the social 
chapter of the Maastricht treaty. 
Judge argues that the Government is really defending executive policy independence 
against challenges from within the UK and externally from Europe (Judge 1993: 
193). Whilst Letwin and Gamble see Thatcher's defence of national sovereignty as 
instrumental, in terms of maintaining British free market reforms, Judge stresses the 
Conservatives' desire to defend a strong executive within a centralised British state 
for its own sake. Judge sees Thatcher's rhetorial emphasis on sovereignty as a 
legitimatory concept, designed to conceal her commitment to defending executive 
power. The commitment by many Conservatives to the defence of British policy 
independence also has to be seen in the context of the development of a `strong 
state' during the Thatcher years (Gamble 1988). Part of the development of this 
9 
strong state was the reduction in local government's status and powers (Bulpitt 
1991). 
Anthony Teasdale relates the constitutional character of West European states to 
their leadership elite's attitude to European integration. Teasdale has noted that 
those European governments which preside over strong states, such as France and 
the United Kingdom also tend to be those which are most hostile to European 
integration, whereas those, like Belgium and Germany, which are the most 
decentralised, are the most supportive of European integration (Teasdale 1993: 
190). 
Europe And Nationhood 
The primary evidence showed the strong emphasis that Conservative opponents of 
European integration place on national identity and sovereignty. It is the Tory 
determination to defend nationhood which is a key factor in the desire of many 
Conservatives to maintain policy independence for the British state. Letwin notes 
that Thatcher's 1988 Bruges speech celebrated Britain's distinctive culture, heritage 
and language and expressed Thatcher's determination to defend these elements of 
`British nationhood' against European integration. 
Shirley Letwin argues that Thatcherism's fundamentally Conservative characteristics 
are seen most clearly in Thatcher's defence of nationhood in response to European 
integration. She regards it as ironic that when Thatcherism most clearly displayed 
its Tory characteristics, Thatcher herself was forced from power (Letwin 1992: 
306). The proposition that an appeal to nationhood is a core Tory doctrine is one 
which is supported by the rhetoric of Tory opponents of European integration. Tory 
opponents of monetary union argue that a single currency would be an assault on 
the party's most revered traditions. European integration clearly represents a threat 
to Conservative nationhood ideology. 
Sources Which Did Not Contribute To Constructing The-Typology 
Other secondary interpretations of Conservatism in the Thatcher years did not make 
a contribution to evaluating the European controversy. The other prominent political 
scientists who have analysed the impact of Thatcherism are Bob Jessop, David 
Marsh, Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques. 
Jessop, like Gamble emphasises the strategic nature of the Thatcher project (Jessop 
et al 1988). However the emphasis which he places on the project as an alliance of 
capitalist interests does not sit well with the European controversy. Jessop argues 
that the Thatcher project responded to the interest of the City of London in relation 
to deregulation, to the Treasury's desire to control public expenditure and to the 
CBI's desire to tame trade union power (Jessop et al 1988: 77). 
However in the context of the dispute over the single currency, it is difficult to see 
a nexus of economic interests which are served by the growing hostility of many 
Conservatives to European integration. Indeed big business shows signs of great 
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nervousness about the trend in Conservative European policy. Jessop's analysis 
gives too little weight to the ideological factors which influence Conservative 
policymaking in his emphasis on how Thatcherism responded to structural changes 
in the global capitalist economy. 
Jessop and his co-contributors rightly note the attachment that the Thatcher 
Government had to the Atlanticist foreign policy tradition but they do not outline 
the reasons for this connection. The absence of this discussion is a deficiency in the 
context of any appraisal of the 1990s European controversy. 
Jacques and Hall like Gamble, argue that Thatcherism was a coherent strategic 
project (Jacques and Hall 1983). However these two authors focus more on the 
politics of support dimension than Gamble's study. They outline how Thatcher 
articulated an `authoritarian rightist' appeal to the British electorate. They argue that 
the constituent elements in this appeal were a stress on the nation, patriotism and 
free enterprise. Even though the authors identify the nation as one of these 
elements, they do not expand on whether the appeal to the nation was made with 
reference to cultural minorities in Britain or to the expanding influence of the 
European Union. The fact that the authors do not elaborate on whether this 
authoritarian rightism was made with respect to internal or external reference points 
is unsurprising given the low saliency of Europe in Conserative elite debates at the 
time when Jacques and Hall published their study. 
Marsh and Rhodes focused on how Thatcherite policies were actually put into 
practice and not just on the conception and proclamation of these policies. Marsh 
and Rhodes' focus on policy outcomes is designed to critically assess the familiar 
proposition of the Thatcher Governments as radical ideologically driven 
administrations. They argue that the extent to which Thatcherite policy goals were 
achieved was dependent upon key factors such as the opposition or compliance of 
interest groups and `street-level' officials. Marsh and Rhodes' emphasis on the 
extent to which policy goals were actually achieved is highly relevant to European 
policy given the resistance which the Conservatives faced in this area. However the 
study understates the degree of resistance which the Conservatives encountered in 
this policy area. 
John Peterson's contribution to the Marsh and Rhodes study acknowledges that 
there was a clear and consistent Tory European strategy which pressed for the 
adoption of free markets and reduced budgetary contributions in the European 
Union (Peterson 1992: 153). However Peterson does not take this analysis further 
by highlighting that the European Union's social dimension and the policies pursued 
by other EU states were an impediment to the Thatcher economic project. 
Peterson greatly underestimates the internal Conservative Party cross-pressures on 
European policy because his piece predates the long struggle over Maastricht 
ratification. Peterson argues that Thatcher's approach to the EU in the late 1980s 
began to marginalise her within the parliamentary party. However subsequent 
events in the 1990s showed that although Thatcher fell from power she. began to 
develop a large and growing constituency of opinion in the parliamentary party. 
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David Marsh also reviewed previous secondary accounts of Thatcherism, such as 
those of Gamble and Jessop. Marsh outlined a typology of these different accounts 
(Marsh 1995). He divided secondary accounts into political accounts, which 
emphasised the strategic nature of the Thatcherite project; economic accounts, 
which saw Thatcherism as a response to an economic crisis and ideological 
accounts, which stressed the role of New Right ideology in the Thatcher 
Governments. 
Marsh focuses on sectoral policy case studies, like labour market reform and 
privatisation, to support his argument that Thatcherism was influenced by pragmatic 
as well as ideological considerations. A key pragmatic consideration which he 
identifies is the leadership's desire for re-election of the Conservative Party (Marsh 
1995: 608). 
Marsh's analysis did not contribute to the typology of Conservative European 
divisions for two reasons. Firstly, Marsh does not discuss European policy in either 
his case studies or as a major factor in assessing the record of the Thatcher 
Governments. This is a significant omission because the Conservative discourse 
over Europe is highly ideological in tone and substance, as has been mentioned 
above. Europe is also a major policy issue which would seem to contradict one of 
Marsh's central arguments in his study. The factionalism which developed within 
the Conservative Party on Europe clearly damaged the party electorally, even 
though Marsh places great emphasis on electoral considerations in the party's 
leadership's approach to policy change. 
An assessment of both primary and secondary accounts of the European controversy 
identifies three core disputes involved in the European controversy: the role of 
nationhood ideology in opposition to European integration; the relationship between 
Britain and the United States and the threat posed to the Thatcherite economic 
project by the dominance within the EU of a different model of capitalism. These 
disputes have reshaped alignments within the parliamentary party and form the core 
of the analytical framework used to construct a typology of the Tory Party's 
divisions over Europe. 
Assessing Earlier Typologies of the Conservative Parliamentary Party 
The extent to which the disputes discussed in the above section realigned the 
parliamentary party can be assessed with reference to typologies of the Conservative 
Party which were written prior to the 1988-94 period. This comparison shows the 
differences in the Tory European debate in earlier periods. 
Previous typologies of the Conservative parliamentary party's European divisions 
were constructed in order to create analytical frameworks to evaluate the 
Conservative European divisions which existed long before the 1988 Hanover 
summit. Ashford's predates Gamble's typology and focused on the divisions which 
took place on the issue of British membership of the EEC in the 1970s. Ashford's 
typology (Ashford 1980: 110-12) has now been superceded by the integrationist 
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developments in the 1990s. Philip Norton's typology emphasises the conflict within 
the party over the role of the state but does not take into account the extent to which 
European integration became integral to this conflict after 1988. 
Ashford argued that there were three groupings within the parliamentary party on 
the European issue. There were federalists, confederalists and anti-marketeers. 
Ashford identified the federalists as those involved in the postwar movement for 
European unity. The federalists supported moves towards political integration, such 
as greater powers for the European Parliament. 
Ashford argued that the confederalist grouping represented the majority opinion in 
the parliamentary party. They were supportive of membership but opposed further 
integration. Ashford locates Margaret Thatcher in this grouping. Finally, he 
identifies the anti-marketeers, whose influence he argues was waning in the late 
1970s. The latter group opposed Britain's membership and committed themselves to 
fighting an extension of European policy competence. 
Ashford's original typology has been rendered substantially irrelevant by the new 
dynamics of the post-1988 European controversy. Ashford's typology is centred 
around the ideological dynamics created by British accession to the EU. However 
by the later period of 1988-94 the key issue was the divisions over further 
integration and not the issue of membership itself. Thatcher and her allies are 
fighting for a particular conception of Europe against the Kohl/Mitterand conception 
which drove developments after 1988. Thatcher and her followers did not set out to 
on a secessionist road but initially focused on prospective developments like 
monetary union. It was only later that Thatcher and some of her supporters shifted 
towards serious consideration of the secessionist option. 
Many of Ashford's confederalists are now not only opposed to further integration 
but wish to repatriate power from the European Union and reassert Westminster 
policy independence in a number of areas. The individuals in the confederalist 
grouping have now made common cause with the older generation of diehard anti- 
marketeers, like Teddy Taylor and Richard Body. 
Ashford's federalist category is also problematic. Many pro-European 
Conservatives, such as Kenneth Clarke reject the label `federalist'. Only Sir Edward 
Heath and Hugh Dykes openly advocate the idealist conception of a `United States 
of Europe' in the modern Tory party. 
The context which has informed the post-1988 controversy was the interaction 
between the ideological perspectives within the Tory party contributed to by 
Thatcher's leadership and the external integrationist drive led by the French and 
German Governments. This interaction has created a new breed of pro-Europeans, 
as well as being a key influence on the growing hostility of many of Thatcher's 
disciples to the European Union. 
Andrew Gamble's typology is a more recent study than Ashford's but it was still 
written quite early in the development of the post-1988 European controversy. 
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Gamble had previously used a two strand typology (Gamble 1988). Gamble's 
typology saw Conservatism as incorporating a free market and interventionist 
traditions. In his 1990 study Gamble revised his view and identifies four groupings; 
the neo-liberals, the Atlanticists, federalists and isolationists, brought into being by 
the European issue (Gamble 1990). Like Ashford, Gamble mistakenly uses the 
federalist label to describe mainstream pro-European Conservatives like Michael 
Heseltine. He also places. Nigel Lawson in this grouping, even though Lawson 
opposes monetary union. 
Philip Norton provided a typology of the Conservative parliamentary party before 
the development of the European controversy. Norton's typology is based on the 
issue of the role of the state in the economy. He identified a "Thatcherite" grouping 
of neo-liberals, populists and the moral right. He also argued that there was a more 
interventionist tendency within the parliamentary party, consisting of "wets and 
damps". These Tories favoured a more interventionist role for the state in the 
economy and were more supportive of the public sectors (Norton 1990). 
Norton's analysis drew from the fact that Thatcherite grouping was broadly united 
on policies like labour market reform, privatisation and the monetarist experiment, 
in the 1979- 88 period. However the primary evidence has shown that the 
Thatcherites split over Europe in the post-1988 period. Norton's emphasis on the 
role of the state in Tory disputes also did not take fully into account the external 
factor of the European industrial and social model, discussed in the above section. 
David Baker, Andrew Gamble and Steve Ludlam developed a typology which 
incorporates both the domestic conflict over the role of the state in the economy 
with the external issue of European integration (Baker et al 1993). By placing 
European integration alongside the statist conflict, they were able to show how and 
why the Thatcherite grouping divided on Europe. However their analysis does not 
give sufficient weight to the role of the Anglo-American alliance as a core dispute in 
the European controversy. This is a significant omission as Atlanticism incorporates 
both economic and foreign policy dimensions to the Tory European conflict, as has 
been noted above. 
Introducing A New Typ 14ogy 
The assessment of primary and secondary accounts of the European controversy 
between 1988-94 has shown that the core disputes of nationhood, Atlanticism and 
free market economics developed as a result of the post-1988 integrationist direction 
of the EU. A re-evaluation of previous academic Conservative typologies has shown 
that these studies do not sufficiently take into account these dynamics because they 
were written before the 1988-94 period. 
The typology outlined below shows how distinct groupings have emerged within the 
parliamentary party as a result of these core disputes. This typology is not designed 
to be a comprehensive estimation of the dimensions of support which each grouping 
enjoys within the parliamentary party. Instead the typology is presented in order to 
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show how Tory MPs have clustered around particular viewpoints on European 
integration as a result of the development of these disputes. 
These viewpoints can be expressed as three clear categories within the 
parliamentary party. The typology describes these categories in detail and identifies 
key Tory politicians who are identified with the three groupings, in order to 
illustrate the key groupings. The three groupings are: Thatcherite Nationalists, Neo- 
Liberal Integrationists and Interventionist Integrationists. 
The Thatcherite Nationalists 
These Conservatives oppose European integration because they see it as a threat to 
domestic free market reforms. They also see European federalism as a threat to the 
Anglo-American alliance; to traditional Tory conceptions of British nationhood and 
the executive autonomy of the British state. The overwhelming number of this 
grouping are Thatcherite Tories. The Nationalists have appropriated the party 
leadership's multi-speed/multi-track rhetoric in order to advocate a separate "track" 
for Britain within the EU. This track would entail only membership of a free trade 
area. Some of their number are contemplating the option of total withdrawal from 
the EU if other member states do not accommodate their policy demands. 
Membership 
These Tories represent the bulk of the Euro-rebels and a big majority of those who 
identified themselves with Margaret Thatcher's leadership of the party. They 
include her closest personal allies, such as Tebbit, Parkinson and John 
Whittingdale, her former Political Secretary. The core of the Euro-rebels are 
members of the parliamentary Fresh Start Group. Fresh Start have 50 members, 
this correlates with the 46 Tory MPs who voted against the Third Reading of the 
Maastricht bill. 
An outer tier of their membership is active in The European Research Group. These 
MPs produced what was in effect a European manifesto. Research Group MPs were 
not in the main dissidents during the Maastricht bill's passage. They include Sir 
Nicholas Bonsor, Dame Angela Rumbold and Alan Duncan. The existence of this 
wider grouping indicates the deeper level of support for rebel positions on the 
backbenches. 
The nationalists draw a large recruitment from Thatcherite lobby groups within the 
parliamentary party, such as the No Turning Back Group and the 92 Group. 
Michael Spicer MP's anti-Maastricht EDM on 3 June 1992 and Kenneth Baker's 
EDM contained many of these MPs, such as Neil Hamilton, Bernard Jenkin and 
John Whittingdale. Fifty-eight Tories signed both EDMs, indicating the cohesion of 
this grouping over a two and a half year period. External anti-federalist groups, 
such as The European Foundation, set up by prominent rebel, Bill Cash and the 
Campaign for an Independent Britain are also involved with the nationalists. 
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Cabinet ministers, Michael Portillo and Peter Lilley are also strongly identified with 
this grouping. 
Doctrine 
Economically, they are the mirror image of the Tribunite Labour Left who opposed 
EEC entry in the 1970s. Just as the Labour Left saw the Community as a threat to 
their domestic economic ambitions, so the Thatcherites fear that European 
interventionist policies will threaten the deregulated supply side regime which they 
have created in Britain. By making Europe an issue related to her domestic 
revolution, Thatcher successfully co-opted the bulk of the Thatcherites in her 
crusade against a federal Europe (Letwin 1992: 300). Thatcher famously raised this 
spectre in a passage in her Bruges speech: 
We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain only to see them reimposed at 
the European level, with a European superstate exercising a new dominance from Brussels (Thatcher 
1988). 
On monetary policy, most of the nationalists are opponents of fixed exchange rates 
as well as a single currency. Tories like Nick Budgen and Ian Hamilton are as 
opposed to government intervention in the currency markets as they are to state 
intervention in industrial affairs. They believe in a "free-floating" pound. Within 
this group however, there are Tories like Lawson, who take a less doctrinal 
approach. They see fixed exchange rates as a legitimate means to offset the short 
term destabilising effects of deregulated capital markets. Lawson's position evolved 
away from the classical monetarism advocated by Thatcher and Sir Alan Walters. 
Most of the nationalists agree with Bernard Jenkin MP that an internal monetary 
discipline is the only acceptable policy (Jenkin 1994). 
For Thatcher, Cash and their allies, monetary policy and the right to issue national 
coinage is integral to nationhood and national sovereignty. For them, the 
proclamation of monetary union at the 1988 Hanover summit was a major turning 
point in the EU's development. They argue that the economic case for EMU is 
fraudulent and that a single currency is really a device to secure a European 
Government. Opposition to EMU is the issue which unites all of these Tories, who 
regard it as a constitutional outrage. Their position on EMU would appear to have 
majority support in the parliamentary party. The Sheffield survey found that a 
majority of backbench MPs agreed with the statement: The establishment of a single 
EU currency would signal the end of the UK as a sovereign nation (Baker et al 
1994: 7). 
The nationalists wish to repatriate power back to the Westminster Parliament. They 
would refashion British membership of the EU into simple membership of the single 
market. The European Research Group proposed that the supremacy of British law 
should be reasserted over a whole range of areas currently within the EU's 
competence, such as agriculture. Michael Spicer's group have also adopted the 
leadership's multi-track/multi-speed rhetoric, in order to argue that the EU should 
be "unbundled" into separate policy tracks (see previous chapter). Member states 
would then be free to opt-in or out of involvement in each policy area. 
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In foreign policy, there is the clearest link between the record of the Thatcher 
Government and the nationalists' opposition to European integration. This group are 
Atlanticists who believe that America has an indispensable leadership role in 
international relations. They fear that a federal Europe would sever the security tie 
with the US. Thatcher expressed this Atlanticist view in her Aspen speech. 
The Pro-Europeans 
The Tory pro-Europeans incorporate two originally quite distinct streams in the 
party. Some were previously critics of the Thatcher project, whilst others were 
strong supporters of Thatcherism. The two categories outlined below indicate the 
different ideological backgrounds of Conservative pro-Europeans. Despite these 
different starting points, the party's pro-Europeans have united around key 
economic and foreign policy arguments in the European controversy and worked 
within the same factional organisations. 
Neo-Liberal Integrationists 
This grouping consisted mainly of Tories who broke with their former allies in the 
Thatcherite grouping. They see European integration and especially EMU as an 
opportunity to enhance the free market project rather than a threat to it. They 
believe that economic globalisation places great constraints on the effectiveness of 
national governments. The integrationists believe that European unity will actually 
augment Britain's diplomatic influence and economic effectiveness. 
Membership 
The parliamentary Positive Europeans and the Action Centre for Europe have a 
common membership consisting of Tory MPs like Ray Whitney, Edwina Currie and 
Quentin Davies. This group also includes monetarists like Sir Peter Hordern. Ian 
Taylor is also a leading integrationist minister. Two Tories who "went native", in 
Thatcher's phrase, as European Commissioners - Lord Cockfield and Sir Leon 
Brittan - are also neo-liberal integrationists. 
Doctrine 
On supply-side issues neo-liberal integrationists are just as opposed to 
interventionist economics as the nationalists. These Tories also support the 
Government's opt-out from the social chapter of the Maastricht treaty and advocate 
labour market deregulation. It is on monetary policy that they sharply diverge from 
the nationalist group. 
Previously pro-European Tories were often wet domestic critics of Thatcherism. 
However this new pro-European grouping have clearly free market credentials. 
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John Stevens MEP notes that the new breed of pro-Europeans have adopted hard 
money arguments very different from the policies advocated by the Tory wets 
(Stevens 1994). For example Sir Peter Hordern advocates EMU because it would 
preclude further devaluations and be a constraint on excessive government 
borrowing. Anthony Teasdale, Special Adviser to Lord Howe 1988-90, has referred 
to the "monetarisation of the Tory pro-Europeans" (Teasdale 1994). 
Neo-liberal integrationists believe that the single market would function more 
effectively with a single currency. They also believe that a European Central Bank 
would pursue a more effective anti-inflationary policy than Britain's past efforts at 
internal monetary discipline. They disassociate themselves from the idealist goal of 
a united Europe and claim that a single currency is necessary solely for economic 
reasons. Kenneth Clarke has argued that British membership of a single currency 
need not lead to political union (Financial Times 10/2/95). 
Neo-liberal integrationists are more sceptical about America's ability or willingness 
to maintain a global leadership role. Integrationists believe that Europe must 
intensify its efforts to collaborate in defence and foreign policy matters. 
Geoffrey Howe's Advocacy of European Integration 
Lord Howe of Aberavon, Chancellor of the Exchequer 1979-83 and Foreign 
Secretary 1983-89, is the patriarch figure of this grouping. He is now President of 
the Advisory Council of ACE. Howe has been the key articulator of pro-European 
arguments in the party. Howe's arguments deserve particular attention because they 
indicate why the split in the Thatcherite grouping took place as a result of European 
integration. Howe has put forward four key positions on Europe. 
He has made a public interest case that national politicians have to reconcile 
themselves to the constraints of economic interdependence. Secondly, he rejects the 
argument that there are cultural impediments to integration and the single currency. 
He contests the ideological legitimacy of the nationalists as the heirs to the "radical 
manifesto" which underpinned the Heath and Thatcher Governments. Finally, Howe 
makes a free market case for EMU. 
Central to Howe's view is that sovereignty is not an absolute which is either held or 
surrendered. He rejects the Powellite conception of sovereignty and instead 
emphasises how sovereignty is deployed or qualified by economic and diplomatic 
imperatives. In a 1990 lecture Howe insisted that sovereignty was not like virginity, 
which you either had or you had not (Howe 1990: 679). Instead he stressed that the 
increasing integration of the financial markets and general global economic 
interdependence place constraints on what any "sovereign" government can achieve. 
Britain has become ever more dependent on an economic system that lies beyond our immediate 
control. It is that which should have dictated our early entry into the exchange rate mechanism (HC 
Debates, 19/12/91, Vol. 201, Col 511). 
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Tories like Howe, Brittan and former European Commissioner Lord Cockfield, 
believe that in a deregulated financial market, floating exchange rates and an 
internal monetary discipline have now become ineffective and undesirable. Howe 
has argued that financial market sovereignty renders his earlier monetarist policies 
almost obsolete. In the 1994 Rede Lecture, Howe cites the former chairman of 
Citibank to press home this point: 
Listen again to Walter Wriston: "How can a national government control, or even measure, the 
money supply, when the markets create new financial instruments faster than the regulators can keep 
track of them? " (Howe 1994: 7). 
Howe is less concerned with the de jure independence of national governments than 
securing de facto control over events. He takes an instrumental approach to 
sovereignty, asking, What will ceding sovereignty actually achieve? Integrationist 
Tories believe that a single currency would re-empower national governments 
because it would end the dominance of the deutschmark in the currency markets, 
enabling other member states to regain monetary sovereignty: 
The point about the European market is its fundamental interdependence.... We have a choice at this 
point and crossroads in our history of having a Deutschmark-dominated continent, where all 
European currencies are at the whim of the Mark, or a truly independent currency with a truly 
independent central bank operating in the interests of all European economies (Tim Devlin MP in HC 
Debates, 18/1/93, Vol. 201, Col. 127). 
Howe contests the importance which Thatcherites attach to a cultural homogeneity 
as the basis for democratic government. Indeed Howe has argued that multinational 
federations can exist cohesively and without leading to instability (Howe 1994: 17). 
The nationalists' reverence for the nation as the basis for legitimacy divides them 
from the integrationists who believe that sovereignty must adapt itself to the 
dynamic of the free market. In the 1994 Rede lecture he went further and argued 
that seeking to tie political authority to culturally and ethnically homogeneous units 
could be dangerous. He cites the unhappy legacy of President Wilson's self- 
determination policy as a historical precedent (Howe 1994: 13). 
Howe is aware that the nationalists' most resonant appeal to the Tory Party is that 
of nationhood. He seeks to distinguish between two variants of this patriotic 
sentiment and implicitly argues that Thatcher represents a malignant strain of 
patriotism: 
Patriotism I take to be the genuine love and pride in one's country, its history, its culture, its 
traditions. It is a wholly legitimate, indeed advisable component of the human 
personality ... Nationalism on the other 
hand is the perversion of this love and pride of one's own 
country into hatred and contempt for others... Unlike patriotism, which can easily respect and 
understand the patriotism of another, nationalism is a creed of competition and exclusivity (Howe 
1994: 20-21). 
Howe argues that after 1988, Thatcher allowed herself to be seduced by a 
nationalist temptation and that temperamentally she has never been able to 
understand and engage with other people's patriotisms. He cites this attitude as 
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evident in Thatcher's retrospective regret about the Anglo-Irish agreement recorded 
in her memoirs (Howe 1994a). 
Given the fact that he has broken with his former Thatcherite allies, like Thatcher 
and Ridley, Howe is keen to show that it is he and not they who have remained 
consistent to what he calls, "the radical manifesto". He argues that the antecedents 
and much of the intellectual inspiration for the Heath and Thatcher Governments 
was prepared by the ferment of the Crossbow publication of the Tory Bow Group. 
in the early 1960s. Howe was editor of Crossbow. In a speech to the Radical 
Society in 1989, Howe argued that Crossbow marked a turning point in the anti- 
Fabian revolution (Howe 1989: 14). 
The contributors to the journal settled on the dual themes of free market economics 
and post-imperial internationalism. Howe's claim to consistency is made by his 
insistence that the free market element of the neo-liberal programme was 
inseparable from an internationalist commitment. Howe cites a number of aspiring 
Crossbow contributors like John Biffen, Patrick Jenkin, Leon Brittan and David 
Howell, who were later to play a leading role in the Thatcher Government. He says 
that we wanted Britain to adjust to its new position in the world, by casting off the 
habits of Empire (Howe 1989; 20). Howe strongly argues that Europe was integral 
to this post-imperial reorientation (Howe 1994a). Therefore he claims that the 
nationalists reneged on the earlier internationalist principles of the radical 
manifesto. Howe argues that one of the reasons for the repudiation of 
internationalism by so many Thatcherites is because of a personal following for 
Lady Thatcher (Howe 1994a). 
Howe advocates EMU as an enhancement of the free market achievements of the 
single market. After his period at the Treasury, Howe became convinced of the 
advantages of using first the ERM and then EMU to secure currency stability. 
Howe argues that without a single currency Europe will not be able to enjoy the 
same advantages as the US does within its own single market. 
Howe has also spoken of the dangers of Britain "limping in afterwards" if other EU 
states form a single currency (Howe 1994a). Francis Maude argues that Howe and 
other pro-Europeans actually desire federal union and are attempting to marshall 
arguments to support this preferred outcome. Maude refers to the dispute over the 
City of London's position in relation to EMU to illustrate his point. He argues that 
the pro-Europeans who insist that the City would be less successful outside a single 
currency zone, are striving to make the best case for the "federalist" outcome which 
they want to achieve (Maude 1994). Howe rejects the charge that his arguments 
about economic interdependence are merely a presentational device to justify his 
commitment to federalism: 
No. Please don't attribute to me the desire for a united "Federal Europe" that overrides anything 
else, because once you do that you introduce a doctrinal objective quite alien to my thinking (Howe 
1994a). 
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Howe resists the federalist label and insists that his objective is to ensure that 
Britain remains part of the European enterprise and therefore able to influence the 
direction of the EU. In his resignation statement, Howe appealed to his party to 
view European integration from the same pragmatic perspective which was decisive 
in Harold Macmillan's acceptance of British membership. Macmillan feared that if 
Britain remained outside the EEC then she would lose diplomatic stature with the 
US and have no say in matters which affected vital British interests. It is this 
realpolitik attitude which the pro-Europeans believe is their most compelling 
argument. Howe deployed this argument in respect of the single currency. He drew 
a parallel between a British opt-out from EMU and the consequences of Britain's 
failure to join the EEC at its inception in his resignation speech: 
The real threat is that of ourselves with no say in the monetary arrangements that the rest of Europe 
chooses for itself, with Britain once again scrambling to join the club later, after the rules have been 
set (HC Debates, 13/11/90, Vol. 180, Col. 464). 
Howe is most vulnerable to the charge of inconsistency in his advocacy of European 
integration since his time in the Heath Government to his departure from the 
Foreign Office. As Solicitor General in 1972 Howe said during the passage of the 
European Communities Bill that "the ultimate supremacy of Parliament will not be 
affected" (Col. 338, Vol. 96 Hansard). Not only is this assertion flatly contradicted 
by the legislative impact of EU membership but it is also contrary to his subsequent 
reflection on the implications of accession. 
In an article in The Financial Times before the Maastricht IGC, Howe said that 
Community membership did not mean the acceptance of a "static set of propositions 
but a process". Yet the undertaking quoted above which he gave as Solicitor 
General, promised Tory MPs just such a static situation. Howe and other ministers 
in Heath's Cabinet could not risk presenting European membership as a dynamic 
process for fear that the party would reject it. Howe denies any inconsistency in his 
advocacy of European policy. He concedes that there was some reluctance on the 
part of the leadership to share with the public the arguments about sovereignty. 
However he says that these were very well expressed in the 1961 Macmillan 
Conservative Political Centre pamphlet (Howe 1994a). 
Interventionist-Integrationists 
These are the Tories who most closely conform to the older factional groupings of 
the 1980s. The interventionist integrationists were originally "wet" critics of 
Thatcherism and represent an older generation of Tory parliamentarians. They have 
now made common cause with the neo-liberal integrationists in order to resist the 
influence of the Thatcherite nationalists. 
Leading Tories like Ian Gilmour, Tristan Garel-Jones, David Hunt and Sir Edward 
Heath are examples of this grouping. On the backbenches, Hugh Dykes and Andrew 
Rowe are examples of the Tory pro-European Left. This group predominates in the 
Conservative group in the European Parliament. Thatcher herself refered to Tory 
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MEPs as the "residue of Heathism" (Thatcher 1993: 749). Interventionist 
integrationists are more associated with The Conservative Group for Europe and the 
long-standing wet lobby, The Tory Reform Group than their neo-liberal 
integrationist allies. 
Bill Newton Dunn, former Chairman of the Tory MEPs, is representative of these 
Tories. Newton Dunn has said that because the UK does not have proportional 
representation he is forced to be in the same party as the anti-federalist Bill Cash 
(Newton Dunn 1994). Nineteen of the fifty-two Tory MPs who signed the Positive 
Europe group statement on 2 February 1995 can be identified as wet or damp 
Tories according to Philip Norton's typology of Conservative parliamentarians 
(Norton 1990). The signatories also indicate that many of these Tories are older 
MPs, who entered the Commons in the early 1970s. 
Doctrine 
These Conservatives are more sympathetic to the public sector provision and in the 
1980s many of them were critical of Margaret Thatcher's rejection of an industrial 
policy. Some of these Tories resemble continental Christian Democrats in their 
views. A few even dissent from the overwhelming opposition to the social chapter 
of the Maastricht treaty in the parliamentary party. In general, though, the 
interventionists-integrationists agree with the neo-liberal-integrationists on the need 
for a Europeanist foreign policy and the desirability of monetary union. 
Michael Heseltine was once identified with this grouping before his later shift to the 
right on supply-side issues. During his period in the wilderness in the late 1980s, 
preparing for his leadership challenge, Heseltine advanced arguments which were 
representative of the sentiments of many interventionist integrationists. He made 
favourable comparisons between the more collaborative industrial relations 
framework operating in France and Germany and the British system (Heseltine 
1989). He also supported a European industrial strategy to develop Europe as a 
distinct trading area vis-a-vis Asia and North America and advocated a strategy 
more on the Franco-German economic model or what Albert has called "Rhine 
capitalism" (Albert 1992). Heseltine used Europe as another strategic point to 
reinforce his case for more interventionist economic policies. 
The Leadership's European Strategy 
John Major was not identified with any of the these party groupings. He 
deliberately sought to articulate a `middle-position' on European integration, in 
order to hold the party together. Major had very little enthusiasm for further 
European integration even if it had not entailed internal party conflicts. He did not 
identify at all with the Monnet-inspired idealist desire for a united Europe. However 
Major believed that the European institutions can play a useful part in defending 
Britain's commercial interests. In general terms, Major was hostile to further 
European integration but was not prepared to contemplate British withdrawal from 
the EU. 
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Although Major would not have instigated the drive towards monetary and political 
union his fundamental instinct is for Britain to negotiate from within the EU so 
Britain can influence new institutions and policies. It is for this reason that Major 
did not veto the Maastricht treaty's provisions for EMU. Instead he ensured that if 
the project took place then it would do so on terms more amenable to Britain. By 
"staying on the European train, " to use Lord Howe's famous phrase, Major was 
able to secure the inclusion of strict convergence criteria for establishing a single 
currency. The criteria reflected traditional Tory objectives of low inflation and 
sound finance. 
Politically, John Major's primary goal was to prevent a Tory split (Lawson 1992: 
1013). The earlier section of this chapter showed that Major belonged to the 
consensualist model of Tory leadership on foreign economic policy. A leading pro- 
European says that Major told him in 1989 of his fears that the Tory Party could 
split over Europe (Interview 1994a). Lawson argued that the Tory Party must be led 
from the centre of the European ideological spectrum (Lawson 1992: 923). The 
EMU opt-out is the best example of Major's party management approach to 
European policy. It enabled the leadership to defer the evil day of decision on 
British participation. 
The key issue pushed by the leadership, upon which the Tories are united, is the 
social dimension. A Sheffield University survey shows that only 3% of Tory MPs 
oppose the British social chapter opt-out (Baker, Fountain, Gamble and Ludlam 
1994: 5). Major and Hurd have been unstinting in their doctrinal opposition to the 
social chapter of the Maastricht treaty and have urged the EU to adopt British style 
labour market deregulation. 
The proactive initiative championed by the leadership has been the enlargement of 
the EU, in the short term to incorporate the Scandinavian countries and in the 
longer term, to encompass the old Eastern bloc. Major reiterated his belief that the 
EU should concentrate on widening its membership in order to underpin Eastern 
European free market reforms. He accused other governments of introspection when 
the Community needed to grapple with the problems of Eastern Europe. 
A key motivation behind Major and Hurd's support for enlargement was an 
expectation that the new entrants would become allies for Britain against a further 
deepening of the Community. The leadership clearly hoped that in the post- 
enlargement EU, there would be opportunities for Britain to form new alliances or 
issue-based combinations which will make the Franco-German axis less central than 
it was in the 1988-92 period. 
Conclusion 
The typology and the chronology of events in the European controversy show that 
three key ideological disputes have arisen in the party as a result of the acceleration 
of European integration in the late 1980s. The following chapters will show in detail 
how these disputes developed. The thesis will also show how these disputes have 
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been influenced by older foreign policy and economic policy tensions within the 
party. 
The typology showed that intensified European integration is seen by the 
Thatcherite nationalists as an assault on the Tory tradition of celebrating 
nationhood. The nationalist determination to defend nationhood is influenced by its 
past role in electoral strategy. European integration also conflicts with the globalist 
conception of nationhood which Tory leaders promoted earlier in this century. This 
dispute over nationhood will be discussed in chapter three. 
The typology identifies EMU as the decisive factor in the split within the old 
Thatcherite grouping. The neo-liberal integrationists led the way in arguing that 
monetary union could offer a more effective economic discipline than the Thatcher 
Governments attempts at economic management during the 1980s. The nationalists 
believe that EMU could never command popular legitimacy. They also see a direct 
conflict between dirigiste European industrial policies and Thatcherite deregulation. 
The conflict over economic policy will be discussed in chapter six. 
Moves towards European unity are seen by nationalists as a threat to their support 
for the Anglo-American alliance. Whereas both pro-European groupings wish to 
shift away from Atlanticism towards a more Europeanist foreign policy. The core 
foreign policy dispute identified by the typology will be discussed in more detail in 
chapter four. 
The Thatcherite Nationalists also see the integrationist dynamics within the EU 
institutions as a threat to their limited conception of a free trading Europe. Pro- 
European Conservatives however see the EU institutions as supportive of British 
objectives, like the single market. 
The three categories which have been identified in this typology have emerged 
through the development of these conflicts over foreign policy, Thatcherite 
economics, the European institutions and nationhood. Two of these categories - the 
interventionist integrationists and the neo-liberal integrationists, have converged in 
the course of these conflicts. The most significant area of convergence between 
these two categories is the monetary union issue. 
The following chapter will also place European integration within the context of 
recurring Tory conflicts over sovereignty in British foreign economic policy. The 
chapter will show how traumatic sovereignty questions have been for the 
Conservtives. This chapter will also show how the events of the 1988-94 period 
shaped the development of the European controversy. This chapter's chronology of 
the European controversy will identify the key events which brought the Tory 
European groupings into being. It will also show how the disputes developed such 
an intensity that sustained and uncompromising dissidence took place within the 
parliamentary party. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Indeed one day somebody will write the history of the Conservative Party in terms of its disruption by 
economic controversy, from the Corn Laws in the last century to Empire Free Trade in the early part 
of this century and fixed versus floating exchange rates in our own time. (Lawson 1992 p. 420). 
One of the most effective backbench campaigns of modern times (Philip Webster in The Times 
23/7/93) 
Initially regarded by the Whips as a sort of Dad's Army of misfits, we soon formed as disciplined a 
taskforce as any SAS brigade (Teresa Gorman MP on the Euro-rebels in The Bastards 1993). 
The recent factionalism within the Conservative Party provoked by European 
integration can be placed witin an older tradition of Conservative conflicts over 
foreign economic policy. The Conservatives have engaged in conflicts over 
sovereignty in foreign economic policy. This chapter will show that these conflicts 
have led to divisions and even splits. In these situations the party leadership has 
adopted either a doctrinal or a consensual role. Major attempted to manage the 
European dispute using consensual tactics. 
This chapter will also show how the key groupings on the European issue emerged 
and the developments which formed the basis for their discourse. This chapter will 
show that the new integrative phase which began in 1988 with the publication of the 
Delors report and the Social Charter, brought the Thatcherite Nationalists into 
being. The chapter will also show that the Bruges speech laid out the central themes 
for the Thatcherite Nationalists' position, in relation to the United States, the 
defence of British deregulation and national identity. 
The chapter shows how the single currency provoked a split in the old Thatcherite 
faction with the Neo-Liberal Integrationist Conservatives giving support to 
European monetary disciplines. The chapter shows how the course of events in the 
European controversy, such as the protracted ratification of the Maastricht treaty, 
reinforced the identities of both the Thatcherite Nationalists and pro-European 
Conservatives. 
Europe and Foreign Economic Policy 
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Foreign economic policy refers to the political and economic strategy pursued by 
Britain in relation to other countries in the world economy. This is not confined to 
trading policy but encapsulates the broader political institutions which British 
politicians must consider in forging Britain's relationship with other states. 
Britain's foreign economic policy towards the US after the war centred on GATT 
and Bretton Woods. The Conservative Party has been continuously disrupted by 
structural changes affecting British foreign economic policy (Baker, Gamble and 
Ludlam 1993: 11). These structural changes have forced the party to confront 
traumatic choices about foreign economic policy at a series of strategic points in 
Conservative history. The conflict over European integration is the latest and most 
recent manifestation of this tradition. Structural changes effecting foreign economic 
policy are closely bound up with Britain's relative economic decline. 
The foreign economic policy conflicts which have convulsed the Conservative 
Party, come into two broad categories. Firstly there is a series of containable 
flashpoints on single issues where the party leadership is forced to take defensive 
initiatives which diminsh British power but to which its backbenchers find it hard 
to reconcile themselves. The best examples are the Rhodesian crisis, the Lend-Lease 
agreement and the Indian Bill in 1935 (Baker, Gamble and Ludlam 1993: 10). 
Of more importance are the regime changes which have much more comprehensive 
and far reaching implications for the British foreign economic policy. The instances 
which fit into this category are the 1846 abandonment of protection, the 1903 
dispute over tariff reform and the Macmillan/Heath applications to the EC. In each 
of these cases Conservative leaders grappled with managing the political 
consequences of fundamental structural changes in foreign economic policy, within 
the party. Here Conservative leaders have attempted to institutionalise new foreign 
economic policy regimes. Baker, Gamble and Ludlam argue that Tory conflicts in 
foreign economic policy in this latter category are driven by the choice between a 
reassertion of national sovereignty and an acceptance of greater internationalisation 
in British foreign economic policy (Baker, Gamble and Ludlam 1993). The 
controversy over European integration in the 1990s is the latest manifestation of this 
conflict over sovereignty in foreign economic policy. 
The party management of Conservative leaders attempting to institutionalise new 
regimes conform to two models of behaviour. The first model is accommodationist, 
where the party leader attempts to coax Conservative MPs into acquiescence with 
new structural realities. The leader will endeavour not to confront his MPs with the 
fundamental nature of the change of regime and will even seek to downplay its 
significance. These leaders place a premium above all on party unity as the essential 
prerequisite to driving through regime change. 
The other model of party management is more combative and challenging. The 
"doctrinal model" of leadership strategy does not seek to conciliate in the face of 
divisions which result from his or her initiatives. These leaders did not seek to 
fudge the extent of political change which they advocated but bluntly presented the 
party with the issue as a major point of departure for British foreign economic 
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policy. This style of party management is inevitably more likely to produce bitter 
rifts inside the party as the leaders themselves become partisans on one side of the 
argument, refusing to mediate between party factions. 
Sir Robert Peel's abandonment of the agricultural protectionist regime in 1846 
produced a major party split and a political realignment. Even today this is cited by 
Tory leaders, like Douglas Hurd, as the nightmare scenario, which could result 
from the party's current divisions. The intensity of the arguments over the Corn 
Laws occured because Peel adopted the doctrinal style of party managment. He 
made no effort to spare the party from the stark choice presented by Britain's 
development into a mature industrial economy. 
The Corn Laws were the symbolic centrepiece of a system of mercantilism 
safeguarding domestic agricultural producers from foreign competition. 
Protectionist legislation was enacted by a legislature dominated by the landed 
interest. This protectionist regime and the class interest which underpinned it 
became increasingly exposed to assault by the industrial middle classes by the mid 
1840s. 
For Peel the politics of power indicated two things. Firstly, that the new 
manufacturing interests would be best able to seek more open and expanded markets 
if they were able to exchange their goods for primary products from other 
countries, the system of protection impeded them from doing this. In addition that 
British agriculture in the long run would not benefit from the artifical prop of tariff- 
induced price competitiveness but from greater productivity. 
In the politics of support, Peel's calculation was that, irrespective of the economic 
benefits of abandoning protection, the existing regime was acting as a rallying point 
for both the middle and working classes against aristocratic government. The longer 
protection remained in place the more likely it was that the middle classes would 
make common cause with other groups in society against the landed classes. 
The most obvious sign of this possibility was the agitation of the Anti-Corn Law 
League, which mounted a populist campaign against higher food prices and as a 
result attracted working class support. In addition to the class alignments which 
were encouraged by protectionism, the issue also became a focal point for other 
sectional opposition to the landed classes, such as the dissenters (McCord 1968: 
26). 
Peel's decision to wind down and the abolish the protectionist regime from 1842 
onwards was dictated by his fear that aristocratic government was becoming 
untenable because it had too narrow an economic base which exposed it to charges 
of sectionalism. He wished to launch a broad alliance between all forms of property 
as the basis of the Conservative Party. The Irish potato famine of 1846 was the 
external shock which forced Peel's hand in making the symbolic shift from a 
protectionist to a free trading regime. In the 1842 budget Peel had already abolished 
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750 duties and so corn only has such historical centrality because Peel's opponents 
inside the party chose to give it such a status. 
In 1846 Peel resigned after pushing through the repeal bill although two thirds of 
his own party voted against him in the lobbies. In the debate Peel made an 
uncompromising speech, demanding that his party either oppose his stand outright 
or get behind him. This "take it or leave it" attitude to partisanship forced a major 
political realigment with the virtual expulsion of Peel and his supporters from the 
Conservative Party and the formation of a separate Peelite grouping. Peel's corn 
law repeal measure brought in a decisive acceptance of internationalisation in 
British foreign economic policy. 
Chamberlain and Tariff Reform 
The next major Tory adaptation to structural change was the Tariff Reform 
initiative put forward by a dissident member of the Tory leadership, Joseph 
Chamberlain. Chamberlain's initiative took place in the context of German and 
American challenges to Britain's trading supremacy. 
Chamberlain's initiative addressed the politics of power imperative to create a new 
foreign economic regime which would stop any further erosion of Britain's trading 
position in the world economy. Now that Britain had serious commercial rivals he 
believed that free trade no longer worked in the UK's favour. His politics of 
support concern was that the challenge of an emergent labour movement in the 
political market necessitated social reform. He sold tariffs as a means by which 
social reform revenues -could be raised, thereby maintaining working class 
allegiance to the Conservative Nation and its imperial project, rather than the 
socialist alternative. Chamberlain's foreign economic policy initiative was a 
reassertion of national sovereignty in this field. 
The boldness of Chamberlain's initiative presented Prime Minister Balfour with 
huge problems. Chamberlain had provoked a divided response to his call for the 
ditching of free trade. A Free Food League was set up by Lord Devonshire inside 
the party dedicated to campaigning against protectionism. Correspondingly, his 
policy attracted significant Tory support in the constituencies and amongst some 
backbenchers - the factions then were quite evenly balanced. 
Facing the prospect of an imminent general election, Balfour followed the 
conciliatory model of party management. He was acutely aware of the fact that the 
government could be brought down if he was seen to repudiate either tariff 
reformers or free traders. Balfour was thus pushed into a nebulous position of 
endorsing the objective of imperial unity whilst expressing doubts about the 
practicability of tariffs. He then tried to move the argument onto the less dangerous 
ground of whether the policy would be electorally saleable. 
Balfour's difficulties can be best seen in the March 1905 debate on a Liberal motion 
condemning preference, which was deliberately tabled to make mischief out of 
Conservative divisions. When the vote was called on the motion Balfour and his 
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frontbench walked out of the chamber. Nevertheless 35 Tory Free Traders voted 
with the Opposition in the ensuing division. In addition Balfour's stance did not 
prevent Chamberlain and his supporters mounting a factional upsurge from the 
grassroots in order to impose their policy on the party (Barnes 1994: 340). 
Europe and Structural Change 
The Macmillan Application 
Britain's gradual and agonised retreat from empire from the late 1950s onwards was 
the latest stage of Conservative adaptation to structural change. It began with 
Harold Macmillan's application to join the EEC in 1961 and continued with the 
succesful Heath application in 1971-2. The opening to Europe was the direct result 
of decolonisation and the deeper underlying shift in the pattern of British trade 
which was gathering pace in this period. 
In the 1950s and 60s there was a structural change in the pattern of British trade, 
with a flow of UK trade away from the traditional "Empire Circle" towards Europe 
and North America. In the 1955-65 period, exports to Western Europe and North 
America increased by £1390 million, whilst exports to the overseas sterling area 
(OSA) countries increased by £403 million. The share positions of the two trade 
areas were almost exactly reversed, with the OSA share falling from a half to a 
third and the share of Western Europe increasing from a third, to a half of all 
exports (Sanders 1990: 118). 
These economic patterns of disengagement from empire ran alongside other political 
changes. The British will to secure her colonies against nascent nationalist agitation 
was sapped by her relative decline. The series of decolonisations which resulted 
were accompanied by a slow withdrawal from the East of Suez strategic military 
presence, at the end of the Wilson Government and at the outset of the Heath 
Government. The internal coherence of the Commonwealth as a diplomatic as well 
as an economic project for British foreign economic policy, was undermined further 
by the new British restrictions on immigration from the Commonwealth and by the 
Rhodesian crisis. 
The Suez crisis, in which Britain's subordinate economic and military role in 
relation to the United States, was so cruelly revealed, was the symbolic shock which 
prompted policymakers to undertake a strategic reappraisal of the imperial regime. 
Either Britain retreated into isolationism as advocated by Enoch Powell, became 
even more closely tied into the Special Relationship, or it became a fully-fledged 
European power inside the EEC. 
When Macmillan made his application to join the EEC, he returned to the 
internationalisation tradition of his party's foreign economic policy. Like Balfour he 
adopted the conciliatory model to ease his party into an acceptance of its reduced 
world role and the need to bind itself into a European destiny. So Macmillan 
presented membership as a commercial option and not as a major strategic choice 
for British foreign economic policy (Neustadt 1969: 141). 
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Macmillan did not court disaster at the early stage of 1961 by openly dismissing the 
Commonwealth as a viable project. Macmillan's cautious advocacy of the European 
option was motivated by his anxieties about the possibility of a party split on the 
issue. The latent divisions which he believed existed indicated that delicate handling 
of the issue was essential. His fears seemed to be confirmed from the outset when 
on the division in the first application debate in August 1961, thirty Tory MPs 
abstained on the government motion and one rebel, Anthony Fell, voted against. 
His friend, Edward Boyle, wrote to him after the August 1961 vote, agreeing with 
Macmillan's own appraisal of the divisiveness of the European issue for the party 
and drawing parallels with the Corn Laws and Tariff Reform. It is significant that 
Conservatives themselves perceived that the European issue was comparable to past 
epoch making splits. Macmillan quotes from Boyle's letter in his memoirs. Boyle 
argued that Macmillan should not attempt to straddle his party's divisions on 
Europe: 
I don't see how the Conservative Party can avoid some sort of split on this issue. But the example of 
Balfour after 1903 surely suggests that the attempt to avoid any split, on some highly contentious 
issue, may simply result in a far greater and more damaging one (and in electoral disaster) 
(Macmillan 1973: 16). 
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The Heath Government and Europe 
Heath was a much more doctrinal leader than Macmillan on European policy. His 
resolve to push through British membership of the EEC stimulated strong 
backbench dissidence. This dissidence had many common features with the 
campaign waged by the Euro-rebels in the 1990s. Both Maastricht and British 
accession to the EEC led to ferocious backbench campaigns and forced the 
Conservative frontbench to take draconian measures against dissident Tories. A 
comparison between 1972 and the 1992/93 debates also shows crucial differences in 
the nature of the European debate, especially in terms of the attitude of the Tory 
Right. 
In 1972 when the European Communities bill (the legislation facilitating British 
accession to the Community) was being debated, the Heath Government faced a 
strong Tory backbench campaign to defeat the bill, with many parallels to the battle 
against Maastricht ratification that will be discussed later on in this chapter. 
The anti-marketeers exploited a comprehensive range of initiatives available to a 
backbencher dissident, in order to oppose government policy. Like the Euro-rebels 
in 1992, the anti-marketeers struck early on in the new parliament by tabling a 
hostile EDM. In the motion they urged the Heath Government to: 
Not to seek or accept terms which do not safeguard British sovereignty and our ability to decide our 
own economic and social policies, and to protect the interests of the Commonwealth and our EFTA 
partners. (Norton 1978: 66) 
The EDM contained 44 signatures, 18 of whom were new members in the 1970 
Parliament. On 28 July Teddy Taylor resigned as Scottish Office Under Secretary 
of State due to his opposition to EEC accession. Organisationally, the anti- 
marketeers made efforts to cement their numbers and discipline their support in the 
face of the government whipping operation. Powell, Biffen and Marten, the diehard 
anti-marketeers of the 1972 battle met regularly to discuss tactics in their campaign. 
Biffen acted as an unofficial whip and recorded the votes of likely anti-marketeers. 
Powell voted against the EEC bill on a total of 80 divisions, Biffen on 78 and 
Marten on 69 (Norton 1978: 80). Norton describes the anti-EEC dissidence as the, 
most persistent Conservative intraparty dissent in postwar history (Norton 1978: 
80). 
Many of the rebels also had a track record of being ardent supporters of imperial 
and Commonwealth ties. The rebels were forced to concede that Commonwealth 
trading preferences were a diminishing asset and did not represent an alternative 
foreign economic strategy. They felt far more secure in concentrating on the 
political aspects of membership rather than the economic case (Gamble 1974: 194- 
5). The political case against membership had two facets - parliamentary 
sovereignty and the global conception of British power. The rebels saw Europe as a 
retreat from a global role. One of the leading accession rebels was Sir Robin 
Turton: 
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I believe that Sir Winston Churchill was right; that our role in the world is something much wider 
than an inward looking Community and that our future depends on our ties with open seas HC 
Debates, 21/10/71, Vol. 823, Col. 944). 
At this stage Conservative pro-Europeans were much more self-confident. The neo- 
liberal Tory Right were also supportive of British membership. The bulk of the 
Tory neo-liberals, who later became identified with Margaret Thatcher's leadership, 
supported British membership. Patrick Jenkin MP, who later became a minister in 
the Thatcher Cabinets asserted that Britain would face "a grim struggle for 
existence" if she remained outside the Community (Gamble 1974: 193). 
Heath's legislative and political tactics in pushing through the accession legislation 
were a precursor for Major's struggle to ratify the Maastricht treaty. Heath faced a 
scenario not dissimilar to that of Major in the Paving bill in 1992 and on the Social 
Protocol in 1993, when the second reading of the accession bill was threatened. 
Heath used the general election threat which was also Major's trump card. Heath 
personally lobbied opponents of his European policy in order to stop them pushing 
his government over the brink. Heath saw nine anti-marketeers in order to press 
home the confidence nature of the vote. Heath said that if the legislation were 
defeated then the 1970 parliament "could not sensibly continue" (Col. 742, Hansard 
17/2/72). Like Major in the early 1990s, Heath was forced to make European 
legislation an issue of confidence in order to secure parliamentary backing and even 
then he only survived by a slim margin. 
Heath won a second reading for the bill by the slim margin of 8 votes. On this 
occasion, 15 Conservatives cross-voted. None of the dissenters had the 
Conservative parliamentary whip withdrawn. Had the government not attracted the 
support of 5 abstaining Labour MPs and 5 Liberals then it would have gone down 
to defeat. As The Times observed on the following morning after the vote: 
The Government came within a hairsbreath of falling in the Commons last night e Times 17/2/72). 
Biffen, later a Maastricht Euro-rebel, described the second reading opposition as the 
highwater mark of the rebellion in 1972 (Norton 1978: 74). 
Both Heath and Major were forced to raise the stakes in their battle to drive through 
European legislation. The Tory European rebels in both periods were prepared to 
risk the fall of a Conservative Government in order to push forward their opposition 
to European policy. This indicates the intensity of the passions which Europe 
arouses within the Conservative Party. 
The Thatcher and Major Governments 
Post- Single Market Europe and Foreign Economic Policy 
By the time of the Thatcher and Major Governments the British economy had 
become even more structurally integrated into the European Union. The European 
Union represented the largest share of Britain's exports of goods and services. The 
single market was a major step in accelerating Britain's integration into the UK 
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economy. The consequences of this integration meant that the British economy was 
increasingly subject to the policies of other European member states. In particular 
the UK economy was influenced by the German Mark. These developents formed 
the context for the conflict over European foreign economic policy which took place 
after the proposal for economic and monetary union (EMU) in 1988. British 
participation in EMU would entail the most fundamental step in British foreign 
economic policy since the abandoment of the Corn Laws. 
Thatcher As Opposition Leader 
The great conflicts which Thatcher provoked over Europe after 1988, followed a 
period in which she followed the conciliatory model of management of this isssue. 
When Margaret Thatcher took over from Heath as leader of the Conservative Party 
in the mid-1970s, she was seen as a unifying force on Europe (Aughey 1978: 24). 
She was committed to British membership but lacked the doctrinal stance of her 
predecessor. Therefore Thatcher's stance was far less provocative to the anti- 
marketeers. Thatcher's pragamatic European stance was in evidence with her 
support for the Labour Government's guillotine motion to secure direct elections for 
the European Assemby (as it was then known (Ashford 1980: 116). She also 
criticised the Labour Party for its refusal to join the new European Monetary 
System (EMS). On_ both the Parliament and the EMS, Thatcher's attitudes 
drastically hardened in the later years of her premiership. 
When Thatcher became Prime Minister, the early phase of her European policy was 
dominated by negotiations over Britain's contribution to the EC budget. When the 
Conservatives came to power the new Chancellor signalled that the problem of 
Britain's contribution to the European budget was worse than the Conservatives had 
realised in opposition (George and Sowemimo 1996: 247). Thatcher and her 
Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, fought a prolonged four year battle to reduce 
the UK's contribution to the EC budget. Eventually, Thatcher succeeded in gaining 
a budgetary rebate at the Fountainbleau summit in 1984. 
The Single European Act 1986 
After the budgetary conflict, the Conservative Government's relations with the 
European Community entered a phase which was more amenable to Margaret 
Thatcher. The negotiation and ratification of the Single European Act (SEA) 
provided temporary reassurance for Thatcher that her free market views had 
prevailed in Europe. The SEA passed through the House of Commons in the face of 
a tiny Tory rebellion: 2% of the Conservative parliamentary party, voted against the 
second reading of the legislation. Significantly, only a handful of MPs were present 
to participate in the debate on the Bill, compared to the intense interest over the 
Maastricht negotiations six years later. In the House of Commons Second Reading 
debate on the Bill to enact the Cockfield plan, Sir Geoffrey Howe strenuously 
played down the implications of the new powers that had been given to the 
Community: 
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I know that the small and enthusiastic group of my hon. Friends who are in the House are anxious 
about references to European Union in the preamble to the Single European Act 1986. Such 
declarations are not new in the Community. (HC Debates 23/4/86, Vol. 201, Col. 325) 
We are not talking about the declaration or proclamation of a United States of Europe or about vague 
political or legal goals. We are talking about practical steps towards the unity (not union) that is 
essential if Europe is to maintain and enhance its economic political position in a harshly competitive 
world. (HC Debates, 23/4/86, Vol. 201, Col. 325). 
However Bill Cash, Tory MP for Stafford, laid down a marker for his later dissent 
over European union, when he tabled an amendment at the bill's Committee stage to 
the effect that: "nothing in this Act shall derogate from the sovereignty of the 
United Kingdom Parliament" (Cash 1991: 3). Cash's amendment indicated that a 
section of the parliamentary party supported the creation of the single market in the 
belief that it would not erode British constitutional preogatives. 
The SEA was a blueprint and timetable for a genuine Common Market, a barrier 
free Europe, apparently institutionalising the British neo-liberal policy agenda 
across the whole of the Community. Subsequently Mrs. Thatcher has conceded that 
she was mistaken in her reading of the implications of the SEA. The consequences 
of the Act were to accelerate moves towards economic and political integration in 
the EC. Mrs. Thatcher now admits that she had "her fingers burned" after acceding 
to the SEA. (Guardian 6/5/93). Yet at the time the SEA was hailed by the 
Government as a successful rearguard action, reached in unfavourable 
circumstances. 
The Milan European Council was presented with the Draft Treaty on European 
Union (Spinelli Report) which proposed full-blooded federalism. This document had 
been passed by the European Parliament on February 14th 1984. It called for a 
federal European Union to have tax raising powers and for the national veto to be 
abolished within ten years. At Milan in 1985 there was strong pressure for an 
increase in competence for the supranational institutions of the EC. Thatcher was 
originally publicly hostile to any new institutional reforms leading to Treaty 
amendments (Times 1/7/85). It was at this juncture that Conservative anti-federalist, 
Jonathan Aitken MP, put it to Mrs. Thatcher that it might be time to consider 
whether there should be a two tier Europe as the French President had suggested 
(Times 3/7/85). However at this stage Thatcher responded in disagreement. 
Thatcher had resented being bulldozed, as she saw it, into an intergovernmental 
conference (IGC) at the Milan summit. Nevertheless at this stage she was 
vigorously opposed to detaching Britain from mainstream EC developments. She 
took a pragmatic stance that an "empty chair" policy, similar to that of De Gaulle, 
would do Britain no good. She resolved to make the best of the IGC (Thatcher 
1993: 551). 
At the Luxembourg IGC the deregulation paper written by Lord Cockfield formed 
the basis of the Treaty amendments. The Cockfield White Paper, freeing capital and 
labour movements, was an attractive extension of Thatcherite domestic 
deregulation. The single market programme was a move towards "deep free trade" 
34 
whereby if a product or service meets the requirements of any member state of the 
EC then it can be sold in any other member state. This involves mutual trust in each 
other's regulatory standards (Willetts 1992: 172). 
However in order to facilitate the dismantling of trade barriers, the Government was 
forced to concede to institutional reforms which it might have opposed had they 
been put forward in their own right. The Government saw majority voting in areas 
like banking, insurance and services as a means of gaining national leverage for the 
Conservatives' neo-liberal policy objectives, stopping states like West Germany, 
Greece and Spain blocking market liberalisation (Taylor 1989: 12). Thatcher was 
only prepared to support supranationalism to achieve a specific end, believing that 
market opening agreements could be exploited primarily by British firms. Young 
has argued that Germany was prepared to acquiesce in the loss of markets in these 
sectors because the SEM as a whole represented a move towards greater progress in 
Europe (Young 1993: 149). She has subsequently said that the price to be paid for 
market liberalisation was majority voting (Thatcher 1993: 553). 
Thatcher now argues that her concession on QMV has been abused by the European 
institutions and that the measure has been used to initiate social legislation. At the 
time of the SEA's ratifiction Thatcher saw the legislation as a means to achieve 
market liberalisation. By the late 1980s Thatcher saw proposals for enhanced 
European powers as a threat to British free market objectives. 
The Turning Point of 1988: Delors and the Social Chapter 
The turning point for the Conservative Party's relationship with Europe was the 
summer of 1988 and the EC German Presidency. The presence of a major EC state 
in the chair is usually very influential in setting a new direction for the Community. 
In this case the British Government was alarmed because the German Christian 
Democratic administration now looked to be siding with the French Government on 
economic and monetary union. This alliance set the foundation for the integrationist 
push in the European Union which led to the Maastricht treaty.. 
It was at this stage that Thatcher abandoned the consensual model of European party 
management which she had adopted as Opposition leader. Unlike Macmillan and 
Balfour, she decided to pursue a rigidly doctrinal approach. The Bruges speech was 
not designed to unite the Conservative parliamentary party but marked the moment 
when Thatcher became a partisan in the European controversy. Unlike Macmillan, 
Thatcher did not seek to finesse the issues involved but argued that the EMU was of 
epochal importance. She made no concessions to party unity and as a consequence 
broke with key allies like Lawson and Howe. Lawson noted that the Conservative 
Party could only be led from the centre on European policy (Lawson 1992: 923). 
The key initiative which set the course for confrontation with Europe was the 
establishment of the Delors Committee at the Hanover summit in June 1988. The 
remit of the committee was to investigate the feasibility of a common European 
monetary policy. With the German Presidency setting this type of pace, the 
35 
federalist President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, felt emboldened 
to raise the stakes in his drive for union. 
In July 1988 Delors made a speech to the European Parliament predicting that, 
within ten years, 80% of all economic and some tax and social legislation would be 
of Community origin. He followed up his assault with a more overtly ideological 
challenge to the British Government at the TUC Annual Conference where he 
argued that the single market had to be accompanied by a social dimension. 
The prospect of a Delors style social Europe, rather than a minimalistic free trade 
area, in which employment and other social regulations were the preserve of 
member states, appalled Thatcher. Delors' TUC speech symbolised her fear that 
Europe was now becoming a threat to British deregulation and free market policies. 
Delors' federalist advocacy also brought home to Tory MPs the ambitions of many 
European actors to go beyond a Europe limited to being a free trade area. These 
European ambitions were augmented by the publication in 1988 of the EC 
Commission's Social Chapter setting out Community objectives for common 
standards of social and employment provision across the EC, including minimum 
wage and health and safety requirements. 
In public Thatcher inveighed against the Charter as the reimposition of the socialist 
project on Britain after the Conservatives had succeeded in dismantling these fetters. 
In private however, when lobbying Community partners, she was more explicit 
about the nature and origin of the threat. She argued that the Charter was a German- 
inspired protectionist device aimed at forcing all EC countries to adopt Germany's 
high social costs. Therefore the poorer EC countries would be unable to compete 
effectively with the Germans on price terms (Thatcher 1993: 752). However on this 
issue at the 1989 Madrid summit she was again unable to prevail. 
The Bruges speech in October 1988 was the most notorious of her challenges to 
Brussels and marks the beginning of her offensive against the "Delors phase" of 
European integration post single market. Much of the speech is an anodyne 
historical survey, together with a reworking of timeworn themes like CAP reform 
and completion of the single market. The striking elements of the speech are the 
doctrinal and confrontational ones, billed strongly by Bernard Ingham, the Prime 
Minister's Press Secretary (Teasdale 1993a). 
In one section she unfavourably contrasts Europe with America to highlight her 
determination to pursue free enterprise values and policies: 
But the whole history of America is quite different from Europe. People went there to get away from 
the intolerance and constraints of life in Europe. They sought liberty and opportunity; and their 
strong sense of purpose has over two centuries, helped create a new unity and pride in being 
American. (Thatcher 1988) 
The clear implication was that the individualistic culture of American was 
preferable to that prevailing within Europe and that a free market society made the 
creation of a federal union more acceptable and manageable. Then in the most 
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famous passage from her speech she engages directly with European federalism, as 
the second front in her challenge against collectivism: 
We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain only to see them reimposed at 
a European level, with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels. (Thatcher 
1988) 
The combination of the Delors' social Europe proposals and plans for monetary 
union changed the debate over Europe within the Conservative Party. Thatcher set 
down the key doctrines of the Thatcherite Nationalist grouping in this early stage. 
Bruges also identified European integration as a threat to the Anglo-American 
alliance, the Thatcher free market project and to Britain's national identity. Her 
economic, foreign policy and constitutional critique brought across most of the 
Thatcherite grouping, like Tebbit and Parkinson. These individuals had previously 
voted for British membership of the EEC. 
Lawson's break with Thatcher over Exchange Rate Policy and EMU 
negotiations 
The dispute between Thatcher, Lawson and Howe over the exchange rate 
mechanism and EMU was the major breach in the ranks of the Thatcherite 
grouping. These three key figures had been united around the monetarist policies of 
the early 1980s. By 1988 Lawson and Howe's perspective on the conduct of British 
and European monetary policy became divorced from Thatcher's views. Nigel 
Lawson as Chancellor of the Exchequer advocated an alternative strategy for 
negotiating with the EU. The essence of his case was that the Government should 
embrace the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) for diplomatic as well as economic 
reasons, whereas EMU should be rejected in principle. Thatcher opposed both the 
ERM and EMU. She believed that fixed exchange rates were a dangerous stage on 
the path to a single currency. 
Lawson had already become convinced of the need for an external financial 
discipline to reinforce domestic anti-inflation policy. He saw the exchange rate as an 
easily understandable and less esoteric guide than a panopoly of monetary targets, 
to achieve price stability. He also saw the anchor with the German mark as a 
responsible guide given the successful track record achieved by the Bundesbank in 
sustaining price stability (Lawson 1992: 507). The decisive moment for Lawson in 
shaping his attitude to the ERM was the 1985 sterling crisis (Thompson 1995: 
255). This was because sterling suffered far more from the dollar's appreciation than 
did the ERM economies (Thompson 1995: 256). 
However for Thatcher, joining the ERM had, by 1988, become the ultimate symbol 
of weakness of resolve and abdication. Seeking to subcontract the management of 
monetary policy to German monetary targets was an admission of failure in British 
policy (Thatcher 1993: 706-7). 
Lawson believed that the structural changes in the financial environment accelerated 
by Conservative policy made domestic monetary managment increasingly deficient. 
Lawson was concerned about the extent to which exchange rate movements could 
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occur due to the gyrations of a global financial market, when these movements were 
unrelated to economic fundamentals. For Thatcher, once free market economic 
disciplines had been introduced, then it was wrong in principle to seek to intervene 
and "manage" the deregulated market. She believed that attempts to do so would 
bring about the very distortions which the Conservatives had been keen to eradicate 
in the first instance. 
Lawson's ability to force Thatcher's hand in negotiations within the EC had been 
undermined by an earlier attempt to subvert her opposition to fixed exchange rates, 
between the winter of 1987 and March 1988. Lawson had attempted to shadow the 
Deutschmark, thereby "living in sin" with the ERM. He had set an exchange rate 
target which he pursued through intervention in the foreign exchange markets. At 
the same time Thatcher was insisting publicly that no target existed and that the 
pound was free to float against all other currencies. Challenged by the Opposition 
Leader, Neil Kinnock, in the House of Commons on the 10th March 1988, over the 
shadowing of the mark, Thatcher made a concise but telling assertion, summing up 
her attitude to economic policy: 
My Rt Hon Friend the Chancellor and I are absolutely agreed that the paramount objective is to keep 
inflation down. The Chancellor never said that aiming for greater exchange rate stability meant total 
immobility. Adjustments are needed, as we learnt when we had a Bretton Woods system, as those in 
the EMS have learnt that they must have revaluation and devaluation from time to time. There is no 
way in which one can buck the market. (Thatcher Quoted in Lawson 1992: 797) 
Eventually Lawson was forced to concede defeat and the pound was uncapped 
above its three marks to the pound level. Lawson believed then and still does now, 
in the economic case for membership of the ERM but his main purpose in 
advocating it after the setting up of the Delors Committee, was diplomatic. 
The Delors Report was published in April 1989 and recommended a three stage 
move to full monetary union. In stage one all member states would become 
members of the ERM. In stage two a European Central Bank would be set up and 
finally in stage three a single currency would replace all the national currencies. 
Lawson also had a diplomatic rationale for backing ERM membership. He hoped to 
detach stage one, from the final two stages. He hoped that if Britain accepted ERM 
membership then it would face less Community pressure to back the remaining 
stages. Lawson argued within Whitehall that the UK needed to join the ERM so that 
it could slow down the momentum towards EMU (Thompson 1995: 263). He feared 
that if Thatcher rejected the whole package, then Britain would be totally isolated in 
the negotiations. Anthony Teasdale, former Special Adviser to Geoffrey Howe as 
Foreign Secretary, argues that the Foreign Office's primary objective at this time 
was to break the linkage between stage one and two/three (Teasdale 1993a). Lawson 
made a series of public initiatives which gave a political rationale for separating the 
three stages: 
The ERM is an agreement between independent sovereign states..... Economic and Monetary Union by 
contrast, is incompatible with independent sovereign states with control over their own fiscal and 
monetary policies. (Lawson 1992: 910) 
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The Madrid Summit and its Aftermath 
In the aftermath of the European elections the Conservatives faced the crucial 
Madrid summit on the 23rd June, which was to examine the Delors Report. Before 
the summit a Howe-Lawson axis was in operation determined to prevent the 
Government being isolated at the summit due to Thatcher's negotiating style. 
Lawson and Howe decided to give Thatcher an ultimatum on Madrid, either she 
agreed to accept the ERM, subject to a series of conditions or they would both 
resign. This ultimatum marked a new stage in the deterioration in the relationships 
of Thatcher's early 1980s praetorian guard. It emphasised the fact that Europe had 
now split the Thatcherite grouping within the leadership of the Conservative Party. 
At the summit the other heads of government were taken aback by the new 
chastened and softly-spoken British Prime Minister. Thatcher announced her 
agreement to the Madrid conditions as they became known, to the House of 
Commons on the 29th June. Teasdale believes that Madrid was a window of 
opportunity for Britain, which Thatcher failed to exploit, due to the surprise of the 
other member states at the new British conciliatory line (Teasdale 1993a). 
Significantly the final summit communique did not endorse the Delors Report but 
merely noted it as a basis for further work. 
The Madrid conditions were that Britain would enter the ERM subject to a shopping 
list of requirements on inflation, capital movements and competition policy. In 
public Thatcher subsequently sought to emphasise the pitfalls involved in these 
conditions, whilst Lawson and Howe were able to claim that the conditions were not 
much more than a formality. The Madrid conditions unexpectedly led to a brief 
truce between the parliamentary protagonists. The opponents of EMU were able to 
claim that Thatcher's rejection of stages 2 and 3 was a victory. Tory pro-Europeans 
took comfort from her movement on the ERM and her new conciliatory approach. 
So the formula allowed both parties a degree of flexibility. However Thatcher's 
resentment at the Lawson-Howe ultimatum ensured that the truce was to come to an 
abrupt end. 
On July 24th Howe was informed by Thatcher that she was relieving him of the 
Foreign Office in a dramatic reshuffle, in which half of the Cabinet were moved or 
sacked. In October Lawson became the next victim as he chafed under the strain of 
seeing Thatcher's personal economic advisor, Sir Alan Walters, contradict the 
Madrid formula. Lawson resigned on 26th October and was replaced by John Major 
at the Treasury. Lawson notes in his memoirs that both he and Howe who had been 
in the vanguard of the Thatcher revolution were now, ten years later, on Thatcher's 
blacklist (Lawson 1992: 958). 
The Ridley Resignation, Aspen, The Vibert Paper and the Hard ECU 
The next resignation over Europe was Thatcher's most loyal supporter, Nicholas 
Ridley, one of Thatcher's closest ideological allies. Ridley gave a Spectator 
interview to Dominic Lawson in July 1990 which was seen to be too closely and 
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publicly expressing Thatcher's own sentiments about Europe for him to remain in 
the Cabinet without huge diplomatic embarrassment. Ridley's inteview was 
evidence of the Thatcherite Nationalists' growing antipathy to what they saw as 
Germany's political dominance within the EU and their belief that a federal Europe 
would reinforce Germany's power. 
In his idiosyncratic interview Ridley made a passionate denunciation of the German 
desire to take over Europe. His most memorable quote, comparing Hitler's 
Germany to Kohl's federalist ambitions, was taken up by the cartoonist Garland on 
the magazine's front cover. However his most revealing quote was his detestation of 
Germany's growing economic domination. Ridley spoke of his detestation of 
`Simply being taken over by economics' (The Spectator 1990). 
Ridley saw the structural power of the German economy in Western Europe as far 
more insidious than German territorial conquest because the market had a 
legitimacy that war could never achieve. After preaching the virtues of market 
forces, it was galling to see Britain placed in a subordinate position to Germany due 
to the operation of the marketplace. 
As the European tensions became increasingly public and embittered in 1990, one 
Tory commentator noted how party alignments were being remoulded by the issue: 
A new breed, the Brugeite has replaced the old dogs of the European Reform Group (that dwindling 
band of maverick anti-Europeans, whose number had dwindled to 11 in this week's Commons vote on 
the ERM. The Brugeite is a more domesticated breed..... And cutting completely across all Right/Left 
distinctions, there is a strand of free market Euro-enthusiasm which thinks that the sacrifice of 
sovereignty is a small price to pay for the creation of a continent-sized test-bed for free trade and 
enterprise. (Ile Spectator 27/10/90 p. 8) 
Thatcher's concerns about the effects on the UK of European integration stemmed 
from a more expansive conception of foreign economic policy. She was concerned 
that a federal Europe would turn inwards and become a protectionist bloc, cutting 
its stategic, commercial and security ties with the United States. For her, resistance 
to the Delors project was allied with a determination to maintain the Atlanticist 
security/economic relationship. 
Thatcher sensed that the Bush Administration was seeking disengagement from 
Europe after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and would endorse faster European 
integration in order to manage the transition of Eastern Europe from communism to 
capitalism. Thatcher made a key-note speech at Aspen, Colorado in the US on the 5 
August 1990 putting forward an alternative political and economic project to insular 
European federalism. She called for the creation of a free trade area encompassing 
North America and Western Europe. The Aspen speech showed that in the post- 
Cold War world, Thatcher continued to see the Anglo-American alliance as central 
to British foreign policy. 
Thatcher also briefly flirted with the idea of putting forward her own alternative 
agenda for institutional development to the IGC. Thatcher was already 
contemplating how European competence could be limited to single market 
40 
jurisdiction and excluded from matters which she regarded as of purely domestic 
concern. She had seen a paper written by Dr Frank Vibert, then of the Institute of 
Economic Affairs. Vibert's paper called for a remodelling of the EC along 
intergovernmental lines. Vibert says that he was called in to brief Thatcher on his 
paper and that she was strongly supportive of it (Vibert 1994 & Letwin 1992: 294). 
Vibert's paper proposed that the Commission not only lose its right to initiate 
legislative proposals but be downgraded into becoming a mere civil service agency. 
The fiscal and monetary powers of the Community would also be constitutionally 
constrained. This latter proposal would have weakened the EU's ability to be the 
vehicle for reflationary social democratic policies. 
Thatcher had already been distressed to discover that on assuming the 
Chancellorship, Major began to adopt a pragmatic approach to monetary union and 
was preparing to compromise with other EC countries on the issue. Thatcher argues 
in her memoirs that Major had been startled by the apparent strength of commitment 
shown by the other EC states at this time to push ahead with the Delors project. 
Thatcher dismissed Major's concerns about the spectre of a "two-speed" Europe, 
with Britain relegated to the slow lane. Subsequently she has accused Major of 
"swallowing the slogans of the European lobby" (Thatcher 1993: 720-1). This was 
the beginning of the divorce betwen Major and Thatcher's European policy. Major 
was determied to leave open Britain's options in respect of a single currency, in 
case an inner core EMU was formed. Thatcher however was opposed to EMU in 
principle and wished to veto it. 
During the summer of 1990 Major had also launched a British counter-initiative to 
the single currency, the "Hard ECU", a common currency. The Hard ECU was 
essentially a political and not an economic proposal. Major hoped that acceptance of 
his proposal would shift debate away from the simple political objective of a single 
currency and onto the practical questions of economic convergence of member 
states' economies. If the ECU proved popular enough in the market place it would 
then be able to develop from a common currency into a single currency. The Hard 
ECU was the first in a series of procedural devices which Major deployed to 
attempt to manage Conservative divisions over Europe. As in the case of his later 
EMU opt-out, the Hard ECU deferred the question of a single currency. 
The concept of a thirteenth currency available to all EC citizens if they so wished, 
was presented as a pragmatic, constructive and evolutionary route to EMU. The 
proposals proved attractive to the Tory Party, because it was a free market road to 
economic integration and did not bind the EC to the goal of a full single currency, 
the hard ECU's political nature meant that the Germans and the French dismissed it 
as a spoiling tactic and did not support it. They were encouraged in this view by 
Thatcher's own steadfastly negative approach. In her statement after the Athens 
summit she declared that she did not think that anyone would use the ECU anyway, 
thereby subverting the purpose of her Chancellor's proposal within months of its 
being announced. Sir Charles Powell argues that the Government "was too late into 
the field with the hard ECU" and that the potential attractiveness of the proposal 
was stymied by Thatcher's obstructive attitude (Powell 1994). 
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ERM Membership and Thatcher's Resignation 
Before Thatcher's downfall the weakness of her political position, with bad opinion 
polls and the legacy of Lawson's departure, forced her into accepting ERM 
membership. Ironically membership in October 1990 came about despite the fact 
that the Madrid conditions had still not been met. In the end it was the political 
factors and not the economic case which were paramount in pushing Thatcher to 
join in the face for pressure for Douglas Hurd, her new Foreign Secretary and John 
Major. Although Thatcher had seized the initiative after Madrid and broken up the 
Howe-Lawson axis, the political fallout from the reshuffle, with the disquiet that it 
had caused on the backbenches, forced her into a weakened position vis-a-vis her 
new top ministers, Major and Hurd. 
ERM membership finally came in October 1990, on the final day of the Labour 
Party conference and was received almost rapturously by Tories after the protracted 
divisions at Cabinet level on the issue since 1988. In the House of Commons debate 
on the ERM dissent was still confined to the handful of monetarist free floaters, like 
Nick Budgen and John Biffen. The rest of the parliamentary party acquiesced with 
varying degrees of enthusiasm in the policy in the mistaken hope that it would 
ensure a "golden scenario" of falling interest rates in the run-up to the election. 
Biffen, as a classical monetarist, opposed what he saw as the distortion of economic 
behaviour to meet an artificial exchange rate. He feared that currency intervention 
would presage wider supply-side intervention: 
The truth is that we are providing a sign post to a planned economy in which first government 
exhortation and ultimately government intervention will be used to bring about economic behaviour 
that accommodates the politically chosen exchange rate. (HC Debates, 23/10/90, Vol. 178, Col. 230) 
Despite ERM entry, within a matter of a month Thatcher was forced to resign 
anyway, due to the aftermath of the EC Rome summit in October 1990. At this 
summit Thatcher was isolated as the other states agreed a timetable for the 
beginning of monetary union. She reacted violently insisting that the other eleven 
were "living in cloud cuckoo land" (Baker 1993: 377). On her return from Rome 
Thatcher made a House of Commons statement in which she departed from her 
script and dismissed Major's Hard ECU initiative and denounced federalism with 
the words, "No, No, No! " 
It was this performance that prompted Howe finally to resign from the Cabinet on 
Ist November. Howe had increasingly chafed at Thatcher's absolutist opposition to 
EMU. Howe had given a series of veiled warnings about what he believed were the 
dangers of Thatcher's position on EMU. His most famous intervention came at the 
Tory Party conference at a fringe meeting of the Bow Group: 
the next European train is about to leave, for a still undefined destination, but certainly in the 
direction of some form of EMIL. Shall Britain this time be in the driver's seat? Or in the back- 
carriage? (Howe 1994: 640). 
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He had attempted to claim that in the past Thatcher had publicly opposed moves to 
European integration, such as the SEA but she had signed up at the last minute. As 
Howe admitted in his resignation speech, he had attempted to "stretch words beyond 
their meaning" in order to reconcile his disagreement with Thatcher. The whole 
basis of Howe's speech was that the Government must continue to negotiate from 
within the Community if it were to be able to protect British interests, Britain could 
not afford to be absent from decision making institutions. 
Howe's speech established some of the key themes which the Neo-Liberal 
Integrationist Tories subsequently articulated. Principally, he warned of the 
diplomatic consequences if Britain allowed herself to become excluded from any 
aspect of the Union's decision making. Howe voiced these arguments in a powerful 
personal statement on the floor of the House: 
How on earth are the Chancellor and the Governor of the Bank of England, commending the hard 
ECU as they strive to, be taken as serious participants in the debate against that kind of background 
noise? ...... It is rather 
like sending your opening batsmen to the crease only to find, the moment the 
first balls are bowled, that their bats have been broken before the game by the team captain. (HC 
Debates, 11/12/90, Vol. 182, Col. 464). 
Howe's speech ended with an implicit call to insurrection against Thatcher. The 
next day Michael Heseltine duly challenged her for the Conservative leadership. On 
the first ballot Thatcher failed to gain the requisite majority. Before nominations 
closed for the second round Thatcher was forced to withdraw and resign as party 
leader by her Cabinet colleagues. After a second ballot, John Major emerged as the 
new Conservative leader after he and Hurd stood against Heseltine in the second 
ballot. 
The Major Government and Europe 
Major's inheritance as leader was the enduring wounds after the coup against 
Thatcher and persisting divisions over Europe. He was forced to accommodate the 
disparate strands within his party after Thatcher's divisive final two years as leader. 
Major conforms to the consensualist model of Tory leadership on foreign economic 
policy. Major committed himself to the over-riding objective of keeping the 
Conservative Party united. 
Major has chosen to manage the European divisions which his predecessor fuelled. 
In 1991 Major faced an imminent intergovernmental conference (IGC), set up to 
negotiate amendments to the Treaty of Rome to move towards a European union. 
The IGC would reach its end in December 1991 and so the negotiations would 
occur in the run up to the general election. Major's overriding priority was to keep 
the party united whilst restoring some political and diplomatic capital amongst the 
other member states. 
To achieve these objectives Major launched an external diplomatic offensive with 
key EC players like Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterand. His style was 
conciliatory and accommodating, abandoning the abusive style of his predecessor. 
He spoke about Britain being "at the very heart of Europe. " In particular Major 
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sought to cultivate Chancellor Kohl as a political ally, recognising that it had been 
the German influence which was pivotal in initiating the IGC on EMU in the first 
place. 
At home Major walked a tightrope between the two factions of his party. By using 
bellicose language about the dangers of a centralised European super-state, Major 
held the anti-federalists in check. Correspondingly, the pro-Europeans were wooed 
by his diplomatic style and promise to negotiate in good faith. As Lawson points 
out Major's priority was to keep the Conservative Party together in the run-up to 
the general election (Lawson 1992). The success of Major's party management in 
this phase was identified by several commentators: 
Mr. Ridley has made a speech against monetary union, in which all the most combative passages 
were all quotations from Mr. Major. (The Spectator. 22/6/91) 
Despite his pre-summit balancing act, Major still had to contend with the suspicions 
of anti-federalists that he was determined to sign a Treaty because of his fear that 
Britain would be consigned to the slow lane of a two-speed Europe. They were 
urging Major to reject outright plans for monetary union and did not believe that a 
separate opt-out status for Britain would be tenable in the long term: 
If the Prime Minister is convinced that we cannot be excluded from the single currency, he cannot 
afford not to sign the Treaty. If that is so, he is not negotiating but pleading for terms. (HC Debates, 
18/12/91, Vol. 201, Col. 481). 
At the summit itself Major was hailed as having pulled off a negotiating triumph. 
The bulk of the proposals of the avowedly federalist Luxembourg draft of the 
European Union Treaty were rejected in favour of much more watered down 
proposals in the political union sphere. 
The Significance of the British EMU Opt-Out 
The Maastricht Treaty established a constitutional mechanism for an economic and 
monetary union. However, crucially for John Major, the IGC gave him a 
procedural device to maintain party unity on the European issue. In a special 
protocol the British government and parliament were granted the power to make a 
separate decision about whether it wished to join in a full monetary union before or 
after the target date. This EMU opt-out gave Major the ability to claim that he had 
delivered on his undertakings to his party and resisted the imposition of a single 
currency on Britain. Major hoped that the EMU opt-out would cool his party's 
passions on the issue but in fact it brought a very temporary relief. 
The British opt-out from monetary union was the centrepiece of Major's consensual 
approach to European policy. Major deferred the issue of whether Britain would 
join a single currency and thereby sought to pacify the Thatcherite Nationalists, who 
were opposed to EMU in principle, whilst reassuring pro-European Conservatives. 
However the opt-out was later to create its own problems for Major and it became a 
focus for division and conflict. It was because the issue of British membership was 
deferred, that the Government had an agnostic stance on EMU, saying that it would 
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decide whether or not join if the circumstances arose. The Government's official 
agnosticism created a vacuum into which the Nationalists were able to vocally 
campaign for Major to reject British membership of EMU. 
The Aftermath of the Summit 
The British Press having raised the stakes in the negotiations, by portraying 
Maastricht as a "high noon" encounter for Britain with other member states, gave 
the Government favourable coverage. Major received an adultatory reception from 
Conservative backbenchers and stories of an imminent pre-election rift in the party 
disappeared. 
These feelings were summed up in the House of Commons post-Maastricht debate 
by one veteran anti-EC campaigner: 
It was a tactical success and a considerable achievement. Certain qualities of steel were required 
beside mere negotiating skills. Like Horatius, the Prime Minister held the bridge. (Jonathan Aitken 
MP, HC Debates, 18/12/91, Vol. 201, Col. 336). 
In the Commons vote immediately after the summit only diehards like Tebbit and 
Nick Budgen opposed the settlement. Even Teresa Gorman and Bill Cash did not 
oppose the IGC's outcome at this stage. Thatcher abstained in the Commons vote. 
In December 1991 there was little sign of the furious revolt which developed a year 
later. However there were a large number of abstentions in the division, including 
Thatcher and Cash. Budgen now says that at this stage, just months before a general 
election, many of his colleagues 'held their fire' but fully intended to reopen the 
debate after the election (Budgen 1994). 
What the Treaty Contained 
The core of the European Union Treaty (EUT) is the section on EMU. Whereas the 
Delors Report outlined the three stages on route to EMU, the EUT set down 
binding convergence criteria to which member states had to adhere, in order to set 
up a single currency, the convergence criteria were essentially narrow financially 
geared conditions entrenched in the Treaty at the behest of an informal alliance of 
interest between the British Government and the Bundesbank. 
They clearly bear the mark of a monetarist perspective focusing on the attainment of 
price stability rather than output and employment. Participating states had to attain 
an inflation rate of no more than 1.5% above the average of the 3 states with the 
lowest prices and a public debt not exceeding 60% of GDP. 1996 was set as the 
first date for an attempt to form EMU subject to qualification according to the 
convergence criteria of a majority of states in the new European Union (EU). By 
1999, the qualifying states would automatically adopt a single currency even if there 
were only two on this occasion. The single currency would be operated by a 
European Central Bank. 
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The convergence criteria were a second insurance policy for the British 
Government. They were designed to slow down achievement of a single currency, 
thereby reducing the political pressure on Britain to join a single currency if it were 
formed. Here Major had a coincidence of interest with the Bundesbank. The 
Bundesbank were concerned that if they were to be displaced by the EMI then 
currency union must come about on German terms - an anti-inflationary discipline. 
Arguably the strong monetarist credentials entrenched in the EUT were further 
evidence of the saliency of neo-liberal economics inside the EU. It was these 
characteristics of EMU which made Howe and his neo-liberal integrationist 
supporters attracted to the single currency project. Whereas for Thatcher and her 
supporters EMU was abhorrent because of its constitutional implications. 
Maastricht After the General Election 
On April 9th 1992 the Conservative Party was elected to a fourth consecutive term 
of office. It seemed likely that Major would be able to use his new mandate to push 
through the bill enacting the Treaty swiftly. After the general election the Tory 
truce on Europe ended and a hard-core of MPs emerged to oppose the Maastricht 
treaty and the federalist project. These MPs were given a lead by Thatcher herself 
and many of the senior figures of the Thatcher Governments. Their campaign 
proved to be the most cohesive and persistent dissent in Conservative history. 
The Second Reading debate was held on 20th May and the Government received a 
massive majority, thanks to a Labour abstention and Liberal Democrat support. 
However from this point onwards a hardcore of Tory Euro-rebels emerged, 
opposing the bill's second reading. These Tories were to prove pivotal to the 
remaining stages of the bill, when wholehearted Opposition support was withdrawn 
and the Government found itself in the ignominious position of running a minority 
administration on Europe. 
Major's problems in ratifying the bill began with the Danish Referendum in June 
1992. After the narrow "No" vote in Denmark, Major found that his even-handed 
stance became less tenable and more politically exposed in managing the party. 
Unfortunately the Referendum coincided with the start of the British Presidency of 
the EC, giving Major the responsibility for accomodating the Danes, as well as his 
own party at Westminster. 
Major could either choose to lead a movement in Europe for the Treaty to be 
ditched, as European law required its ratification by all member states, or he could 
decide to press on with British ratification whilst steering through a separate side- 
deal for the Danes. Major's decision to opt for continued ratification meant that the 
Euro-rebels now firmly identified the Government as being the opposing camp to 
themselves. 
Some moderate Tory MPs would have wished to seize on the opportunity to 
repudiate Maastricht. A Treaty which at seven months earlier was seen as a strong 
rearguard action in hostile terrain, they now had the excuse to dispose of altogether. 
As George Walden MP put it, " the Government seemed prouder of what it had 
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excluded from the Treaty than what was actually contained within it" (Spectator 
1992: 9). This backbench feeling was summed up in an Early Day Motion (EDM) 
calling for a fresh start in the Community, signed by 69 Tory MPs on 3 June 1992. 
Eventually 85 Tory MPs signed the motion, nearly a half of the backbench 
parliamentary party. The text of the EDM was as follows: 
That this House urges Her Majesty's Government to use the decision of the Danish people to postpone 
the passage of the European Communities(Amendment) Bill as an opportunity to make a fresh start 
with the future development of the EEC and in particular to concentrate its efforts on the chosen 
agenda of the British presidency which is to extend the borders of the EEC and to create a fully 
competitive common market. (Spicer 1992: 201). 
The neo-liberal Conservative press then began their campaign to undermine the 
Treaty. From then on the Thatcherite Nationalists had the solid backing of large 
amounts of the British press, amplifying and reinforcing their key themes. The 
Spectator leader caught the mood of the Right of the parliamentary party, arguing 
that Maastricht had never been a triumph for Major and that the Treaty still 
represented something abhorrent: 
It has been seen by the Danes for what some of us knew all along that it was -a brazen attempt to 
create a federal European state of a crypto-socialist nature, by robbing individual countries of crucial 
elements of their sovereignty. In standing up for their rights the brave and individualistic Danes have 
stood up for all citizens in the EEC. They deserve our congratulations and gratitude. (Spectator 
6/6/92: 5). 
Black Wednesday and its Aftermath 
Although the Conservative parliamentary party had welcomed ERM membership, 
the party's attitude to a European monetary policy ended in bitterness and 
disillusionment two years after Britain's entry into the system. This legacy had long 
term consequences for Conservative attitudes to Europe. Sterling's departure from 
the ERM convinced the anti-federalists that European integration could do serious 
damage to Britain's economy. For the integrationists the ERM fiasco reinforced 
their belief that Britain had to deepen integration if it were to avoid such 
vulnerabilities in future. The ERM further polarised Tory opinion. 
In the late summer of 1992 the Government faced the slide of the pound in the 
foreign exchage markets. With no sign of the two year recession abating, the ERM 
was criticised for impeding the Government from slashing interest rates. This 
climate reinvigorated the anti-federalists. They could now make a plausible 
association between European integration and economic slump. Their concerns were 
now seen to be less peripheral and of direct relevance to the pressing concerns of 
most Tory MPs. 
The anti-federalists argued, "If this is what a fixed exchange rate is doing then 
imagine what damage EMU would cause. " At a meeting on the 23rd June 85 
Conservative MPs met at a meeting of the European Reform Group, to consider the 
question of whether the ERM was leading to an overly tight monetary policy and 
the prolongation of the recession (Taylor 1992). 
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Finally on 16th September 1992, as the speculative pressure on sterling became 
irresistible, the Government was forced to leave the ERM, thereby devaluing the 
pound by 15%. The ejection of sterling from the ERM came as the whole system 
came under severe strain due to the impact of high German interest rates, with the 
lira also being forced to leave the system. The anti-federalists now deployed the 
persuasive economic case that European monetary arrangements were attempting to 
force common policies on, divergent economies. Once the pound was left to float, 
the authorities were able to drastically cut interest rates in order to stimulate 
Britain's depressed economy. At the same time the remaining members of the ERM 
laboured under high rates. 
The derailing of the Goverment's entire macroeconomic policy, after Black 
Wednesday, further emboldened the anti-federalists. They now claimed that it was 
due to the ERM/EMU project that the recession had been unnecessarily lengthened. 
Black Wednesday prompted a second EDM, number 549, on 24th September, on 
the fixed exchange rate issue. It welcomed the departure from the ERM. Many of 
its signatories had also put their names to the Fresh Start EDM in June. 
Black Wednesday crystallised the main dynamics of the Conservative divisions over 
Europe. The German Government's dominace of the ERM fuelled Thatcherite 
distrust of Germany's likely power inside a monetary union. Yet for integrationist 
Tories the Bundesbank's disproportionate weight on the ERM was a reason for 
moving to a European wide bank, which they claimed would give other member 
states a say in monetary policy. The breakup of the ERM also enabled the Euro- 
rebels to argue that the economic divergences between member states made EMU an 
unworkable ambition. 
The Paving Motion and New Dimensions to Conservative Dissidence 
After a domestic policy retreat on pit closures, Major sought to rally Tory MPs in 
support of the Government and the increasingly unpopular European cause. The bill 
had already been referred to committee after its second reading and so a further 
motion was technically superfluous. He hoped to regain a mandate for his 
determination to drive the Treaty through the Commons whilst he was attempting to 
accommodate the Danish Government's post-referendum concerns. His move 
seemed to have backfired when Labour took this unexpected opportunity of 
opposing the motion, arguing that it was a vote of confidence in the Government 
and not an endorsement of the Treaty. 
Major dramatically raised the stakes in his public fight with the rebels over the 
Paving Motion. Like Heath in 1972, Major personally lobbied rebellious MPs and 
in another parallel with the accession struggles, he let it been known that he would 
have to resign if the paving motion was defeated in the Commons. MPs like Sir 
Rhodes Boyson who visited the Prime Minister said that Maastricht had become an 
issue of confidence. 
The strength of the Government's whipping operation also indicated the seriousness 
of the rebellion. MPs complained of interference in their constituencies and 
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"unethical pressure" being brought to bear on them through their personal lives 
(Baker, Gamble and Ludlam 1993). Robin Hodgson, chairman of the West 
Midlands regional Conservatives, wrote to The Times calling for Cash and Budgen 
to be deselected (Gorman 1993: 117). 
During the Paving Motion debate in the House Major spelt out the familiar "staying 
on the train" case for ratifying the treaty - that if Britain did not ratify then she 
would have no influence in Europe: 
I know that it is the wish of some that the Maastricht treaty might not have been proposed by others in 
the Community. The fact is that it was. It is equally the case that we got the best out of it that we 
could in our own national interests. 
Those who argue that, because we did not propose the treaty, we should take advantage of the present 
circumstances to ditch it do so in the belief that we could have everything we want in Europe and 
sacrifice nothing. I have to tell them that argument is not real to the way in which the Community 
conducts its business (HC Debates, 4/11/92, Vol. 214, Col. 295) 
The intensity of the pressure succeeded in picking off two of the hitherto hardcore 
rebels, Michael Cartiss and Sir Gerard Vaughan. These two were persuaded to pull 
back from the brink by desperate last minute lobbying from Major himself during 
the division. 
The fact that Major only succeeded in getting his motion passed by 3 votes in these 
circumstances and only with the support of the Liberal Democrats, was indicative of 
the extent to which the anti-federalists were pushing out the frontiers of Tory 
parliamentary dissent. Despite making Europe an issue of confidence and even 
indirectly threatening that defeat might result in another election, a hardcore of 26 
dissenters defied Major. They were immune to all appeals for party unity and 
loyalty. Such behaviour is unprecedented in modern Conservative history. Of these 
26,18 had also opposed the Second Reading of the Maastricht bill in May 1992. 
In the face of brutal whipping and Prime Ministerial lobbying this hard core of anti- 
federalists held up well. Eighteen of their number carried forward their rebellion 
from second reading to the motion. The majority of the rebels are strongly 
Thatcherite in their policy stances. Previously Tory rebellions have been sporadic, 
unorganised and geared to single issues, like the poll tax. After an issue has been 
resolved the loose alliances that have been formed to campaign on an issue will 
break up and no factions are created (Gamble 1974: 8-9). 
At the Edinburgh summit, in the aftermath of the Paving Motion, Major as 
President of the European Community steered a Treaty "clarification" in order that 
the Danish Government's position could be accommodated and the new provisions 
submitted to the Danes in a second referendum. The Euro-rebels were further 
enraged that another opportunity of casting aside the Treaty - the Danish veto had 
been frustrated by the Conservative Government. However, the Government used 
the chastened atmosphere caused by the first Danish referendum to claim that 
British caution about the direction of the Community was now in the mainstream of 
European thinking: 
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Maastricht changed all that. For the first time, the sort of questions that Britain had been asking were 
asked in other Community countries as well (The Economist 1993: 23). 
Major and Hurd strongly urged the Danish people to back the Treaty dispensations 
of foreign policy and EMU that the British Presidency had secured for them. They 
implied that, if the Danes did not back the Treaty, then they faced isolation and 
possible expulsion from the Community. This provoked Tebbit on the 26th April to 
attack Hurd as merely acting as a messenger for German threats. The conjunction of 
the British Presidency with the splits in the British Government's domestic 
constituency further intensified the opposition of the Euro-rebels. 
The Committee Stage of the Bill 
The Maastricht hardcore grouping have in addition to opposing Major on a vote of 
confidence also pushed out the boundaries of parliamentary dissent in other ways. 
During the passage of the European Communities Bill in 1972 a hard-core of six 
Tories opposed the government relentlessly. During the ratification of the 
Maastricht treaty, the hard-core of dissidents increased to 20. However the cohesion 
of the accession rebellion was fairly weak. The rebel numbers during the committee 
stage of the 1972 legislation fluctuated wildly from 1-17. 
The cohesion of the Maastricht rebels can be shown with reference to a survey 
compiled by Mark Leonard, research assistant for Calum MacDonald MP, on the 
pattern of Tory resistance to ratification. Nine Tories, headed by Bill Cash and 
Nicholas Winterton, voted against their party over forty times. But beneath them is 
a cluster of a further ten who notched up votes into the thirties. The figures covered 
63 divisions. The top nine MPs voted against the government at nearly every single 
opportunity during the legislative process, from second reading to the end of the 
committee stage (Guardian 5/5/93). 
The rebels consistently demanded that unless the government granted a national 
referendum on the legislation they would continue to resist ratification using any 
expedient to do so. The referendum demand was clearly motivated by an 
expectation that if the Treaty was put to the people then it would be rejected. The 
referendum campaign allied with the national phone-in endorsed by Thatcher 
received some support from influential opinion formers, such as The Times 
newspaper on 29th March 1993 and also from eminent Tory historian, Lord Blake. 
The rebel operation was far more sophisticated than that of their predecessors in the 
1972 European Communities bill. They established a permanent base at 17 Great 
College Street and a parliamentary group, taking forward the momentum achieved 
by their succesful EDMs - the Fresh Start Group. The first meeting of the Group 
was held at committee room nine on the 24th September 1992 (Sunday Times 
25/7/93: 13). Spicer became the organiser for the group with Cash as the spokesman 
for the media and especially television. Both the group's base and the establishment 
of a whipping operation by Christopher Gill and James Cran ensured that the group 
was able to solidify its ranks. 
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The establishment of Bill Cash's European Foundation in October 1993 also placed 
down a marker for future anti-federalist campaigning inside the Conservative Party. 
The Foundation's director is Ian Milne and Bill Cash is the head of its editorial 
board. The Foundation publishes a periodical, The European Journal, which is by 
no means confined to institutional issues. The journal has broadened its critique to 
the wider issue of the costs and benefits of British membership, it has re-opened 
many of the issues, like the CAP and the operation of the ECJ, which the anti- 
marketeers campaigned on during the 1970s. Its contributors include continental 
anti-federalists, like Phillipe Seguin. This indicates the desire of the editors to bring 
together a coalition across Europe in order to bring pressure to bear on other 
national goverments. 
The rebel operation was taken very seriously by the Government Whips Office with 
officials admitting that the vigour of their campaign forced the Government into a 
minority administration on Europe. The Whips Office contained a billboard listing 
all the rebels and their voting record on the Treaty (Gorman 1993: 55). At 
committee stage the Maastricht hardcore voted against procedural motions, such as 
closure and have backed opposition wrecking amendments. Generally these MPs 
have done anything to frustrate the bill's progress. Francis Pym (Chief Whip at the 
time of the European Commmunities bill) noted in an interview on Channel Four 
News that whereas in 1972 the anti-marketeers opposed the government on 
principled motions, they did not attempt to frustrate the government from getting its 
business through the House. 
One instance of the procedural tactics adopted by the hardcore was their support for 
amendment 28 on 8th March 1993. Here the Government suffered its first defeat on 
an Opposition attempt to democratise the new Committee of the Regions. Their 
motives here were purely to slow the progress of the bill in a war of attrition with 
the Government. The high watermark of rebellion was reached on 20th May 1993 
on the Third Reading of the Bill, marking the end of the Commons stage. Labour 
had decided to abstain in this division and so the whips unusually were secure in the 
knowledge that the legislation would sail through with a massive majority. Safe in 
the knowledge that their votes would not jeopardise the bill's passage to the Lords 
the rebels' numbers rose to 41 with 5 abstainers. Whereas the hardcore of rebels 
consisted of an older generation of MPs, many of the Third Reading rebels came 
from a younger generation, such as Bernard Jenkin and John Whittingdale. 
Further evidence that the division inside the Conservative Party went much deeper 
than the relatively small number of rebels would indicate is provided by the Edward 
Leigh resignation. Leigh was sacked in the Lamont reshuffle and subsequently 
denounced the Maastricht Treaty and said that he regretted voting for it on Third 
Reading. In an interview with The Spectator, the Right's general distrust and 
antagonism towards the Prime Minister's government was revealed (Spectator 
5/6/93). Leigh specifically claimed that as many as half a dozen junior ministers 
shared his antipathy towards Maastricht. Some credibility was provided for this 
claimed by two other events. One was the apperance of the Employment Minister 
and No Turning Back Group member, Michael Forsyth, in the House of Lords 
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during Thatcher's speech on Maastricht, as if to show silent endorsement of her 
views. Gorman claims that Leigh made a representation to the Prime Minister on 
behalf of 14 like-minded junior ministers, concerned by the expansion in the 
competence of the European Court of Justice and its ability to reverse parliamentary 
legislation (Gorman 1993: 169). 
Far more revealing were the unguarded off-the-record comments of the Prime 
Minister himself, when speaking to an ITN journalist, which were leaked on 25th 
July. Major referred to three unnamed Cabinet colleagues who opposed his line on 
Europe as "bastards". These Cabinet members were assumed to be Peter Lilley, 
Social Security Secretary, Michael Portillo, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury and 
Michael Howard the Home Secretary. Major's unguarded comments indicated the 
fact that unlike the divisions over Europe in the early 1970s, the split over EMU 
went all the way up to Cabinet level. 
The Social Protocol Issue 
From the beginning of the European controversy the primary threat that Thatcher 
identified in Europe was the social dimension. Opposition to the social dimension is 
one of the few European policy issues on which the parliamentary party is united. 
There is a virtual Tory consensus that European social legislation would harm 
British competitiveness and increase unemployment. The Major Government has 
been resolute in its drive for greater labour market deregulation. The Maastricht 
treaty established a "social chapter" through which member states could legislate for 
social measures. The chapter brought forward the aspirations incorporated in the 
1989 Social Charter. Major and Hurd secured a legal protocol as part of the 
Maastricht treaty, exempting Britain from social measures decided under the 
chapter's provisions. 
The securing of the social chapter opt-out, in a separate protocol of the Maastricht 
Treaty, was Major's proudest achievement at the summit. It also caused the most 
virulent opposition from the Labour Party, which pledged itself to do all it could to 
reverse the opt-out. The Government and virtually all backbench MPs persisted in 
their claims that the opt-out was vital to Britain retaining her competitive edge, in 
terms of lower social costs than other EC member states. Without it Britain would 
become less attractive to inward investment and would be less competitive with the 
countries of the Pacific Rim. On his return from the Maastricht summit Major 
presented the social protocol opt-out as a triumphant protection for a deregulated 
British economy: 
The Opposition cannot credibly claim that such extraordinary provisions would not recreate precisely 
the kind of national bargaining - but now at a Community level - which created what was called the 
"British disease" of the 1960s and 1970s, so I rejected those proposals. (HC Debates, 18/12/91, Vol. 
201, Col. 282). 
When the opt-out provision of the Treaty was endangered by the Euro-rebels, the 
Government chose to dramatically raise the stakes and threaten to ditch the entire 
Treaty if the House of Commons did not ratify it as negotiated. The frontbench's 
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threat showed the extent to which the Conservatives now saw European integration 
as a threat to British deregulation. 
The Euro-rebels were dismissive of Major's social chapter opt-out "negotiating 
triumph. " The rebels agree with the Government on the objective of resisting social 
legislation but they believe that the European treaties would enable other member 
states to impose these measures on Britain through other means than the social 
chapter. They believe that 
the Government has empowered the European institutions 
to extend their competence into areas like social affairs. Sir Teddy Taylor argued in 
a briefing paper issued to members of the Conservative European Reform Group, 
that the Commission has shown a determination to push ahead regardless with new 
social directives using the powers given by the SEA. He cites the 48-hour week as 
an example, where the Commission argued that it was empowered to make 
regulations in this sphere using the SEA Treaty base (Taylor 1992). 
Labour put down an amendment which they hoped would force the Government to 
accept the social chapter. The rebels immediately demanded to know whether the 
Government would ratify a Treaty complete with the chapter. On 20th January 1993 
Tristan Garel-Jones and the Frontbench insisted that this was inconceivable and that 
by voting for the amendment Labour and the Liberal Democrats were putting 
ratification at risk. The rebels immediately sensed an opportunity to scupper the 
treaty. The Government were forced to accept Labour European Affairs spokesman, 
George Robertson's amendment 27 to the bill or face defeat, as the Euro-rebels 
were going to support the amendment in any case. 
The rebels were therefore incited to vote for the amendment as a procedural tactic 
to stop the Maastricht bill becoming law. Despite their abhorrence of the social 
chapter, they now saw it as an expedient to prevent the treaty coming into force. 
After the failure of the referendum vote in the House of Lords on 14th July, the 
rebels knew that their only remaining hope of killing the Treaty was if they backed 
Amendment 2 as 27 now had become post-committee stage. In the run-up to this 
vote the Prime Minister refused to declare his hand about whether he would ratify a 
Treaty-plus social chapter. Nevertheless the crescendo of rhetorical attacks on the 
Treaty continued unabated. This ensured that the Government had effectively boxed 
itself into a corner and could not accept the chapter without a massive loss of face 
before its own parliamentary party and the wider electorate. 
Two votes took place on 22nd July 1993. The first was on Amendment 2 and the 
second was on the main Government motion, That the House has confidence in the 
policy of HM Government on the adoption of the Protocol on social policy. This 
motion endorsed the Treaty as negotiated. The first vote was won by the 
Government by majority of 1 using the Speaker's casting vote. However the second 
vote saw all but three of the Maastricht rebels vote with the Opposition and the 
motion was defeated, despite the Government having secured the support of the 
Ulster Unionists in the division. 
Major then immediately slapped down a vote of confidence for the following 
morning. The new motion tied a vote of confidence in HM Government to an 
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endorsment of its line on the social protocol. This tactical ruse had been agreed 
before the vote as a contingency measure which could be deployed to reject the 
social chapter if the motion on 2 went against the Government. On this occasion 
Major quite unambiguously claimed that if he lost the vote he would ask the Queen 
for a dissolution and a general election. The threat of a general election at a time 
when the Government was in third place in the opinion polls effectively blackmailed 
the rebels into voting with Major in the division lobbies on the Friday afternoon. 
As part of a deal between the Frontbench and the rebels, designed to defuse the 
acrimony and bitterness created by the Government's tactics, Hurd agreed to make a 
conciliatory gesture to them in his winding up speech on the confidence motion 
(Gorman 1993: 226). The significance of this gesture was clear. The Government 
had been startled by the strength of the rebels' rearguard action against the Treaty 
and wished to pre-empt further trouble over European legislation in the future. The 
FCO clearly had an eye on the 1996 review date when the European Council would 
decide on any further Treaty amendments. Although the rebels had failed to sink the 
Treaty they had established themselves as a force to be reckoned with in the 
parliamentary party on the issue, reinforcing the Government's own hostility to 
European political integration. 
Ratification was finally achieved after they had won the vote by a majority of 39 
and when Lord Rees Mogg withdrew his legal challenge in the High Court. 
Ironically EC-wide ratification finally came on the day in which the ERM, the 
linchpin of the monetary union convergence process, had broken up. 
The Government's European Strategy After Ratification 
After the ratification of the treaty the Government hoped to shift attention away 
from institutional questions and monetary union and onto their ambitions for an 
extension of deregulation in Europe. The breakup of the ERM in July 1993 added 
weight to the Government's arguments that the economic conditions in Europe had 
pushed the achievement of EMU into a remote timescale. They also attempted to 
redefine British relations with the EU by the use of language as they did in the case 
of subsidiarity. The Government's objective was to persuade mainstream Tory MPs 
that the EU could accommodate Britain's preferences for a free trading relationship 
with Europe. A Government insider said that this tactic while essentially 
presentational, is in fact useful in dispelling the nightmares about European 
integration (Interview 1994). 
During the European Election campaign Major launched a new presentational theme 
which had earlier been trailed by the Foreign Secretary in speeches at Inverness and 
Poland. In a speech at Ellesmere Port on May 29th 1994, the Prime Minister 
described his vision of further institutional development in Europe developing along 
the lines of variable geometry. Central to the speech was Major's call for a "multi- 
speed Europe". Major argued that with the imminent enlargement of the EU to 
incorporate the Scandinavian countries and eventually Eastern Europe, the old 
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monolithic structure of the founders and the Treaty of Rome had become 
inappropriate and should be replaced by one providing more flexiblity. Multi-speed 
meant different nations could integrate in different areas and at different speeds: 
I have never believed that Europe must invariably act as one on every issue. Trying to make every 
country conform to every plan is a socialist way of thinking; it's not for us. I don't happen to think 
that it threatens Europe if member states are free to do some things in their own way and at their own 
speed. It's simply good old-fashioned commonsense (Major 1994). 
Multi-speed essentially evaded the question of whether Britain should or should not 
join a single currency if one was formed. It was not a prescriptive policy. Instead 
multi-speed simply described the objective developing reality of the EU in terms of 
the convergence criteria for EMU, the Schengen agreement, the likely association 
status for Eastern Europe and the introduction of the "pillars" in the Maastricht 
Treaty. A Government insider has admitted that the Government's use of the multi- 
speed notion is merely a presentational device which finesses the Conservative 
Party's divisions (Interview 1994). 
A fortnight before Major's speech one of the Euro-rebels, Michael Spicer had made 
a speech in Prague which also called for a Europe based upon a multi-track 
approach. Spicer's approach went much further than his leader because he 
challenged the Government to take its multi-speed/multi-track rhetoric to its logical 
extent. As the Government had already "opted-out" of Schengen, the social chapter 
and had a right to opt-out of the single currency, Spicer argued that opting out 
should become a universal right for EU members across all policy areas and that 
Britain should exercise this right far more extensively: 
A many layered Europe where groups of countries are able to come together to pursue common 
policies for mutual interest while retaining control over areas of solely domestic concern. 
It is no longer realistic to demand a total acceptance of the "acquis communautaire" and the "finalite 
politique " from new members (Spicer 1994). 
The Euro-rebels appropriated the rhetoric of a multi-speed Europe in order to push 
forward their demand that power should be repatriated from the EU back to 
Westminster competence. The debate over the future institutional development of 
the EU continued in the autumn of 1994 with contributions from the French Prime 
Minister and from the German CDU. Balludur called for a three tiered Europe 
whereby a top-tier participated in the single currency, a medium tier was outside 
EMU but present in all other institutions and a third layer was to include Eastern 
Europe. 
Chancellor Kohl's CDU produced a position paper written by Karl Lamars and 
Wolfgang Schauble. The CDU argued that an inner core monetary union should 
develop and named a series of likely participants. Lamars also called for the "top- 
tier" of members to integrate across all fields of policy, including defence policy. 
This might create what Lord Howe has described as a "military-monetary union" 
(Financial Times 30/1/95). 
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However the British Government reacted with annoyance to the Balludur/CDU 
agenda and asserted that these proposals did not represent a genuine multi-speed 
approach. Hurd and Major argued that notions of inner cores were exclusive and 
did not genuinely allow member states to choose the areas which they wished to 
participate in. In his William and Mary lecture at the University of Leiden on 7 
September 1994, the Prime Minister dealt head-on with the German proposals for 
an inner core of states within the EU: 
If we try to force all European countries into the same mould we shall end up cracking that mould. 
Greater flexibility is the only way in which we shall be able to build a Union rising to 16 and 
ultimately to 20 or more Member States. 
No Member State should be excluded from an area of policy in which it wants and is qualified to 
participate..... So I see a real danger, in talk of a "hard core, inner and outer circles, a two-tier 
Europe. I recoil from ideas for a union in which some would be more equal than others (Major 
1994a: 6). 
A Government insider insists that the Lamars proposals are not a logical 
development from the convergence criteria and would create institutional difficulties 
inside the EU. He poses the question, "would inner core states have a separate 
institutional status and body within the EP for example, while the rest of the EU 
legislated aside from them? " (Interview 1994). 
The Pro-European Counter-Mobilisation 
The professionalism of the anti-federalist mobilisation eventually provoked a 
counter-mobilisation by the pro-Europeans within the party, worried that they had 
lost the initiative to the Cashites. Tim Renton conceded that the parliamentary 
Positive Europeans do not enjoy the same cohesion as the Euro-rebels. Renton 
argues that the Positive Europe Group is fairly heterogeneous, comprising those 
who are merely supportive of Britain's membership to those who advocate further 
integration (Renton 1994). It is also clear from the membership of the group that 
they are an ageing body with a dearth of younger members from the 1992 intake. 
By the autumn of 1994 the Action Centre for Europe (ACE) had been founded. It is 
headed by former Euro-MP, Michael Welsh. ACE's Advisory Council was headed 
by the business and Tory Party elite, especially representatives from the financial 
world, including the former governor of the Bank of England, Lord Kingsdown, 
David Hunt, Lord Howe, Lord Whitelaw and Tristan Garel-Jones. Andrew Marr 
described it as a mobilisation of the pro-European establishment unlike anything 
seen since the original referendum campaign (The Independent 20/10/94). ACE was 
an important stage in the coalescing of the interventionist-integrationists and the 
neo-liberal integrationist into a common Tory pro-European front. ACE 
incorporates representatives from both groupings. 
ACE in its first three months succeeded in raising £80,000 from a number of blue 
chip companies, like Grand Metropolitan and Glaxo (The Independent 10/1/95). 
ACE plans to set up a series of study groups on European policy, with the aim of 
issuing a document of its own to counter the tracts produced by the European 
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Foundation. Tim Renton MP argues that the pro-Europeans were advised by the 
Whips Office during the ratification process to take a calm line and to be supportive 
of the frontbench. Renton says that these tactics are now likely to change as the pro- 
Europeans can see the extent to which the anti-federalists have made the running 
inside the parliamentary party (Renton 1994). 
Michael Welsh, ACE's director, says that ACE was conceived as a network 
bringing together pro-Europeans from business, politics and academia. He says that 
it will eschew a direct campaigning role and will not be a pro-European equivalent 
of the European Foundation. Instead ACE will furnish the public with facts and 
analysis about European integration, such as its 1995 pilot study on EMU. However 
he anticipates that partisans, such as Lord Howe, will wish to use this material to 
push their own case (Welsh 1995). 
In addition to ACE, a group of Tory pro-Europeans have also formed an elite 
dining club called the Positive European Group or PEG. PEG has sixteen members 
and meets on a regular monthly basis. It includes Tony Teasdale, Peter Cropper, 
former Special Adviser to Lord Howe, Adam Ferguson and is chaired by Michael 
Welsh. PEG meets at the Carlton Club or the Reform Club (Teasdale 1994). There 
is also a more secretive dining club, known as 88, which includes a number of pro- 
European Tory ministers, such as Stephen Dorrell, the Heritage Secretary 
(Interview 1994a). The parliamentary Positive Europeans are chaired by Ray 
Whitney and include MPs like Jacqui Lait and David Nicholson. 
The Demand for Withdrawal from the European Union 
Another significant development was a call for the first time by a prominent 
Conservative for the party to consider withdrawal from the EU. Norman Lamont's 
argument highlighted an emerging theme articulated by the rebels. Rebels like 
Gorman insist that Britain has lost the argument on economic policy and political 
integration within the EU. Furthermore, a more integrated and interventionist 
Europe would fatally damage Britain's competitiveness. Lamont took this argument 
to its logical extent by concluding that in these circumstances, it would be in 
Britain's interest to withdraw from the European Union. In a speech to the Selsdon 
Group at the Conservative Party Conference on 11/10/94, the former Chancellor, 
Norman Lamont, set out a series of options for the party's European policy in the 
run up to the 1996 IGC. Lamont argued that Maastricht only deferred the question 
of British participation in EMU. He also challenged Hurd's assertion that the debate 
in Europe was at last turning in Britain's favour on institutional issues: 
The plain fact acknowledged by every continental politician except those on the fringes of power - is 
that the eleven other members want a European Union that is a European State 
We deceive the British people and we deceive ourselves if we claim that we are winning the argument 
in Europe..... There is not a shred of evidence at Maastricht or since then that anyone accepts our 
view of Europe (Lamont 1994). 
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Lamont for the first time contested whether the EU provided any commercial 
advantages which would not be available from another source and argued that 
Britain could have an economically viable future outside the Community: 
As a former Chancellor, I can only say that I cannot pinpoint a single concrete advantage that 
unambiguously comes to this country because of our membership of the European Union 
If Britain were not a member of the European Union today, I do not believe there would be a case to 
join. 
It has recently been said that the option of leaving the Community was "unthinkable'. I believe that 
this attitude is rather simplistic. 
Lamont proceeded to contextualise Britain's position in the global economy in a 
way in which Europe appeared to be of less value than it had hitherto been. He 
argued that Britain was neglecting the new Asian markets in its concentration on the 
EU (Lamont 1994: 14). Increasingly the Nationalists drew attention to the opening 
of markets in Asia and the Pacific and argued that it is here that the real commercial 
opportunities lie and not in Europe. The Thatcherite Nationalists are aware that if 
they are to argue against European integration, then they need to outline a positive 
economic future for Britain outside Europe, as well as drawing attention to 
disadvantageous European structures like the CAP. 
Lamont outlined his optimal alternative to membership of a federal EU. The 
Lamont alternative was for Britain to negotiate an "outer tier membership" whereby 
the UK participated in only the free trading provisions of Rome treaty. Such an 
outer tier would be based upon the EEA but would give Britain a say rather than 
just consultation rights, in the institutions of the Community. Like Spicer, Lamont 
saw this minimalistic option as ensuring the benefits of being in a free trade zone, 
whilst avoiding the undesirable features of the social dimension and a single 
currency. 
In a further passage in his Selsdon speech, Lamont made a virtue out of a two-speed 
Europe, arguing that it would accommodate the differing aspirations of Britain and 
her European partners. Other member states would be free to integrate faster, whilst 
Britain could choose its own destination and speed of integration: 
But what have we to fear if others choose a different destination and different institutions for 
governing themselves? Far from fearing a two-speed Europe we should positively welcome it, 
advocate it and warmly support it (Lamont 1994: 20). 
The European Finance Bill Vote 
There was further conflict over European policy when the European Finance Bill 
had its second reading. A large number of the Euro-rebels had signalled their 
intention over the summer to oppose the bill's provisions for an increase in the 
Community's own resources. This increase had been agreed at the Edinburgh 
summit in December 1992. The rebels were given political ammunition by a report 
from the Court of Auditors identifying large scale corruption and waste in the 
operation of the CAP. However on the day of the Queen's Speech the Prime 
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Minister let it be known that the bill would become a vote of confidence. 
Immediately the bulk of the rebels acknowledged that the government had won on 
the issue. 
However, a handful of the rebels still refused to capitulate. Kenneth Clarke then 
declared that if the government lost the bill then the whole Cabinet had agreed in 
advance that a dissolution, would be inevitable. The purpose of Clarke's "suicide 
pact" declaration was to foreclose the option of one of the Cabinet members merely 
replacing John Major and continuing to govern. The rebels were infuriated at the 
stakes having been raised even higher. Before the vote on 28th November they met 
under the aegis of the Fresh Start group and a hardcore of 8 MPs agreed to abstain 
on the confidence motion. 
The Chief Whip had already warned the rebels that if they did not support the 
government then the Conservative whip would be withdrawn from them. Hours 
after the abstention of the eight rebels this threat was carried out. Philip Norton has 
noted that there is no twentieth century precedent for the Conservative whip being 
withdrawn en masse (Norton 1994: 39). The eight rebels were joined by Richard 
Body who resigned the whip in protest after having voted with the government on 
the Finance bill. The other rebels were Michael Cartiss, John Wilkinson, Nick 
Budgen, Teresa Gorman, Sir Teddy Taylor, Tony Marlow and Christopher Gill. 
Conclusion 
This chronology of events clearly shows that 1988 and the Delors Report on EMU 
was a watershed in Thatcher and her party's engagement with the European Union. 
The chronology also shows that a key factor in the European controvesy was 
Margaret Thatcher's identification of European integration as a threat to her 
domestic free market reforms. The chronology also shows Thatcher's commitment 
to the Anglo-American alliance and her desire to lock Europe to US leadership. 
Thatcher's most heartfelt theme was her insistance that EMU was an unacceptable 
assault on the integrity of the British constitution. However her opposition to 
Britain's participation in a European currency union divided Conservative opinion. 
Thatcher's stress on sovereignty in foreign economic policy has deep roots within 
the Conservative ideological tradition as has been discussed in relation to the Corn 
Laws and Protection. 
The Maastricht treaty's provisions for EMU were therefore targeted by Lady 
Thatcher's followers. These rebels were given additional impetus by sterling's 
departure from the ERM in September 1992. The strength of the rebels convictions 
on EMU is witnessed by their voting cohesion and the sophistication of their 
organisation within Parliament. They also maintained their pressure on the Major 
Government in the aftermath of the treaty's ratification. The rebels' resolve also 
held up well in the face of all but the most draconian leadership sanctions. The 
intensity of the revolt would suggest that the European controversy involves issues 
which go to the heart of British Conservative politics. 
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The next chapter will identify the centrality of nationhood ideology for the 
Thatcherite Nationalists and examine its roots in Conservative history and 
ideological development. It will show that from the beginning, European conflicts 
with the globalist aspect of Conservative nationhood ideology. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY AND NATIONHOOD 
England has outgrown the continent of Europe... . she is the metropolis of a great maritime 
empire.. . she is really more of an 
Asiatic Power than a European (Benjamin Disraeli quoted in 
Wilson 1987: 5). 
We are the trade union of the nation as a whole. 
(Rt Hon Edward Heath MP 20/2/74) 
So we today at the heart of a vanished empire amid the fragments of a demolished glory, seem to find 
like one of her own oak trees, standing and growing, the sap still rising from her ancient roots to 
meet the spring.... England herself. (Rt Hon Enoch Powell) 
It would be interesting to study in greater depth the reaction of individual British Conservatives to the 
abandonment of empire. A few, suprisingly few, actively resisted it.... The majority, including 
Winston Churchill and Harold Macmillan, accepted the change with weariness rather than 
enthusiasm. They successfully clothed it with phrases and gestures which the Conservative Party 
would accept. (Rt Hon Douglas Hurd MP, An End to Promises, 1979: 45) 
The persistence of the sovereignty issue in Tory foreign economic policy is due to 
the Tory ideology of nationhood. Chapter one also identified the reverence with 
which the Thatcherite Nationalists view the defence of nationhood. This chapter will 
examine why nationhood is so central to the Conservative Party. It will also show 
how the traditional Conservative conception of nationhood is in conflict with 
European integration. 
Nationhood can be defined as membership of a common cultural community, with 
shared values, language and history. The individuals which make up the nation are 
usually constituted within a state. People within a nation share a common identity. 
Nationhood is often expressed as a desire to protect or advance this identity. There 
are two dimensions to the politics of nationhood. There is an internal dimension 
which focuses on the institutions, values and historical attachments which contribute 
to the nation's identity. There is also an external dimension to nationhood, which 
stresses the nation's identity in the wider world. This aspect of nationhood focuses 
on the nation's affiliations, commitments and affinity with other national groupings 
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and states. It is this aspect of nationhood which is most relevant to the development 
of the Tory European controversy. 
The Tory conception of nationhood celebrated membership of a common community 
as a form of political identity, in order to bind the British electorate to the 
Conservative Party. Disraeli conceived of the nationhood appeal as one which would 
supersede antagonistic class alignments. Tory leaders have sought to use the 
ideology of the nation to counteract the legitimacy and attraction of class politics in 
Britain. Conservatives see the celebration of national identity as their main point of 
contact with the electorate. 
However, the primary aspect of Conservative nationhood ideology was Britain's 
global role. Chamberlain and Disraeli developed this globalist conception through 
the glorification of empire. Pride in Britain's global role was deployed as a form of 
electoral populism. The Thatcherite Nationalists in the 1990s also wish to use 
opposition to European integration in order to revive this patriotic electoral appeal. 
In the postwar period, Churchill decided that Britain's global role could only be 
secured through an alliance with the United States. The Thatcherite Nationalists 
have inherited Churchill's commitment to the Anglo-American alliance. However 
the imperialist Tories in the 1950s saw both Anglo-America and the EEC as a 
retreat from Britain's global role. 
The internal dimension of the Conservative ideology of nationhood confered great 
importance on the central institution of Parliament. Parliament expressed the will of 
the nation. However by the time of Disraeli, Parliament had already developed in a 
manner which gave primacy to the executive. This executive also presided over a 
centralised British state, a state whose character complements the elitist nature of the 
Conservative Party. The three elements of Parliament as a symbol of nationhood, 
the concentration of constitutional power in Westminster and the elitism of the 
Conservative Party are synergetic. They have combined to make many Tories revere 
the national institution which has traditionally concentrated all constitutional power 
in their hands. 
The Crisis of the Old Toryism 
Conservative theorists have been consistent in their emphasis on the importance of 
nationhood . 
It was Edmund Burke who was the first Conservative to develop a 
conception of nationhood as a central form of identification and loyalty for British 
civil society. He conceived of society as an organism, a partnership between the 
living, the dead and those about to be born. Burke attempted in his counterblast 
against the egalitarian ideals of the French Revolution, to assert the superiority of a 
society based upon a notion of interdependence rather than antagonistic groups and 
agents. Common values, customs and local affiliations gained through membership 
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of a national community were too precious to dispense with in pursuit of a Utopian 
egalitarian project. 
Burke's Tory romanticism is particularly relevant to the world and environment 
which the Tory "Country Party" inhabited before Sir Robert Peel became Tory 
Prime Minister. Burke's organic conception of society assumed that society was 
composed of active and passive classes - the leaders and the led. In this world 
traditional agrarian Toryism with its hierarchical conventions was becoming 
increasingly overtaken by the drive from urban industrialised towns. The social 
system of the estate-based countryside could not be transferred into the 
proletarianising industrial towns. 
Burke's romanticism was the forerunner for Benjamin Disraeli's political platform 
when he became Conservative Party leader and Prime Minister. Disraeli's 
aspiration, revealed in his political novels, Coningsby and Sybil, was to reconstitute 
the old elitist feudal conception of society in a manner which could be relevant and 
attractive to the potentially hostile urban constituency, thereby ensuring the party's 
survival. Disraeli was the first modern Conservative leader because he was prepared 
to exchange last ditch traditionalism for tactical opportunism in order to achieve the 
survival of the values of the old squireachy. If the Tories were to survive they had 
to run with, rather than against, the grain of society. 
The mechanism by which the Tories hoped to achieve this was the ideology of 
nationhood. The stream from Burkeian thought through to Disraeli represents a 
transitional process where the Tories were convulsed by the implications of moving 
from an agricultural society to an industrial one (Harris 1972: 16). 
The critical nature of this transition can be seen with reference to the strategic 
weakness that the Conservative Party faced in the mid-nineteenth century. The party 
had previously suffered the Peelite schism over the abandonment of the old 
protectionist regime (see Chapter Two). The Peelite schism was also a product of 
the trauma involved in the Conservative Party's struggle to reconcile itself to 
industrialised Britain. Electorally and demographically the party was in decline. The 
Tories drew their greatest strength from the shires and rural boroughs. 
Palmerstonian foreign policy and orthodox finance seemed to put the party in the 
shade. The party's constituency was dwindling, it faced a strong incumbent 
government and its appeal was waning. 
Apparently the least likely figure to rescue the Tory Party from this oblivion was 
Disraeli, who had previously been the leader of the diehard squires in their failed 
defence of the old priviliges of the landed aristocracy. Disraeli had been one of the 
most articulate opponents of Peel's pragmatic engagement with liberal political 
economy and he assumed the party leadership substantially on the basis of this 
record. However once he became Tory leader Disraeli also discerned the need for 
Conservatism to widen its politics of support. Peel had been concerned to widen the 
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Tory coalition to all forms of property. Disraeli now sought to augment Peelism 
with an awareness of the need to gain the consent of the working classes for elite 
rule. 
Broadening the Tory coalition beyond even Peel's ambitions meant that the Party's 
ability to maintain the cohesiveness of its coalition became even more difficult. His 
ambition to reach out to the urban middle classes whilst at the same time to 
conciliate the working classes involved the management of several conflicting 
interests. The Tories triumph in the 1874 election was still based upon very insecure 
foundations. The Conservative decline in the medium sized boroughs was serious 
and they still trailed the Liberals in large urban constituencies. 
Therefore Disraeli's speeches of 1872-3 became less and less concerned with the 
land. After 1868 the new voters in the towns were the great unknown for the Tory 
Party. These urban voters were unsocialised' in rural aristocratic values. Disraeli's 
electoral coalition building was further complicated by the saliency of the 
religious/cultural cleavage which prevailed amongst the middle classes. Issues such 
as, Church/State relations, Catholicism and ritual, were all matters of public 
controversy. Disraeli needed a project which would finesse these conflicts whilst 
incorporating these heterogeneous groups inside his expanding coalition. 
The Tory romantic of Young England thus became the advocate of enlightened Tory 
paternalism. In Sybil Disraeli fulminated against the "two nations" which 
industrialisation had created. It is important to note that his objection was not to 
inequality per se but to the breakdown of traditional hierarchy based around the 
priniiple of aristocratic leadership. Disraeli was emphatic that private property and 
the hereditary principle were an indispensable bastion against tyranny and social 
revolution. 
Disraeli's charge against Whiggery was that it had failed to recreate the old organic 
polity of rights and reciprocal responsibilities that existed under feudal society in 
industrial Britain. Disraeli was aware that the capitalism of the Whigs threatened to 
polarise society and arouse such class antagonisms that property as a whole might be 
overthrown. For Disraeli the nation was a device which could counteract these class 
antagonisms and maintain elite rule and privileges inside a new Tory politics of 
support. Gamble identifies why the Tories had little alternative but to articulate a 
more encompassing appeal: 
For as the party of property, they could scarcely hope otherwise to secure the votes of the most 
industrialised, urbanised and proletarian nation in Europe.... One Nation is not an ideological frill 
for the Conservatives. It expresses the conditions for their survival as a poltical force. (Gamble 1974: 
18). 
Disraeli's Politics of Support 
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Disraeli's Crystal Palace speech can be interpreted as a defining event of the 
development of nationhood ideology. The Conservative leadership hoped to 
universalise their interests and political values in order to maintain political power. 
The notion of the Tory appeal to English nationalism and the wider patriotism of 
empire was given even greater coherence by Joseph Chamberlain's Social 
Imperialism. 
In his Crystal Palace speech Disraeli combined three interlocking appeals: 
nationalism, imperialism and paternalism. In the speech Disraeli excoriated the 
Gladstone Government for weakening the colonial Empire and advocated a renewed 
"forward policy" in imperial affairs. Secondly, he dedicated the Conservative Party 
to defend the institutions of the country, such as the Church and the Monarchy. 
Finally and most significantly, he promised that the Tories would dedicate 
themselves to alleviating "the condition of the people. " He sought to make these 
institutions political symbols identified with the Conservative Party. 
Disraeli began from the premise that elite rule was desirable and justifiable. The 
political point he contested with the Liberals was the foundations and legitimacy for 
elite rule. Here he sought to make a virtue out of Toryism's aristocratic roots. 
Disraeli argued that aristocratic leadership was preferable to the Liberal millocracy 
because of the latter's tendency to degenerate into oligarchy. He supported privilege 
but not privilege without social obligations. The Whigs unrestrained individualism 
was leading to popular disaffection with the nation's rulers. Disraeli argued that 
Toryism recognised that privilege could only rest upon social responsiblity on the 
part of the privileged towards the lower classes. He argued that Conservatism's 
aristocratic roots made the party more sypathetic to the plight of the working 
classes. 
However Disraeli hoped to reach beyond mere paternalism and articulate a form of 
political identity between rulers and ruled. It is in this area of a bond of 
identification between the rulers and the ruled -a unifying political identity - that 
Disraeli's imperialism and nationalism is relevant. By popularising the empire and 
celebrating national identity, Disraeli wished to synthesise economic interests and 
cultural identification. Disraeli's highly politicised imperialism can be seen as an 
attempt to put forward the empire as a project providing global benefits for the 
whole of society. Disraeli wished to cast the Conservatives' imperial project as of 
general benefit to other social classes. 
Once Disraeli believed that his three-pronged appeal of nationalism, paternalism and 
imperialism had created a point of identification and common interest across civil 
society, he could then risk incorporating the working classes within the British state. 
This came about at first with the 1867 extension of the franchise. He argued that the 
consent of the working classes for elite rule could only be obtained in return for 
their participation in the government of the country. He was certain that the 
potential of the working class to endanger the integrity of private property as a 
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result of the extension of the franchise would not be realised in actuality. The 
trauma involved in this step can be seen with the response to his initiative inside the 
Tory coalition. Lord Salisbury summed up the collective fatalism of many Tories 
during the final Commons debate on the bill: 
The Conservative Party have to my mind dealt themselves a fatal blow by the course which they have 
adopted (Quoted in McKenzie and Silver 1968: 8). 
Nevertheless, as McKenzie and Silver point out, subsequent elections have 
vindicated Disraeli's confidence. Whilst no causational link between the Crystal 
Palace project and the Tories electoral dominance can be established, the stress on 
nationhood has been attributed in Tory folk memory as the means by which the 
Tories escaped from electoral oblivion. Certainly Tory policy reflects a belief that 
an appeal to nationhood is electorally attractive. 
The ideology of nationhood did not of course just manifest itself in political rhetoric 
but was evident in the conduct of Conservative foreign and imperial policy. The two 
major foreign policy initiatives associated with Disraeli's forward policy were the 
Eastern Question and the purchase of the Suez Canal shares from the Khedive. 
Although imperial policy under Disraeli did not markedly differ from Palmerstonian 
or even Gladstonian policy, what was distinct was the ideological stamp which he 
placed upon it and its triumphalist tone. His grand vision was clear - an empire 
which was a centralised military unit supporting Britain's role on the world stage. In 
fact in the actual conduct of policy, Disraeli's approach was distinguished only by 
its inconsistency (Eldridge 1973: 208). 
Nationhood and Tory Electoral Politics 
Tory leaders have sought to popularise nationhood as an electoral ideology. For 
Disraeli the ideological character of his foreign policy was directed at maintaining 
the cohesiveness of his electoral coalition during this transitional period. The 
Conservative Party's propaganda in the period following Disraeli's departure from 
office saw the party endeavour to persuade the working classes that they had a 
vested interest in an assertive nationalistic foreign policy. In the 1990s, the 
Thatcherite Nationalists wish to use opposition to European integration as a patriotic 
appeal in the 1997 General Election. 
The conflicts and strains within the Tory coalition referred to above meant that an 
assertive foreign policy was a seductive escape from the contradictions of 
reconciling these pressures in Tory domestic policy (Cornford 1963: 701). Suez and 
India both qualify as policies of national distraction. The glorification of empire, 
which both these issues represented, was an umbrella under which Disraeli could 
reassure the middle classes that the Tories were a respectable alternative to 
Gladstonian radicalism. 
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As previously discussed, it is not possible to assess conclusively the effectiveness of 
the nationhood appeal to voters. However the party's campaigning messages indicate 
that the Conservative leadership believed that the "patriotic card" was an effective 
one. Tory Central Office propaganda from this period exemplifies these 
calculations. 
During the period 1886-1903 the Liberals became increasingly the target of 
swingeing Conservative attacks on their patriotism and loyalty to empire. Whilst the 
Conservatives had united around the Disraelian concept of empire, the Liberal Party 
became divided on imperialism. The Conservative propaganda in this period actively 
sought to capitalise on these divisions to further cement their image as the British 
political party - the patriotic party. 
The National Union leaflets viciously attacked the Liberal Government of 1892-95 
for propagating a series of iniquities on the "English race", such as Irish Home Rule 
and the Scottish Grand Committee. In the present day it would seem inconceivable 
that the Tories would seek to explicitly exploit tensions between different nations 
within the Union but this is precisely what is evident from Tory literature. The 
English chauvinism of the party's electoral campaigning is demonstrated by the 
following quotation: 
The present mongrel political combination of teetotallers, Irish revolutionists, Small Englanders, 
English separatists and general uprooters of all that is national and good..... (Quoted in McKenzie 
and Silver 1968: 57). 
Evidence for the popularisation of the notion of empire as the provider of material 
advantage for all classes can also be found in the party's literature: 
Why should we have a strong Navy? 
Because the Bread of the working man depends upon it. 
If we went to war and our Navy was defeated, the price of the loaf would rise above a shilling. 
(McKenzie and Silver 1968: 59). 
When the Labour Party replaced the Liberals after the First World War, 
Conservative propaganda was redirected towards them. Yet the basic charges of ill- 
intentions towards empire and lack of patriotism remained unchanged. However the 
fact that the Tories now faced "Socialist" Labour as their opposition meant that the 
ferocity of their attacks knew no bounds. Variations on the above themes were 
continuously re-used in issues like the General Strike and the Zinoviev letter. 
When Labour formed its first minority administration the bitter attacks on the party 
were also mixed with condescension. For example, Baldwin told Tories that he had 
held back from a greater opposition to the minority Labour Government because the 
party needed an education in the responsibilities of managing empire. The purpose 
of Baldwin's condescension was to ensure that, even when Labour achieved office, 
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the electorate judged the party on criteria that were most favourable to Conservatism 
- the defence of Britain's global prestige. Baldwin hoped that Labour would be 
judged according to Tory terms. 
The Thatcherite Nationalists in the 1990s are again reviving patriotic electoral 
appeals in the context of Europe. John Redwood and his supporters argue that 
opposition to European integration would enable the party to achieve electoral 
victory. They argue that the electorate are opposed to European integration. 
There is still time to put right our European policy as the IGC goes forward and before the manifesto 
is completed. If we were to give the public what they want - Euro-realism at the IGC and a 
referendum, perhaps on General Election day itself, we will wrong foot the Labour Party and 
establish a winning position at the General Election (Cash 1996: 41). 
The rebels believe that Conservative acquiescence in European federalism risks the 
party losing its principal point of contact with the British electorate. Although the 
public opinion poll evidence on this point is ambiguous, the Nationalists themselves 
consistently argue that anti-federalism would win votes for the Conservative Party. 
They believe that anti-federalism would clearly differentiate the Conservative Party 
from the Labour Party. Their argument that European integration is at variance with 
the Conservative Party's self-image as the patriotic party, allows them to claim 
legitimacy and stature from the party's historical tradition. 
Chamberlain and Social Imperialism 
Chamberlain's Tariff Reform campaign was examined in chapter three. Chamberlain 
took the Disraelian politics of support strategy to a more advanced and developed 
level. He wanted to rally Toryism behind a platform which would satisfy the 
distributive demands of the working classes and create a popular identification with 
the nation and the empire. Chamberlain hoped that his imperial policy would create 
an ideological imperative which would reach across the class divide and therefore 
ensure Conservative electoral hegemony. Chamberlain progressed beyond Disraeli's 
conception of empire as a common British "partnership of glory" and sought to 
persuade the electorate that their material aspirations could only be achieved through 
reinvigorated imperialism. Chamberlain also sought to convince the Tory leadership 
that protectionism would reinvigorate British capitalism. 
The context of social imperialism is also of importance. After the Liberal landslide 
of 1906 the Conservative leadership and many of their backbenchers feared that the 
arrival in parliament of the Labour Representation Committee was a prelude to a 
social revolution. The Tories at this stage in their evolution had already begun to 
absorb much of the middle class urban vote and were increasingly the party of 
property and of capitalism. Therefore this popular perception of their constituency 
left them more exposed to working class mobilisation. 
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Prominent Tories such as Wyndham and Milner read into the election returns the 
portents of revolution. It was this perception which informed the social imperialist 
desire to counteract the notion of class interest, incentives and identification. 
Chamberlain's rival conception of political conflict in the twentieth century was that 
there was an elite and popular consensus on the desirability of social reform. 
The conflict was whether the revenue to finance such reform would come from 
either the existing stock of wealth in society or additional resources. If it came from 
the existing stock then this would mean confiscation and redistribution of private 
property at the behest of a Socialist Government. Chamberlain's preferred route was 
to increase the resources available from tariff revenue inside the capitalist world 
economy. He wanted to establish the link between the empire and social reform, 
giving substance to the sentimental notion of Disraelian partnership. 
"One Nation" for Chamberlain was the clear synthesis of paternalism, the overriding 
bond of nationhood and the claim that imperialism could render universal benefit 
across society. Social imperialism gave greater coherence to Disraeli's attempts to 
combine identification with the nation and social paternalism. It was the 
attractiveness of this unified appeal which meant that a substantial section of the 
party tenaciously campaigned and lobbied for imperialism and specifically tariff 
reform even though it proved continually electorally unpopular. Leo Amery was the 
most eminent Tory advocate of the imperial strategy. Amery clearly articulated 
imperialism as a way of preventing class warfare from displacing Conservative rule: 
The one thing I dreaded ..... has been a cleavage based on class, on the desire for the material gain 
of one class of the community at the expense of others and of the banding together of those others in 
defence of their possessions. If my long political life has had any meaning it has lain in my constant 
struggle to keep the Tory Party true to a policy of Imperial greatness and social progress, linked with 
a quite definite economic creed of its own, and to prevent it drifting into becoming the party of a 
mere negative laissez-faire anti-Socialism (Amery 1953: 254-5). 
The rejections of the tariff reform platform by the electorate in 1906 and 1923 failed 
to deter Tories from campaigning in favour of the policy inside the party. Lord 
Blake has commented on the enduring appeal of protectionism for the party in 
defiance of the electoral response: 
Yet Tariff` Reform remained an article of faith in the party. Like Clause Four in the Labour 
Constitution it seemed irremovable, in spite of its obvious unpopularity with the public...... seldom 
has a party persisted so long in such an unpromising cause (Blake 1985: 183-4). 
Nationhood and Foreign Economic Policy 
Chamberlain's social imperialism unified nationhood ideology with a foreign 
economic policy strategy. After Chamberlain's death, his mantle was taken up by a 
strong imperialist wing of the party. They were committed to a vision of nationhood 
which would celebrate Britain's global identity by intensifying economic and 
diplomatic links with the British Empire. Nationhood for them was not a bland 
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assertion of national identity and heritage, it involved the defence of a strategic 
position for Britain in the world. The imperialists also sought to link domestic 
economic demands with the strength of the empire. Interwar Tory debates about the 
depression were not contested between those who believed the state should intervene 
in the domestic economy and those who believed in a limited state. Instead the 
salient controversy was a debate between those who believed economic recovery 
could only come about through a revival of imperial preference and those who 
supported free trade. 
The Alternative Political Economy of Empire Free Trade 
Throughout the interwar period the imperialists advocated an alternative foreign 
economic policy to the laissez faire orthodoxy. The imperialists were the only 
prominent opposition to the consensus of Gladstonian economics and during the 
period's economic crises, such as the 1931 sterling crash, their alternative was the 
only one which gained any hearing. 
The alternative project advocated by the imperialists was built around two pillars. 
The first was an extension of preferences to the empire, especially the white 
dominions of Canada and Australasia. The second pillar was far more ambitious in 
its intent -a total reshaping of international political economy on the basis of their 
favoured ideological model. The imperialists rallied to the first pillar whenever 
domestic economic conditions reached crisis, urging greater fiscal unification of the 
empire. For example in 1931 during the financial crisis, Beaverbrook proposed a 
substitution of higher tariffs for the planned expenditure cuts (Barnes and Nicholson 
1988: 176). In September 1931, Leo Amery, former Colonial Secretary, demanded 
that the National Government fight the election on tariff policy. The extent of 
imperialist support for this protectionist economic project is shown by the 200 Tory 
MPs who were members of the Empire Industries Association formed by Neville 
Chamberlain in 1923. 
Amery was also foremostly amongst the imperialists, the politician who made the 
case for the second pillar of their economic project, a restructuring of the global 
economy. Amery argued that laissez-faire had outlived its usefulness by the 
twentieth century. He followed an extension of the Churchillian argument that it was 
dangerous to chart the economic and political course of the 1930s according to the 
maps of the 1840s. Realpolitik dictated that one could not fly in the face of 
nationalist resurgence but you had to adapt to it. He believed in the universal 
application of protectionism by bringing together: 
Nations large enough to satisfy the technical requirements of modern production and yet also 
sufficiently held together by some common ideal, some cooperative purpose, to enlist the forces of 
economic nationalism on their behalf. (Amery quoted in Barnes and Nicholson 1988: 111-2). 
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Conservatives and the Globalist Ambition 
The intensity of Conservative imperialist agitation reached a peak during the period 
of rapid decolonisation in the 1950s and 1960s. The period is the vital context in 
which the Conservative divisions over European integration have to be assessed. 
The arguments over Europe became bound up with the legacy of empire and a 
global role. A large section of the party saw both the American alliance and the 
EEC as a repudiation of Britain's global ambitions and identity. The cultural 
attachements formed as a result of the empire meant that the imperialist Tories 
believed that Britain's global role could not be divorced from close economic and 
political relations with the Commonwealth. They were not prepared to accept that 
the Atlantic alliance or EEC membership could ever be an alternative means to 
perpetuate a global role. 
The most powerful theme that emerges from an analysis of the discourse of the 
postwar imperialists is the appeal of British global leadership which empire had 
bequeathed to the Conservative Party's psyche. The ideology of the empire and 
globalism became an independent identity, detached from the structural realities of 
postwar capitalism and the acceleration of British decline. These dynamics saw 
trading patterns shift decisively towards North America and Western Europe. In the 
postwar world Britain could bear less and less the costs of maintaining an empire. 
Even though Conservatives have now lost the political and territorial aspect of 
empire, the empire of `the mind' still has a hold over the Nationalists in the party. 
The Conservative attachment to globalism gained intellectual reinforcement from the 
political thought of the historian, John Seeley, in the nineteenth century at the height 
of British imperialism. Seeley argued that however wide the dispersion of colonies 
and however remote, they were governed by basically Anglo-Saxon insititutions, 
they were extensions of England. This was especially true of the white dominions in 
Australia, New Zealand and Canada. Seeley's hegemonic project conceived English 
influence, values and institutions permeating into other lands. The impact of this 
dissemination was far more profound and enduring than treating the colonies as a 
resource to be exploited. It was this political and not economic hegemony which was 
so attractive to the imperialists. Seeley described a world remade in Britain's own 
image: 
It creates not properly an Empire, but only a very large state. So far as the expansion itself is 
concerned, no one does or can regard it but with pleasure. (Seeley 1885: 296) 
The second aspect of Seeleyism which is relevant to Churchill is Seeley's attitude to 
post-independence America. Seeley bemoans the secession of the American colonies 
from Britain and draws wider lessons from this historical experience. The treatment 
of America he identifies stems from the British attitude to a colony as between a 
71 
master and a slave. The attitude which he advocated was the treatment of a colony 
as a child. 
This paternalistic concept of empire was one which had great resonance inside the 
imperialist wing of the party. For Tories like Amery and also amongst the wider and 
less committed party, even when the empire became less relevant to British 
capitalism, this vision of Britain's cultural and political shaping of international 
affairs was a seductive one. Britain did not only have a world role because that is 
where her economic interest led her but because of the network of associations and 
obligations which economic imperialism had brought into being. 
These cultural imperial attachments were the factor which ensured that globalism 
persisted in the Tory psyche, in defiance of economic realities. It had become an 
independent source of authority, validation and compensation for many 
Conservatives. Tories were forced to come to terms with Britain's economic 
weakness and the consequential loss of her former colonies. What they were least 
reconciled to was the loss of "Britannia" the cult of British prestige and influence 
which the Conservative Party had celebrated for the previous seventy years. This 
conflict between the reality of imperial decline and the attraction to the 
political/ideological conception of globalism was symbolised by the Suez trauma. 
The emotional concept of a common imperial British identity and citizenship became 
detached from the economic realities of the post-war global economy. This 
detachment increased because the Tory leadership refused to create a genuine 
economic imperial union which would have erected tariffs in opposition to the rest 
of the world (Gamble 1974: 169). 
The tenacity of the imperialists' attempts to reinvigorate the preference system in 
trading relations with the countries of the overseas sterling area (OSA) was not 
because they recognised that their vision had to have some firm economic 
underpinnings. They could see that the direction of British trade was making the 
achievement of their vision less likely. The desperation of the Tory imperialists to 
maintain their idealistic and cultural attachment to empire, led them to push for 
meaningful economic linkages, in order to shore up the political conception of 
British globalism. The preferences which they demanded were increasingly artificial 
linkages designed only to perpetuate the ideal of British leadership in the world - the 
ultimate magnification of British power and patriotism. Epstein argues that the Suez 
Group members were not unreconstructed romantics who wished to see a return to 
the halcyon days of empire in 1900 (Epstein 1964: 53). 
The Antecedents for Atlanticist Conservatism 
In the wartime period all Conservatives were united around the objective of 
maintaining a global British role. The disputes arose about how to secure this 
objective. Whilst Tory imperialists wished to perpetuate an independent global role, 
the party leadership from Churchill onwards came to a reluctant acceptance that this 
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objective was unrealistic. Chamberlain, the former Tory Prime Minister, had sought 
to avoid war precisely because he feared that it would lead to a diminution of British 
power and a dependence on the United States. 
Nevertheless, after the war Churchill made the assessement that a British global role 
could only be pursued through a junior partner role in the Anglo-American alliance. 
Churchill's commitment to the Anglo-American alliance established a foreign policy 
tradition which the Thatcherite Nationalists have drawn upon. Churchill sought to 
make a virtue out of the transfer of supremacy from Britain to America after the 
Second World War by stressing the cultural basis for such an alliance. Charmley is 
dismissive of Churchill's Anglo-Saxon pretensions and stresses that the American 
political class was unmoved by Churchill's sentimentalism (Charmley 1995: 72-3). 
The imperialists resented American supremacy because it threatened the pursuit of 
an independent colonial role and identity for Britain. Suez was the symbolic moment 
when this conflict between these aspirations and American power was resolved. 
During wartime itself Churchill struggled to come to terms with the transfer of 
economic and diplomatic power to America. Anthony Eden, his successor, found 
the accommodation between globalism and US leadership even more difficult. Suez 
was the symbolic flashpoint which finally made clear to Tories the terms of the 
partnership with America. 
Throughout the war, in an exchange of letters and cables between Churchill and 
Roosevelt, it is apparent that the Anglo-American economic relationship was in the 
final phase of being a competitive and conflictual rather than the warm alliance, 
which Churchill was later to celebrate. Some American politicians were strongly 
opposed to British imperialism and pressured President Roosevelt to take advantage 
of Britain's economic dependence vis-a-vis the US, in order to dismantle Britain's 
imperial preferences. Five US Senators said that America was a "global sucker" by 
letting Britain take advantage of its military and economic assistance without any 
reciprocal trade advantages (Hitchens 1991: 222). Churchill's correspondence with 
Roosevelt contains many pleas for America to respect-British imperial interests. In 
one instance Churchill violently objected to an American proposal to load an 
American warship with 30 million pounds worth of South African gold and carry it 
to the US as insurance for British debt. Churchill's immediate response was to 
describe the US action as akin to "a sheriff collecting the last assets of a hapless 
debtor" (Hitchens 1991: 205). 
In the aftermath of the Second World War it became clear to Churchill that Anglo- 
American rivalry was at an end and that supremacy had now decisively been 
transferred from Britain to America. Churchill in his years as Opposition Leader 
gradually came to terms with this reality, especially after the US revocation of the 
Lend-Lease agreement, which provoked a large Tory rebellion against the terms 
forced on the Attlee Government. Churchill believed that the only means for Britain 
to perpetuate its global role after 1945 was to seek a junior partnership with the new 
hegemonic power. 
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Churchill hoped to soften the blow of American dominance by stressing the common 
cultural ties which would ensure Britain's superior stature in Washington. If 
Churchill could not preside over Britannia then he was determined that an Anglo- 
Saxon hegemony should continue. In his famous speech at Fulton, Missouri in 1946 
as Opposition Leader, Winston Churchill called for a "special relationship" with 
America and reiterated his proposals for a common citizenship. This proposal, 
scarcely taken seriously by anyone in Washington, was indicative of the extent to 
which the Tory leader was attempting to make a virtue out of America's new 
dominance of international relations. 
However it is of course the "Iron Curtain" section of his speech warning against the 
expansion of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, which is remembered. Churchill 
hoped to use the Soviet threat as an external device to bind Britain and America 
together. Churchill made his conception of "three circles" in which Britain's 
security interests would operate - the Commonwealth, the Atlantic relationship and 
Europe. Gamble argues that Churchill's formulation was deliberately designed to 
obviate making a choice between these circles (Gamble 1974: 185). 
However there is little doubt as to Churchill's own choice and the emotional 
attachments which motivated it. If anything the three circles conception expressed 
the debate over economic and security alignments inside the Conservative Party. For 
Churchill, the Anglo-American circle was the key alignment. Britain's actions in the 
imperial and European circles would be subordinated to an Anglo-America 
partnership. Churchill's advocacy of a "United States of Europe" in the Fulton 
speech did not envisage Britain as a participant. Instead Britain would be an outside 
sponsor, coaxing and encouraging the defeated and crippled Western European 
powers to simultaneously achieve reconciliation and reconstruction. 
Pro-Europeans have often tried to claim that Churchill would have endorsed their 
views. However in a record from a November 1951 at a Cabinet meeting, Churchill 
made his aloof attitude to British participation in any move towards European unity 
quite explicit: 
I never thought that Britain or the British Commonwealth should, either individually or collectively, 
become an integral part of a European federation ..... Our first object is the unity and consolidation of 
the British Commonwealth and what is left of the former British Empire. Our second, the "fraternal 
association" of the English-speaking world; and third, United Europe, to which we are a separate, 
closely and specially related ally and friend (CAB 129/48 C(51) 32). 
The assymetrical nature of the Anglo-American alliance should not be 
underestimated. The total war strategy had ravaged the UK's manufacturing base 
and infrastructure and exhausted its financial position. The terms exacted by the 
Truman Administration under Lend-Lease and the curtailment of British imperial 
preferences under the GATT regime, were evidence of the power of the new 
American-led Western order. Indeed John Charmley argues that Churchill refused to 
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recognise that British and American interests were not identical in war and in peace 
(Charmley 1993: 593). Churchill acquiesced in the harsh terms of the Anglo- 
American alliance because of his desire for Britain to continue to play a global role. 
Conservative leaders at this time were united around a strong commitment to the 
globalist conception of British power. However whereas Churchill's commitment 
led him to a belief in the necessity of a strategic partnership with the United States, 
Chamberlain, Churchill's predecessor as Tory Prime Minister, believed that British 
status could only be maintained through an independent stance vis-a-vis America and 
Europe. Charmley argues that Chamberlain understood that a British `great power' 
role could only be maintained if Britain did not enter a debilitating and expensive 
European war. Chamberlain feared that war would undermine the foundations of 
British power (Charmley 1995: 8). Maurice Cowling also argues that Chamberlain's 
commitment to globalism made him believe that a war would lead to British 
dependence on America (Cowling 1977). 
The imperialists were bitterly hostile to the influence of the United States in foreign 
economic policy, in particular US trade policy. The diehard imperialists in 1950s 
refused to bow to the logic which Churchill accepted at the end of the war - that the 
American "empire" had now eclipsed British claims and global independence. The 
colonial Right saw America as a threat to an independent international role, where 
Britain maintained trading preferences with the Commonwealth. 
The imperialists saw the multilateral American led GATT rules, especially the Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) clause, as an obstacle to their objective of reinvigorated 
imperial preferences. While Washington found it convenient to encourage a military 
and diplomatic British role in many of its former colonies, in order to resist 
Communist encroachment, Washington was opposed to Britain being able to retain 
its trading preferences with the empire. The postwar imperialists were a 
continuation of the Chamberlainite tradition in the party, in terms of support for 
empire but also in the linkage to social reform. Tories like Julian Amery, Lord 
Hinchingbrooke and Biggs-Davison could not be crudely described as being "right 
wing. " They formed the backbone of the "Suez Group", the rebels who had opposed 
the original evacuation of the Suez canal zone in 1954. 
The Impact of Suez 
Suez was the major historic flashpoint which brought Conservatives face-to-face 
with the reality of Britain's diminished status and her subordination to the US. It has 
subsequently been interpreted as the symbolic shock which accelerated the shift 
towards decolonisation. However the interesting point is that the political actors at 
the time chose to portray the crisis in these apocalyptic terms, they raised the stakes 
of the conflict and invested them with a wider significance. This is clear from the 
speeches in the House of Commons and also from the stance of Anthony Eden, the 
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Conservative Prime Minister. This appears curious after Suez has been properly 
contextualised. 
Firstly, the importance of the canal by 1956 was extremely dubious to say the least. 
The rationale of canal ownership and fortification had been to protect the short-sea 
route to India. However Indian independence had already been granted eight years 
before, rendering the canal of far less strategic significance. Commercially, 
President Nasser was still offering right of passage to international shipping through 
the canal. 
Secondly, Churchill, previously the great apologist for absolute empire over India, 
had ordered the evacuation from the canal zone of British troops in 1954. It was at 
this point that the pass had been sold, with the recognition that Britain could no 
longer bear the burdens of empire to this extent. It was the evacuation from the 
canal zone which precipitated the rebellion of 25 Tory MPs and the formation of the 
Suez Group on the 29th July 1954. The evacuation meant that Britain no longer had 
the power to intervene militarily East of Suez to make or break governments in the 
Middle East. 
So if the strategic significance of the canal had been removed, why did the issue 
provoke the crisis? The trauma would seem to lie in the sentimental attachment 
which had developed around the canal from Disraeli's initiative onwards even 
though the canal zone, the heart of the old empire, had been evacuated, 
Nasser's nationalisation visibly brought home the extent to which Britain could no 
longer determine events in an important region of the world. Nasser confronted the 
Conservatives with the logical consequences of their withdrawal from the canal 
zone. Britain could no longer ensure that a group of client states complied with her 
interests or perceived interests. Nasser's actions stripped away the illusion of power 
which the Conservative leadership had attempted to perpetuate even after the 
evacuation in 1954. The following quotation from Peter Walker at the Conservative 
Conference in 1956 shows the symbolism with which the canal was invested with 
inside the party: 
Suez is basic and vital to the economic survival of our nation and the nations of the Commonwealth. 
It would surely be unthinkable for a Tory Government to take any action than a resolute stand against 
a dictator threatening the very life line of British trade and commerce. (Quoted in CPCR 1956: 8) 
When Eden launched the British-French action against Nasser he faced the wrath of 
the Eisenhower Administration and censure at the UN. This censure also had the 
effect of causing a momentary financial crisis of confidence in the British 
government. Both the US censure and the financial strictures which Eden faced 
brought home again the extent to which Britain's pretensions were no longer 
realisable in international relations. Churchill's actions in 1954 had facilitated the 
subsequent invasion but the Conservative coalition could not reconcile itself to the 
consequences of the 1954 policy change. 
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The reaction of the imperialists to the American intervention and the humiliating 
withdrawl of the Anglo-French forces was predictably furious. Yet their anger only 
highlighted to the non-diehard elements of the parliamentary party the extent to 
which Britain had lost its hegemonic role. Julian Amery MP argued that the UN had 
become a cover for US imperialism (Epstein 1964: 56). The Suez Group's indignant 
anti-American stance found a wider resonance at the height of the crisis when the 
famous Early Day Motion (EDM) appeared in November 1956, stating that the 
"attitude of the US Government was gravely endangering the Atlantic alliance. " It 
was signed by 127 Tory MPs. 
On 6th December 1956 15 Tories abstained on the withdrawl from the canal zone 
vote forced under the threat of US sanctions. They included Empire loyalists, like 
Fell, Maude and Naborro. These MPs were to form the core of the later diehard 
opposition to the EEC application. The rebels had a strong following in the country. 
This is exemplified by the warm reception given to Angus Maude by his 
constituency party at Ealing South, who presented him with a unanimous vote of 
confidence, after Maude had resigned the party whip. 
Powellism and European Integration 
Powell was the primary and almost only spokesman for another alternative strand of 
nationhood, breaking with globalist ambitions and Anglo-America. Powell argued 
that after Suez, Britain had to recognise that its imperial past was behind it and 
retreat to a role as a proudly independent island nation. Even though Powell's 
isolationism is repudiated by Thatcherites, his critique of European integration has 
been adopted by Thatcher and her followers. 
Powell began his career as an imperialist, having studied in a Commonwealth 
country and formed emotional ties with the concept of empire. After Suez however, 
Powell rapidly and dramatically reappraised his views on imperialism, with an 
almost Pauline conversion speech at Trinity college, Dublin in November 1964. He 
now declared that the idea of Britain as a world power had been a myth but it was a 
' good myth'. He argued that responsible political leaders should give people good 
myths to inspire patriotism. 
Powell wished to reaffirm a strong cohesive feeling of national identity. His hostility 
to immigration and multiracialism was therefore consistent with his conception of 
Britain's role in the world. Powell saw patriotism as a re-energising form of national 
pride which would allow Britain to regain its stature in a global economy: 
Britain today needs desperately for its own sake of self-respect, to regain the confidence and the 
conviction that it can hold up its head in the world in competition with all comers in the world 
(Wooda 1965: 16). 
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Powell dismissed the notion of pooling sovereignty within the EEC because of his 
absolutist conception of the nation. Powell argued that only British political 
institutions have the legitimacy to govern the British people. He argued that a 
democratic state had to be socially and culturally homogeneous. If a state had a 
heterogeneous population, then it would not be able to command consent from these 
citizens. Powell argued that democracy was synonymous with the nation-state. In a 
homogeneous nation state an electoral minority would acquiesce with the majority's 
wishes, because of an underlying affinity with their fellow-countrymen. 
Powell argued that the EEC's multinational nature denied it this basis of popular 
consent. He believed that the different regional, ethnic and national identities within 
the EEC, did not allow for common affinities and therefore consent for majority 
rule. This stress on the need for a common national culture to underpin government 
has been adopted by the Thatcherites. Norman Tebbit said after the 1991 IGC that 
"people will not be governed by those who do not speak their own language. " 
Powell stressed that any democratic governing institutions had to be the expression 
of the will of a national community. If the European institutions were to gain 
legitimacy then there would have to be a common European identity: 
To transform the assembly of the EEC into a true Parliament and the government of the EEC into 
parliamentary government, would require more than constitutional reforms, amendments and devices, 
It would require the transformation of the inhabitants of Western Europe, including the British Isles 
into a single homogeneous electorate.... Each must form his own judgment of how miraculous such a 
tranformation would be (Powell 1992: 472-3). 
The virtue of Powell's platform of isolationism was that although it laid bare the 
decline of British power it did not subordinate Britain to another alliance, one in 
which she would not be able to be entirely independent. Powell believed that while 
Britain should abandon any pretentions to grandeur and a global role, it was 
essential that she should at least be independent in this diminished position. The 
celebration of a proud independent island nation made a virtue out of the retreat 
from empire in a way that EEC or Anglo-America never could. In Powell's world 
Britain could at least be master of all that she surveyed and could reconcile herself 
to that, rather than enter the broader stage but compromise her independence and 
distinctiveness. Whereas supporters of the Anglo-American relationship, like 
Macmillan, hoped that in return for a loss of independence, Britain could retain a 
global influence. 
Europe As A Retreat From Globalism 
For imperialists , 
Anglo-America threat to an independent British colonial policy. 
Europe, however, was an assault on the very essence of a globalist British identity. 
The EEC's trading rules and the supranational nature represented a negation of the 
global ideal for Tory imperialists. The EEC's common external tariff inevitably 
meant a diminution of imperial trading preferences. Diminished economic links with 
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the Commonwealth meant a diminished political relationship. Europe also 
represented Britain turning its back on a world role and focusing instead on a 
confined continental role. It is therefore unsurprising that many of the opponents of 
British EEC membership. in the 1960s-70s were Tory imperalists, like Robin 
Turton. 
Chapter Two considered the economic and political trends which led to Macmillan's 
decision to make an application to seek British membership of the EEC. Macmillan 
understood that the Commonwealth was no longer a viable alliance to underpin 
British foreign policy but he chose not to share this analysis with his party. He 
reluctantly came to the conclusion that the globalist objective was only attainable 
through membership of the EEC. It is because he appreciated the strength of internal 
party sentiment for the Commonwealth that Macmillan issued a series of disclaimers 
about the importance of the Commonwealth in order to reassure his MPs. He 
presented this fundamental change of policy as an alternative means to preserve 
Britain's existing commitments to the Commonwealth: 
I ask myself the question: how can we best serve the Commonwealth standing aside from the 
movement for European unity, or by playing our part in its development(HC Debates, 2/8/61, Vol. 
645, Col. 1484). 
Whenever the party leadership was pressed specifically on whether a strategic 
choice was involved they sought refuge in a series of disclaimers, insisting that the 
EEC did not involve any strategic choice for the country about its global identity 
and affiliations throughout the world: 
But I believe that my European friends will not misunderstand me if I say that if were forced to make 
this cruel choice I would unquestionably choose the Commonwealth .... Happily we are not confronted 
with this dilemma. Europe fully recognises the importance of the Commonwealth (Rt Hon Duncan 
Sandys MP in HC Debates, 3/8/61, Vol. 645, Col. 1755). 
Europe And The Loss Of Policy Independence 
European membership and European integration did not only involve Britain 
symbolically turning its back on a global role but it meant placing limits on Britain's 
policy independence on domestic matters. It was galling enough for the 
Conservative Party to accept that the Americans could circumscribe British foreign 
policy preferences, as they did during the Suez crisis. European integration was 
even more traumatising. Europe did not only involve a diminution of Britain's 
external power but it threatened British policy independence over domestic issues. 
Tories who had celebrated Britain's government of India and other colonies, now 
had to face the prospect that Britain would lose domestic independence. 
These constraints on British domestic policy were highlighted by Enoch Powell in 
his long campaign against EEC membership. Powell stressed that the nature of the 
contract involved in British accession to the Treaty of Rome was unparalleled 
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compared to other treaty obligations which Britain had entered into. The centrepiece 
of Powell's opposition to British accession was that membership bound Britain in 
advance to whatever others might decide (Powell 1992: 475). One example of such 
a binding common decision would be the judgements of the European Court of 
Justice. 
Powell also dismissed the notion of pooling sovereignty put forward by Tory pro- 
Europeans. His absolutist concept of nationhood is followed through in his 
constitutional arguments about sovereignty. Powell says that if X is governed by 
XYZ then it is no longer self-governing, unless X always prevails over Y and Z. He 
acknowledges the diplomatic argument that Y and Z may be more favourably 
disposed to X in this arragement but this does not alter the fact that X has lost 
sovereignty. Powell says that even slaves or servants may be treated well by their 
masters (Powell 1992: 476). 
European supranationalism therefore represented a further stage in the declining 
prestige of the Conservative nation. Further European integration with a consequent 
loss of British policy independence takes Conservatives even further away from the 
Disraelian ideal of a proud independent world power. Oliver Letwin, a former 
adviser to Margaret Thatcher in the Downing Street Policy Unit, succinctly 
summarises the loss of power which the EEC represents for many Tories: 
Last time round the Empire was ours. We were not part of it. This time we will not run it, we will 
merely be part of it. Decisions - the decisions of our union will not be made at Westminster; they will 
be made in Brussels. Instead of ruling a large part of the world we will be supplicants at a court 
several hundred miles away (Letwin 1989: 33). 
The Thatcherite nationalists still have a strong commitment to Britain's global role, 
particularly in relation to the Anglo-American alliance. Like Churchill, they see 
Britain's natural role as a trusted junior partner to the United States. Increasingly, 
they see the development of the European Union as increasingly antithetical to this 
role. The next chapter will outline this conflict. The Thatcherites also increasingly 
resent the domestic constraints on British policy independence brought about by EU 
membership. Chapter Five will show how the integrationist dynamics in the 
European Union are incompatible with national independence. 
The Conservative Ideological Tradition 
The ideology of nationhood and its intertwining with foreign economic policy shown 
in the tradition of the Social Imperialism provides more substantiation for the Baker, 
Gamble and Ludlum 1993 conception of Tory foreign economic policy conflicts 
discussed in chapter three. These authors argue that the Conservative ideological 
tradition can be viewed as a conflict between demands for the assertion of 
sovereigny versus acceptance of greater interdependence. 
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Ridley and Spicer have consistent neo-liberal/national soveriegnty responses to 
earlier controversies in FEP. Both argue that a Conservative Government was 
wrong to return to the Gold Standard in 1925. In the same way this patterning is 
shown by the postwar imperialists from an extended government/ sovereignty 
position on the Baker, Gamble and Ludlam ideological quadrant (Baker, Gamble 
and Ludlam 1933). Sir John Biggs Davison is a good example of this patterning in 
the Tory ideological tradition. He argued that it was the system of national 
protectionism which brought Britain supremacy. He attacks Peel for surrendering 
the true Tory cause by his embrace of laissez-faire (Biggs-Davison 1957: 25). 
For Biggs-Davison, free trade marked the decline in English fortunes. He says that 
the 1860 Cobden Free Trade Treaty mutilated the Cape's wine industry and sewed 
the seeds for the Boer War. Biggs-Davison assails the legitimacy of laissez-faire in 
the Tory tradition of political practice, attacking it as a Liberal policy. He gains 
historical stature for the superiority of his position by arguing that protectionism is 
in line with the paternal tradition of the English monarchy since the Middle Ages 
Other imperialists, like Arthur Bryant, a writer of anti-EEC tracts after the 
Macmillan application, support the case of a recurring conflict over FEP inside the 
party, complete with contested versions of historical events. Bryant's identifies the 
great betrayal as Baldwin's in 1923 by not pursing his election pledge to introduce a 
tariff policy: 
When a generation later the Conservative Party returned to power, despite a tentative and 
unsuccessful attempt by its new leader, Stanley Baldwin, to revert to Joseph Chamberlain's ideal, it 
continued to steer a nineteenth century course through the economic tempest of the twentieth century. 
(Bryant 1962: 21). 
Nationhood and the British State 
The Conservative ideology of nationhood cannot be seen in isolation from other 
factors. Nationhood as articulated by Disraeli and his successors did not just involve 
celebration of a common cultural identity and Britain's global prestige. It was also 
closely identified with the character of the British constitution and the nature of the 
Conservative Party's organisation. Anti-federalist Tories are defending a particular 
conception of the nation, one which involved constitutional as well as cultural 
aspects. This conception has grown out of the interaction of a leadership-focused 
party, the centralisation of power within the British state. 
Disraeli celebrated nationhood partly by celebrating British institutions. Chief 
amongst these institutions was parliament. Parliament and the monarchy were both 
institutions which were invested by the Tories with significance as symbols of the 
nation. However parliament was much more than a symbol because it was also the 
site of political power. It expressed the will of 'the nation' and therefore was a 
subject of particular Tory reverence. Parliament's institutional role within the 
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British state had also developed in a direction by the time of Disraeli which made it 
very difficult for Conservatives to countenance any diminution of its role. 
By the time Disraeli became Prime Minister the slippage of sovereign power to the 
executive was well established. As David Judge has argued government was already 
the preserve of the executive (Judge 1993: 25). By the 1830s ministerial measures in 
parliament were given priority (Fraser 1960: 451). The Cabinet's formulative role 
in policy became routinised and the legislative initiative had moved from parliament 
to the executive. Judge also argues that the development of mass-membership 
national Conservative and Liberal parties as a consequence of the extension of the 
franchise cemented the adherence of MPs to executive policy (Judge 1993: 25). By 
the time of the Disraeli premiership the Conservative leadership was articulating its 
appeal to nationhood in the context of greater executive supremacy within the British 
state. Theories of representative government in Britain have conceived of the House 
of Commons as holding the executive to acccount. Whereas in actuality 
representative government has become the legitimation of executive power (Judge 
1993: 6). 
The executive supremacy of the British state complemented the elitist character of 
the Conservative Party. A state which places great power in the hands of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet is attractive to a party which is dominated by its leadership. 
The Conservative Party is a leadership and not a member's party. Eccleshall argued 
that Conservatism is a ruling class ideology, one that identifies society as a 
command structure, where people are disciplined by firm political leadership 
(Eccleshall 1984: 91). Within the Tory Party's organisation, the formal 
centralisation of power legitimises and rationalises this ideology (Beer 1969: 92-98). 
Conservative Central Office and its chairman are within the patronage of the party 
leader. The leader is sovereign in making party policy with his or her position 
subject to the support of the parliamentary elite. 
So in office a Conservative Prime Minister is a strong leader at the head of a strong 
executive in a highly centralised state. Judge argues that the nature of the British 
state has conferred upon politicians an 'executive mentality'. This mentality is one 
which accords with the Tory party's elitist character, where the party mission is to 
lead the populus rather than respond to wider democratic forces. 
European integration is therefore a challenge to a Conservative conception of 
nationhood which stresses the sole legitimacy of parliament as the expression of the 
will of the British people. In this respect parliament is the nation. At the same time 
the increasing competence of the European institutions threatens the Tory Party's 
attachment to strong executive power. Every ruling of the European Court and 
every majority vote on the Council of Ministers represents a potential threat to the 
executive supremacy of the British state which the Tory leadership has so prized. A 
constitutional tradition based on a centralisation of power in Westminster, the Tory 
emphasis on national identity and its leadership driven character have combined to 
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encourage many Tories to defend British self-government to the death. 
Parliamentary sovereignty is therefore both a symbol of nationhood for many Tories 
and a doctrine which expresses the Conservative desire for political and 
constitutional supremacy in Britain. 
Conclusion 
Nationhood was conceived by the Tory leadership as a means of making an electoral 
appeal which overrode class divisions. This electoral ideology from the outset meant 
much more than an affirmation of cultural identity. From Disraeli onwards, 
nationhood centred on the celebration of the nation's external prestige in the world 
economy. The Tory attachment to global prestige was centred on the British empire. 
This emphasis on national prestige was used as a powerful electoral ideology by the 
Conservatives. The Thatcherite Nationalists also wish to use European integration to 
make a patriotic appeal to the British electorate. 
In the aftermath of the Second World War the Tories' globalist ambitions, expressed 
through the Commonwealth, were confronted by American supremacy. Eventually, 
Britain's ability to conduct an independent colonial or foreign policy was 
undermined by American power, symbolised by the Suez debacle. Churchill's 
grudging accomodation with American power prepared the basis for the more full- 
hearted support for Anglo-America held by the Thatcherite Nationalists. 
Europe was even more of a challenge to the Tory conception of nationhood than 
American power. EEC membership threatened the nation's ability to govern itself in 
domestic affairs whereas Washington only curtailed Britain's foreign policy 
independence. Europe also represented a retreat from world influence and global 
ambitions. The combination of domestic restraints on British sovereignty and a 
confined continental sphere of influence ensured that Europe was very traumatic for 
many Conservatives. 
The next chapter will show how the intial Macmillan application for EEC 
membership was strongly influenced by Atlanticist considerations. Macmillan 
carried forward Churchill's conception of the US alliance by his attempt to lock 
Europe into American world leadership. It is this hostility to a more independent 
Europe which still strongly influences the Thatcherite Nationalists. However the two 
pro-European Conservative groupings see Europe taking on a more independent 
identity. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
EUROPE AND ATLANTICISM 
As our economic influence declined in comparison with that of the Community, we should find that 
the United States and other countries would increasingly attach more weight to the views and 
interests of the Community (Reginald Maudling, Cabinet meeting 13/7/60) 
A united Europe would augment, not check the power of a united Germany. Germany would pursue 
its interests inside or outside, while a Europe built on corporatist and protectionist lines implicit in 
the Franco-German alliance would certainly be more antipathetic to the Americans than the looser 
Europe I preferred (Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p. 784) 
When it comes the crunch, Britain has invariably been America's only truly reliable ally (Sir Charles 
Powell in The Spectator 31/9/94). 
More and more Europeans were coming to feel that when it came to the crunch, their governments 
had no real influence on America's strategic thinking and that established NATO mechanisms risked 
becoming unidirectional (Geoffrey Howe, Conflict of Loves , 32) 
The Thatcherite Nationalists and the two pro-European Conservative groupings are 
divided on the issue of whether British foreign policy should be based on 
Europeanism or Atlanticism. The previous chapter examined Churchill's attempts to 
forge an Anglo-American alliance in order to adapt British ambitions to the harsh 
realities of the postwar world. In the aftermath of Suez, Macmillan strengthened his 
government's commitment to an Atlanticist project, designed to achieve common 
Anglo-American economic and security objectives. 
Macmillan's Atlanticist project saw British membership of the EEC as a means to 
strengthen Britain's alliance with the United States. Macmillan's application was 
also designed to curb moves towards an independent Europeanist foreign policy. 
The Thatcherite Nationalists are committed to this Atlanticist project and it has 
become integral to their opposition to European federalism. However, pro-European 
Tories like Howe stand in the tradition established by Heath's Europeanist policy. 
Heath wished to see a more assertive and Europeanist foreign policy as a 
counterbalance to Washington. 
The Thatcherites instinctively trust American leadership in the security and 
economic spheres. They wish to perpetuate an Anglo-American alliance in the post- 
Cold War era. They deeply distrust Europe in economic and security matters. They 
fear a federal Europe would undermine American leadership. The pro-Europeans 
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believe that Washington's past unilateral foreign policy actions, together with 
America's current disengagment from its post-Cold War role, reinforces the need 
for a more Europeanist policy. Tory groupings contest the meanings of crises like 
the Gulf War and the Bosnian conflict, in advocating their respective projects. The 
divide between these two opposing conceptions of British foreign policy is 
widening. 
The Relevance of the Macmillan Application 
The Nationalists' support for an Atlanticist project and rejection of a Europeanist 
stance has deep roots in Conservative foreign policy. Harold Macmillan's 
application to join the EEC was driven by a desire to reinforce the Anglo-American 
alliance and to check European foreign policy ambitions. The application stemmed 
from an Atlanticist project, combining a fundamental coincidence of view and 
interest between the British and American Governments. This project was 
reinvigorated by Thatcher and Reagan in the 1980s. An Anglo-American free 
trading project still influences the Thatcherites in their attitude to European 
federalism in the 1990s. 
Both President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan supported an American 
leadership role in order to defend a Western managed global free trading order. 
Both saw Communism as the primary challenge to this order. They also saw a more 
independent European foreign policy as disruptive to the defence of the Western 
order. However both leaders had to accept the reality of a revived Europe and 
needed to successfully manage diplomacy in relation to its existence. Macmillan 
realised that Europe's growing power would force it into the top counsels of 
Washington, however uncongenial its existence might be to the Americans. This 
development would be at Britain's expense. Whereas Kennedy knew that Britain's 
usefulness as an ally would diminish if she could not use her influence to steer 
Europe towards American foreign policy preferences. Therefore it was in both 
leaders' interests for Britain to join the EEC, in order to exert an influence on the 
direction of the organisation. 
The Strategic Context for the Application 
Chapter three examined Churchill's gradual accommodation with American 
supremacy. It also analysed Churchill's belief that Britain should be an outside 
sponsor and not a participant of European unification. By the time of Macmillan' 
premiership, the Conservative Party was forced into a recognition of the brutal 
realities of US supremacy. The Tories also accepted an Anglo-American alliance, 
with Britain as the junior partner. 
By this stage the antagonistic relationship between British and American power in 
relation to Commonwealth trade had ended. Economically, this was due to the 
withering in value of imperial preferences. Politically, Suez had also demonstrated 
America's ability to dictate terms to Britain. Past imperial and territorial rivalry was 
now overriden by a common interest in repelling Soviet encroachment from British 
and American markets. 
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Macmillan came to Downing Street determined to secure an optimum position for 
British foreign policy influence within these parameters. Indeed it was he who was 
one of the pivotal figures in pressing Eden to abandon the Suez expedition under 
American pressure. As Chancellor of the Exchequer, Macmillan had been faced 
with the reality of the vulnerability of the British economy in the face of American 
and international pressure. during the occupation of the canal zone. This political 
background to his assumption of the premiership made Macmillan more likely to 
seek to anchor Britain firmly within the Atlantic alliance. 
Macmillan had two overriding objectives in his foreign policy. He wished to 
maintain Britain's global influence and role and secondly, he wanted to maintain 
diplomatic stature with Washington. Macmillan hoped that a closer relationship with 
Washington would avoid a repetition of the misunderstandings of Suez. Macmillan 
came to the conclusion that EEC membership was necessary for the achievement of 
these objectives. He hoped that the Atlantic alignment would be reinforced by 
British membership of the Community. Macmillan believed that the 
Commonwealth's gradual decline into a series of fractious bilateral relations and its 
economic weakness, made it unviable as a support for Britain's global aspirations. 
Macmillan saw Europe as an alternative means to support a global British role. 
Macmillan had no intention of abandoning the global ambitions of his Tory 
predecessors. Young argues that Macmillan stressed the continuity of British policy 
in advocating Europe to the Tory party (Young 1993: 85). His application was not 
conceived as a radical break with Tory foreign policy, which would commit Britain 
to an exclusively European diplomatic alignment. Dutton notes that EEC 
membership was not envisaged by Macmillan as a replacement for Britain's external 
relationships but as an addition to them (Dutton 1993: 523). Young argues that 
Macmillan saw EEC membership as a means of propping up British power (Young 
1993: 85). Macmillan's continuing commitment to a globalist conception of British 
power is shown in his own commentary on the application: 
It was after all, asking a great deal of the Conservative Party, so long and so intimately linked with 
the ideal of Empire, to accept the changed situation, which might require a new concept by which 
Britain might serve Commonwealth and world interests more efficiently if she were linked with 
Europe than if she remained isolated, doomed to a diminishing power in a world in which her 
relative wealth and strength were bound to shrink (Macmillan 1973: 5). 
This passage shows that from the very outset the Conservatives' European 
perspective was not influenced by a commitment to the European project of Monnet, 
with the associated beliefs in federalism and Franco-German reconciliation. The 
decisive factor in the Macmillan application was not an embrace of these ideals but a 
conviction that a great power role and the Anglo-American alliance could only be 
perpetuated via the Community. Eisenhower had warned Macmillan that Britain had 
to become an EEC member if it wished to retain international importance 
(Middlemas 1990: 33). 
Macmillan's realisation of Britain's diminishing diplomatic influence and relative 
economic decline at first led him to construct the European Free Trade Association 
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(EFTA). He saw EFTA as a device whereby Britain could reassert its authority and 
bargaining power vis-a-vis the EEC. However what he certainly did not wish to see 
was an economic and political division of Europe, with Britain stranded in the 
weaker "bloc" of influence. The formation of EFTA was a means of exerting more 
pressure on the EEC to move towards an accommodation with Britain. 
By the end of 1960 Macmillan had resolved that membership of the EEC was 
becoming essential. The decisive factor for Macmillan was his fear that the new 
entity was not only becoming more commercially prosperous but that it was showing 
signs of becoming an independent "third force" in international affairs, between the 
US and the Soviet Union. Even though US administrations might feel a stronger 
identification with British foreign policy aims, they would give Britain increasingly 
less weight due to the sheer size of the EEC in foreign economic policy. This fear 
that Britain might be bypassed by the US in foreign policymaking, was put most 
cogently by Reginald Maudling, the President of the Board of Trade at a Cabinet 
meeting on the 13th July 1960: 
As our economic influence declined in comparison with that of the Community, we should find that 
the United States and other countries would increasingly attach more weight to the views and 
interests of the Community (Maudling 1960). 
George Ball, from the US State Department made the point even more starkly: 
Did Britain wish to face a European coalition hostile to its interests, or a group of European nations 
working closely with the US that did not include Britain? To avoid these dangers Britain must try to 
become the leader of Europe (Ball 1982: 217). 
De Gaulle's France was also diverging from Atlantic foreign policy and Macmillan 
feared that the Community would increasingly become the expression for 
"disruptive" French foreign policy preferences. Developments like the Fouchet Plan 
and early ideas for European political cooperation were potentially worrisome for 
Macmillan in this respect (Lord 1993). These concerns stemmed from the basic 
British fear of foreign policy isolation. Yet Macmillan was also opposed to the 
substance of Gaullist foreign policies and felt a much stronger identification with the 
traditional "containment" policies of the Kennedy and Eisenhower administrations. 
In the New Year of 1961, Norman Brook, Macmillan's Cabinet Secretary, began 
drafting a memorandum to be sent to the newly inaugurated President Kennedy 
setting out the broad vision of which EEC membership was a component. Brook's 
memorandum is referred to by Macmillan in his memoirs as the "Grand Design. " 
The Brook memo is highly significant because it shows the strong coincidence of 
interest and outlook between the US and UK governments at this time. It also shows 
the Macmillan Government was straining to seek the approval of the Kennedy 
Administration for the Grand Design project. 
The overriding theme of the memo is the need to reinforce Western unity after the 
expansion in Soviet influence which had occurred in the 1960s. De Gaulle is 
constantly referred to in the document as a force for disunity in the Western 
alliance. Brook cites a series of issues like Laos, Nuclear Testing, the Congo and 
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NATO, where De Gaulle has been disruptive. The document states in stark terms 
the threat which it identifies in the Gaullist approach: 
All this adds up to something like a repudiation of the concept of an Atlantic Community (Brook 
1961). 
The development of the Six as a separate political entity is a threat to the cohesion of the Atlantic 
Community. If, under French leadership, the Six continues to develop in the direction which it is now 
taking, Western unity will tend to be disrupted at the very time when it should be increased(Brook 
1961). 
The memo urges EEC membership so that the bridge between Europe and North 
America, can be maintained. However, it also goes further to raise more 
fundamental and prescient concerns about how the EEC might develop if it were not 
steered by British influence: 
In the lcnger term it (the EEC) may be an instrument for a resurgent Germany. De Gaulle may see it 
now as a means of asserting French leadership in Europe but in the years ahead an association 
limited to the Six is more likely to be dominated by Germany (Brook 1961) 
In order to maintain the Atlanticist "bridge", the memo's thrust is that British 
membership of the Community is the means to achieve this end. In Macmillan's 
own report of his first Washington summit with President Kennedy, he is even more 
explicit about the mutual advantage that British membership would bring in steering 
the EEC away from the Gaullist project: 
I again made the point that although the French were the immediate problem it might soon be the 
Germans; the important thing was to deal with the problem presented by a'revived Europe. He quite 
saw the point and repeated how anxious the Americans were for us to get into the Six..... Politically, 
they hoped that if we were in the Six we would be able to influence them, whatever might be the 
political personalities: In this connection he expressed some anxieties about the Germany that would 
come after Adenauer (Macmillan 1961). 
Here Macmillan is characterising the British application as a bid to "Atlanticise" the 
EEC, to disseminate American foreign policy preferences inside the organisation 
and stop it developing as a third force. Macmillan's biographer also argues that the 
Kennedy Administration anticipated that as a member of the EEC, Britain would be 
able to act on America's behalf inside the organisation (Horne 1988: 295). By 
describing Europe above as a "problem" Macmillan shows that the Conservatives 
saw European integration not as an opportunity but a threat to their pre-existing 
conceptions of British power and its foundation in Anglo-America. 
Macmillan, in seeking the endorsement of the Kennedy Administration, reveals the 
core identification in interests and outlook between British and American foreign 
policy, which he perceived. Macmillan was not applying for membership because of 
an attraction to the political project of the founders of the EEC. Instead the 
application was motivated by a fear that the existing Atlanticist project (of open 
trade and anti-Communism) was endangered by the growing success of European 
integration in the 1960s. 
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The Cold War context for the European application and American influences upon it 
were also reflected in the political rhetoric of leadership advocates of EEC 
membership. Before party activists at the 1961 conference, Macmillan was careful 
to place the application firmly in a Cold War context. He advocated British 
membership as a step towards solidifying the West and Europe against the Soviet 
Union: 
We must now accept the fact that the bleak ideological struggle may last for another generation, 
perhaps even longer. We cannot retire, but we cannot wage it alone. It is this in mind that we have 
approached the question of Europe and of the Common Market (Ashford 1980: 100). 
This geo-political appeal for membership clearly had some resonance within the 
party. Michael Spicer MP, who was a supporter of EEC accession but later became 
a Thatcherite Nationalist, describes how he advocated membership as a device to 
contain the Soviet Union: 
As a Member of Parliament I fought the 1975 Referendum for a "Yes" vote for Britain's continued 
membership of the Common Market....! let them have it straight.... what was bad for the Soviet Union 
was good for Britain and there was nothing the Soviet Union desired less on its doorstep, I argued, 
than a closely associated association of free trading states (Spicer 1992: 10). 
Chapter One notes that during her period as Opposition leader Thatcher spoke 
positively about the EEC's role in combating the Soviet threat. Hugo Young notes 
that Thatcher's speeches during this period advocated the EEC as an anti- 
Communist Western European alliance (Young 1991: 184-5). However although the 
Cold War framework was useful to sell the Community to Conservatives in this 
period, this device subsequently unravelled. Once the Warsaw Pact had collapsed 
the ideological coalition which Macmillan and Heath had assembled to support the 
Community broke down. Free marketeers and Atlanticists, like Spicer and Thatcher, 
after 1989 no longer identified the European project with the imperative of defeating 
the Soviet enemy. The Atlanticist project was able to lock into support for the EEC 
many Tories who saw Europe as an alliance against Communism. However the end 
of the Cold War has enabled them to withdraw their allegiance from Europe. They 
are now able to view Europe independently of previous Cold War affiliations. 
The American Perspective 
The Prime Minister's fears appear well founded after an examination of the 
evidence of the Kennedy Administration's perspective on the application. George 
Ball, the American Under-Secretary of State, argued in a memorandum to Kennedy 
in May 1961, that Britain had pursued an outmoded "aloofness" with regard to 
Europe which had now become untenable. Ball recalled President Eisenhower being 
told by Macmillan in 1960 that if France and Germany pursued unity then Britain 
would have to lead a peripheral alliance against them (Ball 1982: 209). 
Ball was describing what another US politician, Dean Acheson, the former US 
Secretary of State, had referred to as Britain's traditional attempt to balance the 
powers in Europe, not aligning herself with any one camp. Ball in his advice to 
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Kennedy was dismissive of this stance and regarded it as a failure to adjust to reality 
after the retreat from empire. Ball reveals in his memoirs the importance that he as a 
leading US foreign policymaker, attached to British membership of the Community: 
Once in office, I saw my responsibilities as twofold: I would encourage the British to take the plunge, 
but at the same time, I must not let insular British elements destroy the institutional potential of the 
Rome Treaty and turn the EC into a mere trading bloc (Ball 1982: 210). 
Ball's evidence underpins the theory that the US hegemonic interest as the leader of 
the Western alliance, coincided neatly with Britain's own economic and political 
interest in seeking membership. Ball says that the US was prepared to sacrifice some 
commercial interests to facilitate British membership because of the political 
advantages that it would bring for America. Arthur Schlesinger, Special Assistant to 
the President, is even more explicit in his memoirs, saying that the US anticipated 
that Britain as an EC member could offset the "eccentricities" of Paris and Bonn 
policy (Schlesinger 1965: 720). Ball strongly emphasised that the Kennedy 
Administration believed in the development of supranationalism in the EEC, seeing 
the Rome Treaty not cast in stone but as part of a dynamic process. 
The desire of American governments to further supranational development of the 
Community has been a consistent view held in Washington since the Kennedy 
Administration. It has been motivated by a desire for the EC to develop a much 
greater identity and cohesion in order that it could share a larger part of the defence 
burden before and during the Cold War. However, during the Cold War the US 
Administrations also had a countervailing concern that this identity should not 
develop into undue independence, thereby undermining US leadership of the West. 
It is for this reason that the Kennedy Administration hoped to combine the burden- 
sharing role of the EEC with the steering role of their old ally - Britain. 
Ball claims a greater enthusiasm in Washington for European integration than that 
which existed in London. For the reasons stated above the Americans had a bigger 
stake in supranationalism than the wary Conservative Government. Ball argues that 
Britain wanted the economic gains and diplomatic status without the political 
involvement. Britain had to be forced to recognise that no easy compromise between 
these two factors was possible, she either stayed aloof or became a full partner (Ball 
1982: 214). 
The Contradictions Within Macmillan's Personal Attitude to Europe 
Anthony Sampson, in his biography of Macmillan, highlights the contradictions of 
his subject's views on the priority which should be given to the European and 
imperial alignments by citing an article which Macmillan wrote in The Manchester 
Dispatch in 1949: 
The Empire must always have first preference for us: Europe must come second in a specially 
favoured position. Politically, strategically and economically, Britain is part of Europe, though she is 
also head of the Empire. We cannot isolate ourselves from Europe (Sampson 1967: 85). 
Here we see the future Prime Minister being torn between two imperatives. The 
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first was the strong emotional attachment to the wider patriotism of empire, a 
sentiment which he also knew was deeply held within the Tory Party. He also 
cherished Britain's unchallenged leadership role within the Commonwealth. At the 
same time Macmillan's emotional instincts were countered by a strong realpolitik 
grasp of the extent to which the Commonwealth was a wasting economic and 
diplomatic asset, whereas the Six were emerging as a vibrant grouping. These 
strategic realities led Macmillan to make this sober and slightly grudging assessment 
on the eve of the 1961 application: 
For better or worse the Common Market looks like being here to stay at least for the foreseeable 
future. Furthernwre, if we tried to disrupt it we should unite against us all the Europeans who have 
felt humiliated during the past decade by the weakness of Europe. We should also probably upset the 
US, as well as playing into the hands of Russians.... The question is how to live with the Common 
Market economically and turn its political effects into channels harmless to us (Macmillan 1972: 55). 
The other issue which fuelled Macmillan's agonising about the EEC was a concern 
about the balance of power in the Community. He feared that the character of the 
EEC was such that Britain might never be able to assume a leadership role or even 
achieve membership. In his memoirs Macmillan analyses French and West German 
motivations for building up the Community and even at this early stage he shows his 
suspicion about the Franco-German axis and the prospect that it would exclude 
Britain from the inner councils of the EEC. In particular he argues that French 
leaders like Debre promoted the EEC as a means to provide stature for themselves 
as a global power (Macmillan 1972: 56). Ironically, although Kennedy wished to 
see British membership in order to steer the EEC towards American foreign policy 
preferences, Macmillan's own gut instincts seemed to show a fatalism about whether 
Franco-German influence would irrevocably confine Britain to a secondary and 
defensive role. These fears continue to resonate amongst the Thatcherites in the 
1990s. They fear that Britain will never be able to take a leadership role in Europe 
because of the Franco-German axis. 
The Influence of Heath's Foreign Policy 
Edward Heath's four year premiership marked an aberration in the Conservative 
Party's European and wider foreign policy. However Heath established a minority 
tradition within the party which supported a more Europeanist foreign policy. This 
tradition has been drawn upon by both neo-liberal and interventionist integrationists. 
Heath specifically sought to distance himself from the special relationship and 
believed that Britain should fully commit itself to a more independent and assertive 
European base, breaking free of deference to America. Heath also had a different 
conception of how the Western world should pursue its strategy of Cold War 
containment. Thatcher firmly believed in US leadership, to which Europe should 
give its support. However Heath believed that the US was less able to provide 
leadership on its own and secondly, that Europe had to assert its own authority in 
order to make the transatlantic relationship less asymmetrical: 
What Europe is about is redressing of the balance on the two sides of the Atlantic - redressing the 
balance in trade, finance, defence and in political influence .... it is for the good of the 
Western 
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world as a whole that Europe should be developed, should be more prosperous, and should 
counterbalance the other side of the Atlantic (Col. 666-7 Hansard 17/11/66). 
It is important also to note the context of Heath's tilt away from excessive 
dependence on Anglo-America. At the outset of his premiership the US's crumbling 
status as global hegemon was highlighted by the breakdown of Bretton Woods and 
the gradual disengagement from Vietnam. With the rise of Germany and Japan the 
world seemed to be becoming less unipolar and more multipolar. Heath then carried 
Macmillan's concept of interdependence a stage further by stressing that Europe 
now had an essential role in security and economic policy. 
However an essential continuity in Conservative foreign policy was also present in 
Heath's assumptions about Britain's role in the EEC. Heath too shared the globalist 
ambition inherent in Churchill and Macmillan's beliefs. Heath's two predecessors 
believed that Anglo-America would underpin Britain's traditional role as a world 
power, whereas for Heath Europe was the focus for his desire to relaunch Britain as 
a world power. Heath's biographer, John Campbell, argues that Heath saw Europe 
as an opportunity for Britain to be great again (Campbell 1993: 335). Heath as 
Opposition Leader had opposed the Wilson Government's decision to repudiate 
Britain's East of Suez policy. Heath believed that Britain could take a leadership 
role in Europe which would give the country greater diplomatic stature in 
international affairs than merely being America's junior partner. 
There were several instances in which Heath showed a coolness to initiatives from 
the American Government which Thatcher would never have considered 
appropriate. Kissinger's proclamation of a 'Year of Europe' calling for an enhanced 
security role for Western Europe in 1973 was greeted with disdain amongst Britain's 
European neighbours and Heath did nothing to disassociate himself from their 
response. 
He rejected special bilateral consultations with Washington (Dickie 1994: 146). 
Serious differences with the US emerged over the 1973 Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur 
war. Britain backed a weak but distinctive EEC line and refused to allow the US to 
overfly British airbases in order to supply Israel. Heath believed that US policy was 
unnecessarily subservient to Israeli interests and defended his policy as being even- 
handed between the combatants. On a personal level as well, Heath and Nixon did 
not have a special relationship (Dickie 1994: 144). 
Campbell describes Heath's Europeanism as a "forward looking aberration" in 
postwar history. He was certainly the only postwar Tory Prime Minister to seek to 
distance Britain from the United States and not to claim a "special relationship. " 
Heath's stance, however, did prepare the ground for Tory Europeans, such as 
Howe, who believed that Britain could not afford to place all its diplomatic capital 
in the alliance with the US and that Europe should become a more independent 
force. 
The Atlanticist View 
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Earlier in this chapter, it was argued that Macmillan's application to join the EEC 
was influenced by strong Atlanticist considerations. Macmillan wished to see Europe 
locked into US foreign policy preferences. It was this principle which was carried 
forward by the Thatcherite Nationalists in the 1990s. 
The Thatcherite Nationalists believe Europe should be supportive of and indeed 
subordinated to American leadership of Western institutions in order to safeguard 
global free trade. During the Thatcher premiership this convinction manifested itself 
in intimate cooperation with the US in the "Second Cold War" containment of 
Communism. 
Thatcher is the key articulator of the Atlanticist view amongst the Nationalists 
grouping. For Thatcher, security and economics were two sides of the same coin - 
the preservation of the American-led politico-economic order. Thatcher saw 
America as the guarantor of global free trade and through Western institutions, like 
GATT, NATO, G7 and the IMF. 
Thatcher says in her memoirs that there is "no substitute for the leadership of the 
United States" (Thatcher 1993: 821), making it clear that she believes in the 
importance of the US as global hegemon - the enforcer of the rules of the capitalist 
system. In a speech in 1976, Thatcher described her conception of the American 
role in succinct rhetorical terms: 
We look to our alliance with America and NATO as the prime guarantee of our own security and in 
the world beyond Europe, the US is still the prime champion of freedom (Thatcher 1976) 
Frank Vibert, the director of the right-wing European Policy Forum, encapsulates 
this view well by arguing that the US and the UK have a shared view of the role of 
the state in society, which is not held by Europeans (Vibert 1994). Seeing American 
leadership as a necessity, Thatcher and the Atlanticists oppose in principle any 
ambitions to make Europe an independent actor in international affairs. Thatcher 
expressed her belief that Europe should be locked into an Atlantic community in the 
1988 Bruges speech (Letwin 1992: 302). 
The Thatcherites have a strong sense of kinship with the United States which is both 
economic and cultural. Sir Charles Powell has said that Thatcher believed that 
America was the greatest country in the world and wished that Europe could more 
closely emulate the US (Powell 1994). Iain Duncan-Smith MP also insists that an 
underlying kinship will ensure that the Anglo-American alliance endures: 
Two nations that share a common language, a common based legal system, and a profound belief in 
the philosophy of free trade and democracy (The Times 31/3/95). 
In addition Thatcher also saw America as not only more robust in fighting 
Communism but as an instinctive free trading power unlike other European states. 
She believed that European federalism would intensify these protectionist tendencies 
(Thatcher 1993: 784). Thatcher believed that a protectionist federal Europe would 
eventually lead to a divorce between Britain and America, leading to the withdrawal 
of US troops and a destabilisation of the global economy (Thatcher 1993: 814). She 
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even proposed the creation of a joint North American and European free trade zone 
to forestall this scenario (Thatcher 1993: 725). This proposal was floated in the 
press briefmgs to Thatcher's 1990 Aspen speech (see Chapter Two). Jonathan 
Aitken, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, has articulated the fear of a divorce 
between a federal Europe and the United States: 
The Special Relationship between Britain and America has been the cornerstone of our democratic 
values and suddenly to start, as the federalists want, to throw that out of the window is quite wrong 
(Col. 336, Hansard 18/12/91). 
The conjunction of Ronald Reagan's election as US President in 1980 and 
Thatcher's election victory in 1979 created an alliance not just on security issues but 
on economic policy. The realist foreign policy perspective shared by Republicans 
and Conservatives focused on maximising the interests of the entire developed 
capitalist world. However this commitment to the capitalist system was also to a 
particular model of capitalism, the free market Anglo-Saxon capitalism characterised 
by Albert and discussed in Chapter One. The rhetoric and policy platforms of the 
election campaigns of both Thatcher and Reagan were a direct appeal and response 
to popular revolts against "big government" or state intervention. These revolts 
were focused on the growing manifestations of big government in terms of rising tax 
burdens on middle class incomes. American and British Conservatives espoused one 
central doctrine, that the excessive growth of the state had stifled individual 
initiative and enterprise. In office the two governments pursued similar policies. 
Both deregulated industry, both cut tax rates for upper income taxpayers and 
pursued a tough monetary squeeze. Both governments asserted "managers right to 
manage" in the face of opposition from organised labour. 
The New Right had five central economic contentions: 
- lower taxes would provide 
incentives for individual enterprise. 
- private entrepreneurs should operate in a commercial environment free of 
regulation and interference. 
- the pursuit of price stability was a precondition for economic growth and therefore 
had to strictly control the money supply and curb inflationary expectations. 
- government should repudiate 
demand management and aim instead to balance the 
nation's books in order to provide an economy based upon "sound money. " 
- that full employment was a 
desirable consequence of a prosperous free market 
economy but it should not become a policy goal which would lead to distortion of 
the market itself. 
Having outlined these five key positions in New Right economics it is important to 
introduce two qualifications to them. Firstly, in intellectual terms, this list is a 
generalisation which does not address the disputes within the New Right itself on 
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many economic issues. One example is the dispute between Hayek and Friedman on 
the causes of inflation and the importance of the money supply. 
The second qualification is that in political terms, the Reagan Administration and the 
Thatcher Government had far from identical macroeconomic policies. The most 
obvious and fiercely contested dissimilarity in the records of the two governments 
was on the question of America's huge federal deficit. "The Deficit" as it had 
become known in America, had grown in defiance of Reagan's balanced budget 
proclamations and Thatcher's espousal of good fiscal housekeeping. Indeed it was a 
cause of disagreement between the two leaders. Nevertheless on the key issue of a 
minimal state there was a shared policy agenda. 
Internationally, there was also economic policy cooperation between the two 
governments. Britain withdrew from UNESCO in tandem with the Americans. At 
G7 summits Britain was as likely to side with the US as she was with France, 
Germany and Italy. 
Cold War Influences On Thatcherite Nationalists 
Thatcher's Atlanticism was forged during the Cold War. As Opposition Leader in 
1976 at the earliest possible moment Thatcher identified herself with US leadership 
and more significantly with the nascent groundswell of the American New Right 
anti-detente reaction. In a speech at Kensington Town Hall, Thatcher placed herself 
firmly alongside the proponents of the "New Cold War" in Britain and the United 
States. This grouping had bitterly opposed the de-escalation of the Vietnam War and 
also the Nixon/Ford Administration's promotion of detente with the Soviet Union, 
culminating in the signing of the SALT treaty. In a speech at the beginning of her 
leadership of the Conservative Party, Thatcher expressed the fear that America and 
the West would not have the resolve to tackle a resurgent Soviet threat: 
In the late 1970s... the US was undergoing a crisis of morale following its failure in Vietnam... 
Hobbled by this psychological constraint and by a Congress also deeply influenced by it, two 
presidents saw the Soviet Union and its surrogates expand their power and influence in Afghanistan, 
southern Africa and Central America.... by the late 1970s, the US, Britain and our European allies 
were faced by a Soviet Union in this second aggressive phase (Thatcher 1993: 9) 
Eventually these New Right activists formed the mainstream of the Reagan 
Administration and committed US foreign policy to the confrontational approach to 
the Soviet Union in the 1981-84 period. In the Kensington speech Thatcher 
dismissed detente and the prospect of Soviet changed intentions: 
We have seen Vietnam and all of Indo-China swallowed up by Communist aggression... Even now the 
Soviet Union and its satellites are pouring money, arms and frontline troops into Angola in the hope 
of dragging it into the Communist bloc. We must remember that there are no Queensbury rules in the 
contest that is now going on. And the Soviets are playing to win (Thatcher quoted in CPS 1977). 
I would like to the first to welcome any evidence that the Russians are ready to enter into a genuine 
detente but I am afraid the evidence points the other way (Thatcher quoted in CPS 1977). 
Thatcher endorsed in her speech the controversial "domino theory" beloved of the 
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American Right, that once an individual state had fallen under Communist influence 
then the others in the geographical vicinity would also be likely to succumb. She 
also invested great political significance in Angola as US New Right leaders like 
Reagan, Jean Kirkpatrick and Jesse Helms did at this time. The role of the Russians 
in Afghanistan and the Cubans in Angola and Ethiopia seemed to confirm the 
impression of a concerted Soviet drive into the Third World designed to weaken the 
West (Halliday 1986: 224). 
When Thatcher became Prime Minister she set her government a mission statement 
which intertwined a crusade to restore the free market with a renewed drive against 
Communism: 
Taken together these three challenges - long term economic decline, the debilitating effects of 
socialism and the growing Soviet threat - were an intimidating inheritance for a new Prime Minister 
(Thatcher 1993: 9). 
The Europeanist View 
Perhaps Europe's voice would be better heard in Washington if this Europe of ours spoke more with 
one voice and acted together more decisively ( Hans-Dietrich Genscher quoted in Nuttall 1992: 184). 
The two pro-European groupings within the Conservative Party have united around 
a Europeanist conception. Geoffrey Howe is now the key articulator of this 
conception. The Europeanist view is far less ideological than Thatcherite 
Atlanticism. Europeanism has been more recently articulated within the 
Conservative Party. Initially, Europeanism was strongly held by other EU member 
states but was fairly absent amongst Conservative politicians. However recent 
experience has led to a number of Tory pro-Europeans advocating a more 
independent and robust pro-European foreign policy. It has gained ground as a 
pragmatic response to circumstances. It has particularly flourished in the aftermath 
of the Cold War and American disengagement. However it has been strongly 
pushed by the Foreign Office since the 1980s and has been given renewed impetus 
by general moves towards European unity. 
Europeanism sees the Thatcherite reliance on American leadership as unhealthy and 
undesirable. Many Europeanists accept that America as the last remaining 
superpower will take a leadership role. However they do not believe that the EU 
should simply defer to the US. They believe that an independent European foreign 
policy identity is even more necessary in the post-Cold War world, to prevent 
America taking a series of unilateral actions contrary to European economic and 
security interests. In general Europeanists believe that American power will be more 
sensitively and responsibly exercised if it is counterbalanced by a concerted and 
effective European view. Europeanists also believe that on a number of issues 
Europe has a distinctive view and perspective which is either not appreciated or not 
shared by the Americans. 
Since the ratification of the SEA there has been a formal European foreign policy 
machinery inside the EU. This machinery has been seen by Europeanists as an 
embryonic European foreign policy. As was discussed above, President Kennedy 
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urged British EEC membership, partly because he wished Britain to have a say in 
Europe's foreign policy machinery. The Macmillan Government was alarmed at the 
prospect of being excluded from the EEC's Fouchet plans for foreign policy 
cooperation (Newell 1992: 39). This machinery has developed in sophistication and 
coherence since the 1960s. Europeanists now have ambitions to forge a 
supranational common foreign and security policy (CFSP). 
Fouchet paved the way for an intergovernmental European Political Cooperation 
(EPC) structure within the EU. EPC created an organic and systematic process 
whereby British foreign policy has been continually influenced by the preferences of 
her partners for nearly ten years. EPC exists as a secretariat in Brussels which is 
headed by a Political Committee, composed of Political Directors from the member 
states' foreign ministries. Beneath this level are regional sectoral working groups 
considering European policy towards different regions, like the Ukraine and the 
Middle East. The Political Committee, after deliberating on these reports, places 
recommendations before the Foreign Affairs Council. 
Frank Vibert of the EPF has argued that the Conservative Government instigated the 
incorporation of EPC into the treaties because they saw it as another means to 
enhance the stature of British foreign policy preferences in Washington (Vibert 
1994). 
European and Atlanticist Influences on British Foreign Policy in the 1980s 
Throughout the period of the Thatcher Governments both Atlanticist and 
Europeanist foreign policy infuences can be seen at work. The meanings of the 
events which took place in this period, such as Grenada and the Falklands are 
contested by the Nationalists and the pro-Europeans. 
However in this period, Thatcher ensured that the Anglo-American relationship was 
given primacy. Sir Charles Powell was Thatcher's highly influential foreign affairs 
private secretary from 1984-90 and was closely identified with her thinking on the 
Community. Powell has confirmed that there was a conscious strategy in 
government in this period to become as close as possible to the US in order to 
maximise Britain's influence and if this necessitated public displays of lavish praise 
then ministers were prepared to engage in this (Powell 1994). The best example of 
this behaviour was Thatcher's fulsome address to a joint session of the US Congress 
in 1985, received rapturously by the American elite. 
Maximising British influence meant the government needed to be able to insert itself 
in debates going on inside the Reagan Administration in order to ensure that the 
outcomes of these debates were broadly favourable to Britain. This strategy was 
particularly successful because of the frequency of divisions within the Republican 
Administration (Names 1994: 132). Thatcher was usually allied with or was indeed 
drafted by the State Department against the Defence Department and in particular, 
Richard Perle (Names 1994: 129). Powell has, however, also conceded that the 
British Government itself was divided on many of these issues, the critical one being 
the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) or Star Wars. 
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On a series of issues the Thatcher Governments were subject to Europeanist and 
Atlanticst policy influences. On the declaration of Polish martial law Thatcher 
acquiesced in a distinct European foreign policy position. Britain backed an EPC 
policy postion which was far from identical with that of America. The German 
Government was anxious to preserve the vestiges of detente and opposed the US 
policy on sanctions. The US had proposed cutting airlinks, postponing a grain 
agreement and revising exchange arrangements. Eventually EPC produced a 
compromise in order that Greece could be exempted from imposing sanctions on the 
Soviet Union. 
The more important Europeanist stance adopted by the Thatcher Government was 
the 1980 Venice Declaration. EPC had to respond to the aftermath of the Camp 
David peace accord signed by President Carter with Sadat and Begin in 1978. 
European leaders were determined to intensify the Middle East peace process and 
bring in the Palestinians. The Nine member states issued the Declaration setting out 
a series of objectives for the furtherance of the peace process, including the issue of 
a Palestinian homeland. The US however was resentful at Europe's intervention and 
wished to pursue Middle East peace outside its own Camp David process. Venice 
was an occasion where European policy departed from that of the United States 
Government. Nevertheless Lord Howe argues that Venice was a positive 
development. Howe argues that Venice's divergence from Washington's position 
was beneficial. He believes that it eased the US into a longer term acceptance of 
Palestinian rights and conciliation with King Hussein of Jordan (Howe 1994a). 
On the SDI issue, Thatcher's Atlanticist approach came into conflict with Howe's 
Europeanist preferences. At Camp David in December 1984 Thatcher achieved a 
major policy coup by getting Reagan to agree to a four point accord which on paper 
restricted his ability to develop SDI. Thatcher's approach to SDI again showed how 
she came into conflict with other European leaders because of her desire for close 
relations with America. Thatcher was personally opposed to SDI as was Geoffrey 
Howe, yet she differed on tactics from Mitterand and Kohl. They favoured a clear 
and public opposition to SDI. However she was concerned above all not to 
antagonise the US (Hames 1994: 133). Her strategy was always to take the inside 
track and put constant pressure on Reagan to make SDI a bargaining tool. 
At Camp David in 1986 Thatcher recommitted Reagan on paper to a restatement of 
the principle of nuclear deterrence and the development of nuclear weapons. This 
was in direct response to the dramatic breakup of the Reykjavik summit in 1986. At 
Reykjavik Soviet Leader Gorbachev had sprung a major multilateral arms reduction 
initiative on a surprised and unprepared American President. Gorbachev's proposal 
would also have involved the elimination of many of Western European nuclear 
arsenals. However, Gorbachev's price was an American commitment to abandon the 
SDI programme, which Reagan rejected. Although Thatcher, Mitterand and Kohl 
were privately pleased and relieved at the breakdown of the summit, they were 
dismayed that the bulk of their nuclear arsenals had nearly been negotiated away 
over their heads. However although Thatcher shared this analysis and concern with 
the other Europeans she again diverged from them on the question of how to 
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respond to the aftermath of the summit. 
France and Germany decided to beef up Western European defence forces and 
cooperation in order to prepare for the contingency of American disengagement. 
Whereas Thatcher drew precisely the opposite conclusion - that preparations for this 
contingency made it far more likely to occur (Hames 1994: 133). Thatcher's 
response conformed to that of Macmillan in the late 1950s and early sixties: if 
American commitment to the special relationship and to Europe was in doubt, then 
Britain should react by endeavouring to deepen the relationship even further. 
Whereas the lesson that France drew from Suez above all was to continue to seek as 
much independence from US policy as possible so that she would be prepared for 
adverse circumstances (Powell 1994a). 
While Thatcher attempted to modify the Reagan Administration's policy on SDI by 
playing the inside game, Howe took the unprecedented step of voicing European 
criticisms publicly. Howe believed that the EU should become the vehicle for the 
development of independent foreign policy views from the US and that these should 
be openly asserted and articulated: 
And I had successfully pointed up a British alternative to Margaret's technique of influencing 
American thinking by starting from a premise of loudly proclaiming loyalty. More and more 
Europeans were coming to feel that when it came to the crunch, their governments had no real 
influence on America's strategic thinking and that established NATO mechanisms risked becoming 
unidirectional (Howe 1994: 393). 
However the most critical area in which Thatcher's influence was brought to bear 
was on Western assessments of Mikhail Gorbachev when he *came to power. 
Gorbachev had been identified by the Foreign Office as the rising star of the 
Kremlin elite, likely to challenge old orthodoxies. Thatcher's famous meeting with 
Gorbachev at Chequers in 1984, when she said that "we can do business with Mr 
Gorbachev" prepared the way for a reappraisal by the Reagan Administration of the 
Soviet position. 
Thatcher's stature with the US government meant that her favourable opinion of the 
new Soviet leader was seen as an authoritative endorsement of Gorbachev and 
therefore helped to persuade the President himself about Soviet intentions. At the 
same time Thatcher could meet the Soviet leader and gauge his intentions at a 
distance from US government circles; she could act as an interlocutor for the 
Americans without them being seen to be formally involved or committed. Max 
Kampelman, chief US disarmament negotiator at Geneva from 1985, argues that 
Thatcher's view on Gorbachev strengthened the President's resolve that this was the 
correct course to follow (Smith 1989: 147). 
David Gergen, Reagan's Director of Communications at the White House in the 
early 1980s, cites an occasion at the Williamsburg summit when missile deployment 
was being discussing. Some European ministers wished to back a weak statement on 
the issue which the US group were prepared to live with. Yet when the statement 
was taken to Thatcher she rejected it and insisted on a redraft. She forced the 
German and Italian ministers to change the document. Gergen said that the 
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Americans were impressed with her performance (Smith 1990: 111). 
Throughout Thatcher's premiership the intimacy and cooperation between Britain 
and America persisted, even surviving the fractiousness of the Grenada invasion. 
Two issues in particular, the Falklands and Libya, showed how the diplomatic 
capital which the Conservatives invested in the special relationship produced hard 
foreign policy returns. At the same time the reciprocity which the US expected for 
its assistance in the Falklands again underlined Thatcher's distance from other 
European leaders. 
When Argentina invaded the Falklands, America's public stance was to mediate and 
be even-handed between the two parties. Reagan certainly hoped to avoid bloodshed 
even though he sympathised with the British case. Indeed there were divisions 
within the Administration on this issue. Jean Kirkpatrick, US Ambassador to the 
UN, opposed the setting up of the British taskforce and was supportive of 
Argentina. Kirkpatrick took the realpolitik view that Argentina's junta was 
supportive of the US within the Latin American region and that overt American 
support for Britain would jeopardise this relationship. 
However eventually the Administration, or more accurately elements within it with 
Reagan's blessing, gave military support for the taskforce. Reagan gave broad 
authorisation for the Pentagon's military assistance to the British taskforce (Smith 
1990: 87). Defence Secretary Weinberger was able to authorise intelligence support 
for the British war effort and the use of Ascension Island to provide fuel supplies. A 
satellite was moved from the North to the South Atlantic to assist the British and 
Reagan took the final decision to authorise this (Smith 1989: 84). Weinberger's 
efforts were able to come out into the open after the Senate passed a resolution 
endorsing the UN's call for the upholding of British sovereignty over the islands. 
The Senate resolution backed all efforts to reverse the invasion (Dickie 1994: 9). 
In the eyes of Conservative MPs the American assistance deepened the warmth in 
the transatlantic relationship. Correspondingly, these same MPs noted what they saw 
as the flabbiness of Europe's response. Although France was strongly supportive of 
Britain's line, unsuprisingly, other countries with links to Latin America like Spain 
and Portugal, absented themselves from sanctions against Argentina. Ireland for its 
own domestic political reasons also refused to endorse British action over the 
Falklands. This episode, along with the Gulf War, reinforced a view amongst many 
Tory MPs of a reliable ally across the Atlantic compared to an irresolute and 
vaccillating EU. 
American backing was seen to involve a quid pro quo when Thatcher gave her 
support to the US bombing of Libya in 1986, one of the most unpopular of recent 
foreign policy actions taken by a British Prime Minister. The French Government 
had refused permission for US F-1-11s to overfly their territory; Thatcher gave her 
blessing and subsequently suffered tremendous domestic political criticism. 
Significantly, as with the Gulf War four years later, Thatcher was to claim that 
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unilateral American action was justified under the terms of article 51 of the UN 
Charter, providing for "individual or collective self-defence against an aggressor. " 
However, one incident in the early 1980s stands out as a turning point in the 
development of the Thatcher/Reagan special relationship and relations with Europe. 
This was the American invasion of Grenada in 1983. Grenada became the precursor 
to the divergence between those Tories like Thatcher who held to a belief about the 
value of the alliance and those like Howe who believed that America's unreliability 
meant that European integration should be encouraged to act as a counterweight to 
the US. Howe himself describes the Grenada episode as a "humiliation" in his 
memoirs. 
Grenada was a former British colony and subsequently a member of the 
Commonwealth. In 1979 the independence government was overthrown by a coup 
led by the Marxist Maurice Bishop and his New Jewel Movement. The fact that 
Bishop then began to establish ties with Cuba and Moscow immediately raised 
concerns in Washington. By October 1983 Bishop himself was overthrown and 
replaced by a Revolutionary Command Council. At this point the Organisation of 
East Caribbean States called for military intervention in the island. 
The Cabinet instructed the British Ambassador Oliver Wright to convey Britain's 
opposition to military action to the Reagan Administration. Howe spoke on the floor 
of the House of Commons on 24th October saying that he was in the closest possible 
touch with the US and Caribbean governments and had no reason to expect 
American intervention (Howe 1994: 328). On 24th October the President sent a tele- 
letter to Number Ten saying that he was giving serious consideration to an OECS 
request for military intervention by the US and welcomed Britain's advice. However 
within a matter of hours Reagan had dispatched another letter declaring that the US 
was "going in" with troops. In his memoirs Howe bluntly describes his anger at the 
US move after Reagan had signalled consultation: 
What on earth were we to make of a relationship, special or otherwise, in which a message 
requesting the benefit of our advice was so quickly succeeded by another which made it brutally clear 
that that advice was being treated as of no consequence whatsover (Howe 1994: 329). 
Thatcher spoke on the hot-line in strong terms to the President. Thatcher and Howe 
then faced the ignominy of facing a House of Commons emergency debate on the 
25th October. Howe says that: 
The truth is that the government has been humiliated by having its views plainly disregarded in 
Washington (Howe 1994: 331). 
At the Security Council the British Ambassador abstained in a debate on the issue. 
Howe himself draws the comparison with the Soviet Union's unilateral invasion of 
Afghanistan and expressed his concern at the time that the US would believe that the 
military success of the Grenada invasion would be a model for other Third World 
incursions. 
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This incident led Howe increasingly to believe that in order to influence American 
policy public expressions of praise and seeking the "inside track" would be 
insufficient. Instead Howe believed that US policy was more likely to be influenced 
by exercising external leverage on Washington through a more unified European 
foreign policy line. Howe quotes approvingly in his memoirs a journalist who said 
that Britain had been living in a fool's paradise in looking to America first and 
Britain second. 
In particular Howe made his own judgement in the aftermath of Grenada, that the 
Falklands collaboration would probably prove to be the exception rather than the 
rule as a model for US instincts (Howe 1994: 337). Implicitly Howe concedes that 
he made the appraisal that if America's views diverged from those of its allies then 
the US would press ahead regardless. For Howe the development of political 
cooperation within the EC was more than a contingency in these circumstances, it 
was a more secure long term foundation for ensuring that British foreign policy 
priorities were given greater weight in Washington. 
The Grenadian aftermath and the SDI issue were the genesis of the divisions 
between Howe and Thatcher on Atlanticism versus Europeanism. Whereas Grenada 
convinced Howe of the utility of intensifying political cooperation in Europe, it left 
Thatcher's conception of the Anglo-American alliance unaltered. In her memoirs 
recalling the incident ten years later Thatcher reiterates her opposition to the 
invasion but then says: 
Britain's friendship with the United States must on no account be jeopardised (Thatcher 1993: 333). 
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The American Tilt Towards Germany 
Thatcher's belief in the primacy of the Anglo-American alliance eventually brought 
her into confrontation not only with the Europeans but also with the US Government 
itself. A number of key events provoked a strategic reappraisal on the part of the 
Bush Administration, principally the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the end of the 
Cold War. The Bush Administration prepared the ground for the Clinton 
Administration's enthusiastic embrace of European integration. The Bush European 
policy encouraged the integrationist Tories in their belief that Britain had to work 
for a Europeanist policy but it also led to the Thatcherites straining even harder to 
maintain an Anglo-American partnership. 
Previously, as Stephen George argues, US attitudes to the EU had always moved on 
a spectrum from partnership to rivalry (George 1992: 56). On the one hand the US 
felt a strong political and geo-strategic desire to support the EEC as a bulwark 
against Communism in Western Europe. Associated with this was America's desire 
to share the burden of Soviet containment. On the other hand, the US saw the 
Community as a commercial and trading rival in the global economy and feared that 
the EEC would pursue protectionist policies damaging to British interests. These 
contradictions were evident at the outset in President Kennedy's reaction to the 
Macmillan application. 
However by 1989-90 the balance of US perceived interests had shifted decisively in 
favour of Bush's support for intensified European integration. In particular the new 
circumstances of post-Cold War Europe were seen by Bush and his Secretary of 
State, James Baker, as necessitating a new "special relationship" with Germany. 
Britain's role as the US's most reliable partner during the Cold War and America's 
interlocutor with Europe, was now played out. The new situation facing US 
policymakers in 1989 was to manage the breakup of the Eastern bloc and the Soviet 
Union whilst reducing America's own defence spending. 
As we have seen the desire to maintain diplomatic stature with the US was a critical 
factor in Macmillan's decision to apply for EEC membership. In the final two years 
of her premiership Thatcher was prepared to risk this diplomatic relationship by 
confronting Bush's tilt towards Germany and desire for European unity. In 
particular Thatcher confronted Bush on the unification issue. Thatcher saw 
unification as the precursor of a reassertion of German power and believed that EU 
integration would augment this power. Thatcher's fears about Germany are shared 
by many other Thatcherite nationalists, like Bill Cash, Norman Tebbit and Bernard 
Jenkin. 
It was the NATO discussions on short range nuclear forces (SNF) which first 
highlighted Thatcher's growing estrangement from the Americans. Germany 
opposed the modernisation of SNF missiles and Chancellor Kohl's opposition was 
strongly influenced by German public opinion. Thatcher however saw SNF as 
essential to the NATO strategy of flexible response (Thatcher 1993: 784). She also 
opposed the proposal for a "third zero" of matching US and USSR reductions in 
these forces. However James Baker decided to conciliate the Germans in the face of 
these pressures. Teasdale argues that at this time the British Government feared that 
on the SNF issue Britain would be left in the side-car whilst the American and 
German limousines sped on past her (Teasdale 1994). Thatcher also has admitted 
that on SNF: 
I found myself going to Brussels as the odd man out. Everyone else accepted the principle of SNF 
negotiations (Thatcher 1993: 788). 
The eventual compromise enabled the Germans to argue that the prospect of early 
SNF talks had been preserved. Publicly Thatcher put a brave face on her defeat. 
However the really significant departure was on 31 May 1989 when Bush met Kohl 
in Mainz and declared that: 
The United States and the Federal Republic of Germany have always been firm friends but today we 
share an added role - partners in leadership (Dickie 1994: 213). 
It was at this point, when rhetoric was running in the same direction as policy, that 
Thatcher realised that the Anglo-American alliance was becoming superceded: 
Unfortunately, even then the US State Department continued to put out briefings against me and my 
policies -particularly on Europe.... to some extent the relative tilt of American foreign policy against 
Britain in this period may have been the result of the influence of Secretary of State James Baker 
(Thatcher 1993: 783). 
Three policymakers were at the forefront of the Bush Administration's tilt towards 
Germany and support for European integration; Robert Zoellick, State Department 
Counsellor, Dennis Ross, Head of Policy Planning and Condolezza Rice, at the 
National Security Council. Sir Charles Powell argues that Robert Zoellick was the 
key originator of the policy as chief advisor to James Baker. Powell says that Baker 
had entered the State Department with a feeling that Britain had "had things too easy 
during the Reagan years" in terms of access and influence (Powell 1994). 
Zoellick had come with Baker from the Treasury and from the financial world, 
inevitably saw Germany as more central than Britain. Powell also says Eagleburger 
was a key articulator of the new policy (Powell 1994). Powell also argues that at 
this stage of the new US policy Thatcher was so self-assured about the enduring 
nature of the Anglo-American partnership, that she told her advisors that eventually 
the Americans would come around to realising that Britain was her only reliable ally 
(Powell 1994). The experience of the Gulf War clearly made Thatcher feel 
vindicated. 
In November 1989 came the fall of the Berlin Wall and the beginning of the end of 
the old East German state. The speed of the disintegration of the Eastern bloc 
surprised the US Administration as it did most external commentators. It was at this 
juncture that the Administration began to see Germany as the new focus of US 
policy in Europe. The US Ambassador to Bonn, Vernon Walters was convinced that 
Germany would become the main driving force behind European integration and the 
rebuilding of the East. The Community, with Germany in a leadership role, should 
be encouraged to seek further integration, in order that the US could relieve itself of 
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many European responsibilities. To a certain extent therefore a strong Germany had 
now become in the interests of the United States. This led to the real point of schism 
with the Thatcher Government. The US also believed that the only sensible means 
by which Eastern Europe could develop an association of free market liberal 
democracies was through their engagement with the EU. 
The highest level public statement reflecting the new US policy came from Bush 
himself in December 1989. Bush called in general terms for intensified European 
integration in order that the Community could manage the breakup of the Warsaw 
Pact. His remarks unnerved Downing Street and Bush was forced into a 
"clarification" for the press in which he said that he was not giving America's 
endorsement for the single currency project or for political union. Nevertheless 
Thatcher concedes in her memoirs that this public disclaimer was merely a public 
relations gesture and did not reflect the reality of the direction of US foreign policy. 
Throughout the first half of 1990 Thatcher persisted in an attempt to delay German 
unification. In an interview with the Wall Street Journal on 25 January 1990, 
Thatcher argued for a drastic slowing of the pace of German unity. Some of her 
coded public expressions of anxiety about the prospect of German unity did illicit 
private sympathetic responses from other European leaders, such as President 
Mitterand. Powell claims that the French were even more concerned at the prospect 
of a united Germany than Thatcher (Powell 1994). However once Baker had swept 
aside Thatcher's misgivings, the other Europeans decided not to be seen to oppose 
the inevitable. 
Embarrassingly, Thatcher's anxieties came into the open with the leak of minutes 
drafted by Charles Powell from a Chequers seminar on Germany. The Independent 
On Sunday on 15/7/90 reproduced the entire document and revealed that in 
attendance at the seminar were a motley group of academics and policy analysts 
whom Thatcher had called upon to advise her about Germany's future development 
post-unification. The seminar's guests included Lord Dacre, Professor Norman 
Stone and Tim Garton Ash. The seminar paper identified certain attributes central to 
the German character; "angst, aggressiveness, assertiveness, bullying, egotism and 
sentimentality" (Dickie 1994: 270). 
Significantly, the seminar paper advocated a reliance on continuing good German 
behaviour in Europe as one means by which the consequences of her power could be 
managed. Yet the very cause of Thatcher's anxiety was that Germany would "revert 
to type" and become overtly nationalistic, thereby rendering extremely unlikely just 
the responsible behaviour which she hoped Germany would display to reassure her 
neighbours: 
We wanted a continuing military American presence in Europe as a balance to Germany. We would 
want to see limits, preferably self-imposed through a further CFE agreement on the size of Germany's 
armed forces Jbe Independent On Sundav 15/7/90). 
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Conflicting Tory Attitudes to Germany 
Tory protagonists have not only contested the meaning of specific events, like 
Grenada and the fall of the Berlin Wall, they also disagree fundamentally on their 
attitude to the nature and role of Germany within the EU. Conservative Party 
attitudes to Germany conform to a stark bipolar mould. The Thatcherites view 
European integration as augmenting German power and believe that Germany has 
consistent hegemonic ambitions. Whereas pro-Europeans place great faith in the 
postwar experience of the Federal Republic as a liberal democracy: they believe that 
German unity within the context of a more integrated EU will ensure that Germany 
will not dominate and will be subjected to the continuous influence of her partners. 
The view of Germany expressed by Thatcherite nationalist leaders, like Cash and 
Thatcher essentially rests on a belief in the fundamental continuity of German 
hegemonic ambitions and character. Thatcher sees Germany as intrinsically 
threatening to its neighbours (Thatcher 1993: 791). Cash argues that Germany's 
sense of a national mission overrides any alliances or institutions to which she has 
been or is presently involved. Central to this view is a dismissal of what Cash calls 
the "zero hour" thesis. This is the view which argues that after Hitler's defeat, 
German history began with a clean slate -a zero hour in the country's history, when 
previous nationalistic and totalitarian passions were expunged from the state's 
culture. 
In Cash's own revisionist view, Germany's postwar western orientation was only 
advocated and pursued by Chancellor Adenauer as an expedient (Cash 1991). Cash 
also uses America as a focus in order to criticise Germany for being both hostile to 
the free market and anti-Western. He puts the "augmentation thesis" very succinctly 
in the following quotation: 
To hand her (Germany) the key to the legal structure of Europe within EMU... and EPU with a 
majority voting system gravitating around alliances dependent upon Germany simply hands her 
legitimate power on a plate... (Cash 1991: 71). 
Cash believes, along with many other nationalists, that Germany's economic weight 
is such that within a supranational EU she will effectively dominate. Cash seized on 
the German Christian Democrat parliamentary caucus position paper, Reflections on 
European Policy, in order to force home his argument that Germany will act 
unilaterally if it does not achieve its purposes through the EU. The CDU paper says 
that if European integration does not progress then Germany might be tempted to 
stabilise Eastern Europe on its own in the traditional manner. Writing in the 
European Journal Cash said: 
So there we have it. Either we accept a single currency and majority voting on defence and foreign 
policy and a federal Europe, with the loss of our Westminster democracy, or Germany will go its own 
way (Cash 1994: 2). 
Chancellor Kohl's behaviour on the issue of German recognition of the Oder-Neisse 
line (the Polish borderlands) also gave ammunition to Tories who identified with 
Cash's position. Kohl argued before the German election in 1990 that it would be 
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impossible for West Germany to guarantee the security of the borderlands (with 
their German-speaking peoples) until the Bundestag of a united Germany had spoken 
on the issue. Kohl's ambiguity aroused diplomatic tensions in the crucial period 
during which unification was being negotiated with the Americans and the Russians. 
The Chequers seminar paper highlights this issue: 
Kohl's handling of the Polish border issue, in particular his reference to the need to protect the 
German minority in Silesia, had given the wrong signals. Historic fears about Germany's 'mission' 
in Eastern Europe, had been revived (Independent On Sunday 15/7/90). 
Lawson has argued that EU integration is the only means, given Germany's history, 
in which she can achieve legitimation for a global role commensurate with her 
modern economic status: 
For Helmut Kohl, acting very much under the influence of his long-serving Foreign Minister, Hans- 
Dietrich Genscher, a strong Germany aroused too much fear for it to be able to exercise the political 
power and influence beyond its borders that its strength warranted. The solution was for it to allay 
that fear by exchanging German clothing for European attire (Lawson 1992: 901). 
Cash also draws historical comparisons to press home this same point: 
I have always found the word "Europe" on the lips of those who wanted something from other powers 
which they dare not demand in their own name (Cash 1991: 80). 
Bernard Jenkin MP (Cons: Colchester North) argues that the effect of German 
policy in Europe is gradually to establish a German hegemony by consent under a 
European label (Jenkin 1994). Thatcher's concern about Germany's volatile 
nationalism is so acute that she sees a role for the US in ensuring internal 
equilibrium in Europe free from German predominance. It is for this reason that 
Thatcher was so alarmed by the US's tilt towards Germany. In her memoirs she 
articulates her view why European federalism, German assertiveness and the US 
leadership role are intertwined: 
Only the military and political engagement of the US in Europe and close relations between the 
sovereign states in Europe - Britain and France - are sufficient to balance German power: and 
nothing of the sort would be possible within a European superstate (Thatcher 1993: 791) 
However the Nationalists' hostility to Germany is challenged by Tristan Garel- 
Jones, the former Minister for Europe. Garel-Jones argues that if the nationalists 
take their hostility to Germany to its logical conclusion then they face a dilemma. 
Either they support federalism as a way of constraining the exercise of German 
power or they treat Germany as an aggressive power, like the old Soviet Union: 
They (the Thatcherites) tend to be people who believe that there is a special demon in the German 
soul. The difficulty they have is that if on one level you believe Germany is dangerous.. That's what 
Kohl believes. That's why he talks about binding Germany in and subsuming German sovereignty in 
the wider whole. 
So if you believe that you had better become a federalist. Either you become a federalist or you start 
pointing your nuclear missiles at these people. One or the other! if, like me, you don't believe that, I 
don't believe that there is a special evil in the German soul. I think that the reasons why fascism 
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prospered in Germany were complex but nothing to do with the inherent characteristics of the 
Germans (Garel-Jones 1994). 
Lord Howe puts the opposing case to Cash and Jenkin from the pro-European 
perspective. He argues that Germany is more likely to behave in a manner 
conducive to the interests and feelings of partners and allies if it is continuously 
subject to the influence of other European states inside the EU. He says that 
"detaching yourself and shouting at Germany from outside" is not a satisfactory 
alternative. Yet even Howe concedes that his belief in continuous diplomatic 
engagement with Germany is not a failsafe policy (Howe 1994a). 
The Gulf War 
Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait came as Thatcher had arrived in Colorado to 
give a major foreign policy speech. Thatcher's Aspen Speech (see chapter one), 
described by 
. 
George as her "American Bruges Speech" was intended as a direct 
intervention in the US about what the future shape of Europe ought to be (George 
1992: 59). Thatcher hoped to steer the Bush Administration away from its new 
focus on Germany and back towards the Anglo-American alliance. Powell concedes 
that the Foreign Office was reluctant to clear the speech but that the Prime Minister 
was determined to make it (Powell 1994). The speech called for a new Western 
Magna Carta of liberties and the pursuit of a North Atlantic free trade zone, an idea 
which Thatcher says was viewed unenthusiastically by the Foreign Office and the 
Treasury. Powell says that the Treasury was opposed to the proposal. 
Thatcher's presence in the US gave her a prime opportunity to influence and identify 
with American policy on Kuwait. Thatcher was vigorous in her support for Bush's 
robust diplomatic response to the Iraqi invasion. Initially European unity was 
achieved on the UN economic and diplomatic measures taken against Iraq. The 
EU's trade provisions were used to instigate the economic sanctions against Iraq. 
However by late Autumn of 1990 it looked as if the use of military force was a 
probability. It was then that splits emerged amongst the Europeans on the Gulf. As 
early as September, Thatcher had criticised other European countries for not doing 
more to support the US-led effort (Wall Street Journal 3/9/90). While France joined 
Britain in contributing to Operation Desert Shield, Mitterand took an independent 
line on the need for linkage between Iraq's expulsion from Kuwait and the 
settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem. 
The EU by this time had procrastinated on the issue of aid to the frontline states. 
The last weeks leading to the war were the most trying for the Community as the 
linkage issue pulled apart the consensus which had been maintained in the summer 
of 1990. In particular Germany at best lukewarm on the need for military action, 
refused to commit her troops to Desert Shield. The only contribution which 
Germany made was to provide mineweepers for the Eastern Mediterranean to 
relieve other NATO vessels for duty in the Gulf. Germany's stance enabled 
Thatcher to publicly make the invidious comparison between Britain's steadfast 
reliability and Germany's abdication. Her coded message to the White House was 
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clear, "Germany is not fit for the role which you had anticipated for her. " Francis 
Maude, then a Foreign Office minister, argues that the Americans having invested 
so much in Germany, were quite surprised at Germany's attitude to the Gulf (Maude 
1994). 
The EU had become a house divided; Britain had reverted to its old role as an 
Atlanticist power, Germany as a self-centred giant, reluctant to take on international 
responsibilities and France persisting in its Gaullist independence and the other 
Europeans mostly taking cover (Hella Pick in The Guardian 13/9/90). Even the 
Belgian Foreign Minister complained that the divisions over the Gulf had shown the 
hollowness of European ambitions for a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) 
(The New York Times 25/1/91). France's ferverent independence was shown by 
President Mitterand's unilateral eleventh-hour diplomatic initiative offering Saddam 
Hussein linkage between a Kuwaiti withdrawl and the Arab-Israeli dispute. 
The successful Anglo-American cooperation during the Gulf War and Germany's 
hesitant and uncertain attitude encouraged the Thatcherites to believe that Britain 
would continue to have a strategic significance in the eyes of America which other 
European countries had disqualified themselves from possessing. Both Francis 
Maude and Bernard Jenkin are insistent that when the US faces a really serious 
international problem then it will turn to Britain as its only reliable ally (Jenkin 1994 
and Maude 1994). Maude had said that the Gulf War had the beneficial consequence 
of shoring up the Atlantic relationship (Maude 1994). Iain Duncan-Smith argues that 
it is incidents like the Gulf which indicate that Germany is not ready to assume the 
role that both the Bush and Clinton Administrations hoped she would fulfill 
(Duncan-Smith 1995). Thatcherite Nationalists took comfort from these events as 
they believed that America's dallying with Germany during unification had ended 
with the US being jolted into a realisation of the continuing importance of Britain as 
an ally. 
The pro-European Tories took an opposing view on the significance of the Gulf 
War. They argued that the disunited European view made the case for a more 
coherent and united common foreign policy. They also believed that it was 
unhealthy that the US was able to effectively dictate the direction of Gulf policy, 
especially in the aftermath of the liberation of Kuwait. 
Immediately before the invasion of Kuwait, Thatcher was at an early stage of 
developing ideas for a post-Cold War renewal of the Anglo-American alliance. She 
believed that the alliance had to be perpetuated in order to safeguard other threats to 
Western interests. She wished to reorientate NATO so that it could intervene outside 
the European theatre, or "out-of-area" to protect these interests. Sir Charles Powell 
concedes that these ideas were at a very early stage (Powell 1994). 
The Gulf War fortified Thatcher in her belief that American leadership was still 
relevant in order to prevent challenges to Western interests in the post-Cold War 
era. In a speech to the North Atlantic Council in June 1990, two months before the 
invasion of Kuwait, Thatcher had identified access to Middle Eastern oil as one of 
these Western interests. She cited this area as one which would support her belief 
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that NATO needed to assume an "out-of-area" role to protect Western interests: 
There is no guarantee that threats to our security will stop at some imaginary line across the mid- 
Atlantic. It is not long since some of us had to go to the Arabian Gulf to keep oil supplies flowing 
..... potential threats to 
NATO territory may originate from outside Europe (Thatcher 1993: 812). 
The Impact of the Clinton Presidency 
The Gulf War had left two legacies. It revived the old partnership and enabled Tory 
MPs to hope that Bush's pro-German policy had been an aberration. Also due to the 
divisions within Europe in supporting the UN action in the Gulf, ambitions for a 
more united European security policy were discredited. The former Defence 
Minister Alan Clark spoke scornfully about the Europeans "running to their cellars" 
(The Financial Times 8/2/91). The episode temporarily confirmed the Thatcherite 
view that Britain and the US had an underlying identity of view on security 
questions. Two years later however this view was challenged by the severe strains 
that emerged in the relationship on the crisis in former Yugoslavia. 
More fundamentally, the new Clinton Administration renewed the strategic 
reappraisal of Bush in relation to Germany's post-Cold War role and European 
integration. President Clinton even broadened the strategic rethink by switching 
emphasis away from Europe altogether and focusing more diplomatic attention 
towards Asia. At the same time the shape of the new post-Cold War world changed 
the environment which policymakers operated and this too contributed to strains on 
the Atlantic relationship. 
During the Cold War geo-politics and diplomacy had been forced into a bipolar 
mould, which actually increased in its rigidity during the Reagan years. In this 
context Britain under Thatcher was the most loyal supporter of the US containment 
policies in Europe and the Third World. The potential for division between the 
powers in this era was far more limited. All the western powers agreed on the 
objective of containing Communism; the only disputes which occured were on the 
specific means, such as Reagan's decision to develop SDI. It was because of the 
US/UK agreement on the need to contain the Soviet Union, that disputes like that 
over SDI were rare. More commonly, over the Polish crisis in 1981 and Cruise 
missile deployment, Britain and America agreed on the means of foreign policy as 
well as the mere objective. 
However the "New World Disorder" which has developed in the aftermath of the 
collapse of Communism has broken the bipolar mould and created disputes not only 
about the means to pursue foreign policy but also the objectives themselves. The 
new situation has seen the emergence of a series of bloody regional wars in the 
place either of former Soviet clients or satellite states. The most obvious and 
notorious examples are in Bosnia and Somalia. 
In this more fragmented context, there is far greater potential for greater foreign 
policy disputes between Britain and America, as well as other UN powers. For 
example on Bosnia, should the objective for the West be to curtail or merely contain 
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the conflict? If the objective were to curtail the conflict, then should the appropriate 
and effective response be the use of airpower or large scale ground forces? This new 
situation has a far greater potential to break apart previous alliances and this has 
occured over Bosnia. 
In addition the Clinton Administration has continued and indeed stepped up, moves 
to give Germany a greater role in international affairs and to encourage European 
integration. Clinton welcomed Germany's ending of its constitutional prohibition on 
the use of force and held out the prospect of Germany becoming a permanent 
member of the UN Security Council. Even in personal terms, the new "special 
relationship" which existed between Reagan and Thatcher has now been transfered 
to Clinton and Kohl. The Kohl-Clinton axis has been in evidence on Russian and 
Bosnian policy. 
Clinton described the relationship between America and Germany as "more 
immediately relevant" than that between Britain and America. At the same time 
Clinton and his Secretary of State, Warren Christopher shifted their diplomatic 
emphasis away from Europe and towards the newly vibrant markets of Southeast 
Asia and Latin America. After the collapse of Communism, America has now 
shifted in line with its economic interests towards the Pacific and has far less of a 
stake in Europe. Correspondingly, pressure has continued to mount from the US 
Congress for American troops to be withdrawn in large numbers from Western 
Europe. The Clinton tilt towards Germany stems directly from a desire to offload 
responsibilities onto another power. This strategic reappraisal is likely to continue 
under any of Clinton's successors, either Democrat or Republican. 
More generally, it is now clear that American's post-Cold War attitude to Europe is 
symptomatic of a more fundamental reversion to pre-war isolationism. Congressmen 
of both parties, but especially the Republicans, are increasingly hostile to deploying 
US troops or financial resources outside their own borders unless in pursuit of the 
most narrowly defined national interest. These Congressmen are responding to a 
clear US public mood which is hostile to foreign adventures and expensive 
commitments. The Clinton Administration's concentration on domestic reform 
rather than foreign policy, directly stemmed from this popular mood. In the 
aftermath of the 1994 American mid-term Congressional elections and a Republican 
majority in both houses of Congress, the neo-isolationists seem to be gaining 
ground. In particular, Senator Helms, a noted isolationist critic of foreign aid, is 
now chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 
The Response of Conservatives to the Clinton Presidency 
However the Thatcherites still insist that an Anglo-American partnership is 
indispensable. While they are privately bitterly critical of President Clinton's 
lamentable foreign policy record, they are not deflected from their ideological 
commitment to the alliance. Iain Duncan-Smith dismisses notions of American neo- 
isolationism. Duncan-Smith argues that Britain and America will continue to have 
coincidences of economic and security interests, such as the Gulf (Duncan-Smith 
1995). Duncan-Smith argues that in the past there have been occasional "scares" 
III 
about the prospect of US disengagment which have come to nothing. He cites the 
Sam Nunn Senate amendment in 1984, which called for a big US troop withdrawal 
from Western Europe. This occurred at the height of the Cold War. Duncan-Smith 
argues that America has always been instinctively isolationist but successive 
American Presidents have been able to exert effective leadership in order to 
suppress this feeling (Duncan-Smith 1995). 
Lord Parkinson argues that the continuing existence of NATO engenders an 
American belief in reciprocal obligations to Europe in the post-Cold War era. 
Parkinson says that British support during the Gulf should remind the US that "one 
good turn deserves another" (Parkinson 1995). Bernard Jenkin argues that in periods 
of weak presidential leadership, such as the Carter Administration, the Anglo- 
American relationship "goes to sleep" (Jenkin 1994). Jenkin argues that the State 
Department has always been disposed to downgrade Britain's role in the world, 
whereas the Pentagon has tended to recognise Britain's importance. 
The pro-European Tories have seen the erratic record of the Clinton Presidency as 
the strongest possible argument for a robust European foreign policy. They also 
believe that Congressional hostility to American engagement in the world means that 
Europe must look to its own resources. Peter Luff MP argues that the mood in 
Congress means that Britain must work for closer European defence cooperation. 
He also believes that increasingly America will deal with Europe as a whole and not 
separately with Britain. Therefore he argues that if Britain wants to retain any 
meaningful relationship with the US then it must be part of the EU (Luff 1994). 
The Impact of Bosnia 
The specific issue which has acted as a flashpoint for the unravelling of the Atlantic 
tie is Bosnia. Bosnia has encapsulated a serious dispute on policy between the US 
and the UK, shown Clinton's preference for German views and has also indicated 
America's growing military disengagement from Western Europe. On assuming 
office, Clinton was already committed to launching air-strikes against the Serbs if 
they continued to defy UN resolutions. Initially, the President backed away from his 
campaign pledges and came to an agreement with France and Britain on measures to 
contain the conflict. 
However in the late spring of 1993 with renewed atrocities taking place in Bosnia, 
Clinton began articulating the "lift and strike" policy of lifting the UN imposed arms 
embargo against Bosnia and accompanying this with air strikes against Serb artillery 
positions. While Clinton vaccillated and ultimately backed down on his threats to 
use airpower against Serb targets in 1993-94, he continued to publicly press Britain 
and France to support a UN resolution to lift the arms embargo. From Clinton's 
perspective this option had the virtue of enabling the Muslims to fight on their own 
behalf rather than committing American ground troops in their defence. 
Clinton's position on the arms embargo was adopted even more vociferously by 
Congress. The desire of Congressmen to lift the embargo was also symptomatic of 
neo-isolationism. The supply of arms to the Muslims enabled the US to make an 
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internationalist moral gesture against the Serbs as the "aggressors" in the conflict, 
whilst avoiding an American ground commitment. John Wilkinson MP has argued 
that the absence of American ground troops could be a precursor to ultimate US 
military disengagement from Europe (Wilkinson 1994). 
The lift and strike policy was opposed in principle by Britain. Major and Hurd had 
two fears in relation to Clinton's preferred options. Firstly, they feared for the 
safety of British troops supporting the humanitarian UNPROFOR relief effort. 
Secondly, the Foreign Office argued that lifting the embargo would create a 
conflagration in the Balkans and encourage the Serbs to launch a pre-emptive knock- 
out blow against the Muslims. Christopher was dispatched to London after the Serbs 
rejection of the Owen-Vance peace plan to rally British support for the plan but was 
met with a cool response. Meanwhile an unseemly war of words took place across 
the Atlantic with Senator Joe Biden expressing his outrage at British refusal to go 
along with airstrikes and Representative Susan Molinari calling for the arms 
embargo to be lifted irrespective of European views (Dickie 1994: 251). 
American exasperation at the British line was matched by British annoyance at 
America chastising its allies while refusing to put troops of its own on the ground. 
Opinion poll surveys in America showed consistent hostility to US troops being 
deployed in Bosnia and in trouble spots more generally. These trends were clearly 
very influential on the Administration and encouraged Tory fears that America was 
sliding into neo-isolationism after the Cold War, just at the time when American 
leadership was even more necessary. 
Bosnia not only involved British alienation from American foreign policy objectives 
and anchorage but also from Europe. Divisions emerged over Bosnia as pervasive as 
any that occured during the Gulf War. Western policy had originated via the EU. 
The EU and the Commission were keen to prove that they "were up to the task" of 
managing Europe's first security crisis after the end of the Cold War. The Owen- 
Vance peace mission was sponsored by the EU and its terms of reference were also 
instigated by the Community. The US was drawn into a leadership role because of 
Europe's failure to curtail the conflict or take more than a lowest common 
denominator response to the conflict. 
It was the Croatian episode which showed the EU again to be a house divided and 
also reinforced Thatcherite fears about Germany's behaviour and orientation. After 
Croatia had pushed through its independence declaration, the Serb-dominated 
federal Yugoslav army launched a counterattack on Croatia, carving out enclaves of 
ethnic Serb areas but gradually expanding their conquests into the pursuit of a 
"Greater Serbia". From this stage onwards the British Government refused to 
consider military force. However, a Government Insider said that the Germans saw 
the issue as a "first order concern" because of their kinship with the Croatia 
(Interview 1994). 
The Germans pressed for military action to be taken by the EU. They were met by 
the retort from Britain that as the Germans themselves were prohibited from 
participating in a military effort, this disqualified them from having any authority to 
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press the EU into such a course (Financial Times 18/9/91). Germany then pressed 
for early European recognition of Croatian sovereignty. Initially France supported 
Britain's caution on recognition but under German pressure changed its stance. The 
Germans were insistent and made it plain that they would recognise Croatia 
unilaterally if Europe did not do so collectively. German tactics bore fruit when EU 
foreign ministers reluctantly sanctioned this policy. On the arms embargo the EU 
was also split. The Germans favoured President Clinton's line and Clinton wrote to 
Chancellor Kohl in 1993 urging his assistance to change the EU policy on this issue. 
German tactics left a legacy of bitterness amongst her allies and further polarised 
Conservative opinion. They also enabled the Thatcherites to argue that within a 
Europeanist foreign policy, Britain's preferences would be overuled by its allies and 
therefore the UK should retain its veto over foreign policy. For the Thatcherites, 
Germany's apparent bullying where her interests and views parted company from 
those of her partners, was a portent of future trouble between the former Fatherland 
and her neighbours. A Government insider admits that the Germans were "quite 
muscular" on the Croatian issue but argues that this situation is unlikely to be 
repeated with respect to any other regional issue (Interview 1994). 
John Whittingdale MP has argued that the episode over Croatian recognition shows 
that where German views conflict with those of the rest of the Community, then 
Germany will get its way anyway (Whittingdale 1994). Garel-Jones concedes that 
Britain was bounced into recognising Croatia by the Germans but says the only 
dispute was over the timing of the EU's recognition. However he takes issue with 
Whittingdale's criticism of Germany by stating that any country in the EU has the 
ability to act alone, an option which Britain took up in its defence of the Falklands. 
In this respect Garel-Jones says that Germany is no different from anybody else 
(Garel-Jones 1994). 
The dispute over Croatia highlighted another British concern over European 
ambitions for a CFSP. Britain feared other EU countries setting the direction of 
policy in any supranational framework, while Britain and France bore the main 
burden of any enforcement actions. It was not only the existence of foreign policy 
disagreements but British doubts about the means by which policy would be 
delivered, which reinforced the Conservatives' determination to defend an 
intergovernmental foreign policy. 
Although this issue did more than any other to strain the Anglo-American alliance, 
one of the Thatcherite Nationalists - lain Duncan-Smith - has argued that the breach 
with America took place mainly because of British miscalculations. Duncan-Smith 
argues that the US's desire to lift the arms embargo was right, as was its refusal to 
countenance US ground troops. He believes that Britain was persuaded away from 
this policy against its own better instincts because of countervailing pressure for a 
"European solution" through the EU (Duncan-Smith 1995). Duncan-Smith's 
argument shows that the Atlanticists are able to use Bosnia to argue for a 
reaffirmation of the link with America and a repudiation of closer European security 
cooperation. 
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Common Foreign and Security Policy 
After the Maastricht treaty the European Union developed a common foreign and 
security policy (CFSP) to build on European Political Cooperation. Some of the 
more integrationist member states in the EU like Germany and the Benelux 
countries wish to see develop a more supranational CFSP, which they believe will 
enable the EU to exert the political influence commensurate with its economic 
weight in the world. Naturally, calls for a supranational CFSP divide the 
Nationalists and pro-European Conservatives. The Thatcherite Nationalists are 
dismissive of Europe's foreign policy pretensions and would strongly oppose any 
use of majority voting in CFSP. The pro-Europeans take a pragmatic view, that 
whilst differences in outlook and national interest remain, CFSP has to remain 
intergovernmental but they are prepared to consider a longer term move to 
supranationalism in CFSP. 
Conservative foreign policy faced a potential impasse as a result of disagreements 
with other EU states and due to the reappraisal of the Clinton Administration. The 
Bosnian episode shook the Tories assurance that America and Britain will take the 
same view on major security questions. In addition the growing isolationist trends in 
the United States also forces the Government to consider greater European 
contributions to its own defence and that this necessitates intensified European 
defence cooperation. However the disagreements between Britain and its allies on 
Bosnia and the Gulf make the forging of a common policy very difficult to sell to 
Conservative MPs. 
Major and Hurd moved in a gradualist way towards supporting a clear European 
defence identity and an organisational framework for defence cooperation. The new 
Franco-British aviation corps may be an antecedent for such cooperation. The 
ultimate conclusion of such cooperation might be the enhancement of the Western 
European Union (WEU). However, if the EU did reinvigorate the WEU as part of a 
common defence policy then it would logically follow that they would have to have 
an effective common foreign and security policy, building on the achievements of 
European Political Cooperation. Yet although the Conservatives have qualified their 
foreign policy via EPC, a full supranational foreign policy would be a more radical 
departure. 
On a basic pragmatic level the Foreign Office accepts that it makes sense for there 
to be a joint European approach to major regional issues, instead of member states 
pursuing separate national policies. Douglas Hurd has argued that on a series of 
regional issues, like the Middle East and on international questions, like nuclear 
non-proliferation, policy can only be effectively pursued if there is a joint European 
approach. 
Each of the 12 member states could pursue and elaborate its own policy towards the Middle East but 
that makes no sense in today's world (Douglas Hurd quoted in Col. 171 Hansard 30/3/93). 
However the divisions which emerged during the Gulf War within the Community, 
have convinced the Conservatives that in the absence of consensus, it would be 
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dangerous to move towards a CFSP where British troops could be committed in the 
teeth of the opposition of a British Government. The Conservatives also see the 
national veto as enabling the British Government to secure interests which are of 
particularly relevance, sensitivity or signficance to the UK: 
All member states must preserve the freedom to act independently to defend their individual national 
interests, as is the case with Britain's bilateral agreements over Hong Kong and the Falklands (CPC 
1994: 10). 
At Maastricht the Government therefore resisted moves to make joint actions subject 
to majority voting. However Major and Hurd conceded a "double-lock" mechanism, 
where a unanimous vote the Council of Ministers could decide to define an area of 
joint action and then decide if this action should be subject to QMV. By facilitating 
future majority voting in foreign policy, the Government enabled the longer term 
evolution of CFSP once reassured about a convergence of view on foreign policy 
within the EU. 
Douglas Hurd stressed in Luxembourg, that a move towards majority voting in 
foreign policy while these disputes exist, would only lead to a series of destructive 
schisms within the Community because member states would be unable to tolerate 
their fundamental interests being overidden: 
These differences which arise from time to time, and have arisen in the case of the Gulf, they arise 
from differences of perceived interests. They do not in my view arise because of defective machinery, 
more efficient structures, would have imposed a tidier response. I must say that I rather doubt if that 
is correct. 
Indeed I would say that had there been majority voting, if that had been the rule in foreign policy in 
Europe during the last six months, some member states would from time to time have been deeply 
dissatisfied with the majority verdict. They might have felt their own national interest perceptions and 
interests had been ignored, they might have felt obliged to break ranks, and that kind of imposed 
unity, imposed by the mechanisms of reaching decisions, might have been artificial and impressive 
only for the moment (Hurd 1991: 11). 
Peter Luff MP (Worcester) and one of the new 1992 intake of pro-Europeans, 
concurs with Hurd's judgement and says that the really pro-European position is not 
to force the pace on CFSP before there is agreement on security issues. Luff says 
that if you try to bind CFSP together before it is ready then you risk the whole 
edifice falling apart (Luff 1994). His view indicates that the pro-Europeans fear that 
too precipitate a move towards a supranational CFSP could risk discrediting the 
whole enterprise because of the outstanding disagreements on security issues. 
The 1994 European Election manifesto strongly attacked the opposition parties for 
their desire to give up the national veto in foreign policy in the absence of 
convergence on security issues; 
Our objective is to build the CFSP brick by brick, identifying areas of foreign policy where it makes 
good sense to work together 
Unlike the Labour and Liberal Parties we are utterly determined to maintain Britain's national veto 
(CCO 1994: 52). 
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A Government insider argues that the Foreign Office's objection to Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats stance was that they were moving ahead too fast towards CFSP 
in the absence of agreement in Europe and that policy was only effective if there 
could be such an agreement (Interview 1994). 
So the EU has been able to agree a common policy towards South Africa and the 
Ukraine, where no member states' interests are at stake. However on issues integral 
to Europe's stability, like the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the Community has been 
rendered impotent by this lack of consensus and by the fact that Britain and France 
would bear a disproportionate burden of any military enforcement actions. Bill 
Newton Dunn, former chairman of the Conservative MEPs, has conceded that 
issues like Yugoslavia show the urgency of creating a European security policy but 
admits that the fear amongst states like Britain about being outvoted, has meant that 
an effective CFSP is unlikely to come about (Newton Dunn 1994). The requirement 
for consensus on foreign policy joint actions means that on the most explosive 
issues, like the Gulf and Bosnia, the EU has only been able to push for "soft-power" 
initiatives, like sanctions, rather than military force. 
The lack of a security consensus within the EU, so cruelly revealed by the Gulf and 
Bosnia, has led Nationalist MPs to strongly oppose majority voting in CFSP. John 
Wilkinson MP has rejected any notion of co-decision making or majority voting in 
foreign policy. He poses the question, "What would have happened if we had had 
co-decision making in 1940? " (Wilkinson 1994). It is exactly this apocalyptic 
scenario of a major threat to British national security, which has convinced the 
overwhelming majority of Tory MPs to defend fiercely Britain's independent 
foreign policy prerogatives. lain Duncan-Smith argues that the weakness and 
vacillation of European member states would ensure that a WEU-led defence policy 
would be a recipe for inaction (The Times 31/3/95). 
Pro-Europeans like Tristan Garel-Jones reject these stark analyses. Garel-Jones 
insists that the problem of QMV in foreign policy is one of the perceptions which 
have arisen about Britain's ability to get its preferences adopted within any CFSP 
framework. His argument shows the extent to which the high profile and public 
disputes between Britain and other member states on the Gulf and Bosnia have 
deflected attention from the general consensus on security questions within the EU: 
It's a difficult choice as I say. In 99 cases out of 100 we are in the majority and b. ) the position 
paper has been written by us in a great number of cases. 
As I say a lot of smaller countries always say, you know, "Why don't you have more QMV, you 
create the majority in the first place, you lead the majority, you know why don't you.. . they always 
say if we had QMV we could outvote Greece, we could outvote Germany on Croatia. They say, "Tell 
me the last time you were in the minority on an issue of foreign policy? You never are! " 
A Sheffield University/ESRC survey of Conservative MPs shows that 87% of 
backbenchers agreed that Britain should block the use of QMV in the areas of 
foreign and defence policy (Baker, Fountain, Gamble & Ludlam 1994: 6). This 
finding shows the extent to which Tories view Britain's unfettered capacity to 
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defend its interests as essential to her sovereignty. Garel-Jones recognises the reality 
of the strength of Tory opposition and strikes a slightly exasperated note about the 
constraints which it places on British action: 
And as I say, in the present Parliament, probably for the next decade or so, the idea that the balance 
should shift away from Britain still retaining the right to act independently is not on the agenda. I 
don't think that isn't yet sufficiently clear to colleagues in the House the extent to which we are 
almost always in the majority in-the European Union. 
However Tim Renton MP, a leading member of the Positive Europeans and a 
former Tory Chief Whip, argues that his colleagues' opposition to CFSP may also 
stem from an atavistic impulse. Renton says that the reality of Britain's economic 
position in the modern world is that she will only take action when she collaborates 
with allies, whether this be in the Gulf or in Bosnia. The only exceptions Renton 
sees to this would be the Falklands and Gibraltar. He says that many Tory MPs 
hanker after the days of grandeur when Britain "stood alone" and acted 
independently of any other power, as in the days of Henry V and Agincourt (Renton 
1994). 
Lord Howe has also raised an additional impediment to the pursuit of CFSP. Howe 
argues that there is a real question as to whether a system of common foreign policy 
would command loyalty and a sense of identification amongst the peoples of Europe. 
He argues that when British, French and American soldiers fought in the Gulf they 
did so out of a sense of national loyalty and obligation. Howe does not believe that 
this sense of allegiance can be transferred easily to an institution like CFSP (Howe 
1994a). Here Howe shows his common ground with some of the anti-federalists. 
The latter always insist that federal institutions will not command popular loyalty 
because the peoples of Europe will not identify with them. Therefore the anti- 
federalists argue that the institutions will lack authority and legitimacy. 
However Howe has made a suggestion designed to provide a way around the 
impasse over an agreed but effective CFSP. He points to the history of EPC where 
countries authorised the development of a common policy as long as they themselves 
were not expected to go the distance on implementing the policy. He agrees that the 
sanctions opt-outs provided for in the case of Ireland and Italy during the Falklands 
War are an example of a flexible operation of CFSP (Howe 1994a). 
Howe also cites the operation of Five-Power cooperation on the UN security council 
as a better example. Howe argues that members of the "Permanent Five" have not 
used the veto on issues where their national interests are not immediately at stake in 
order that a common UN policy can be pursued (Howe 1994a). This restrained use 
of the veto system at the UN would apply to Russia's acquiesence in America's 
Haiti invasion and China's abstention on UN resolutions during the Gulf War. Howe 
lists an array of regional and global problems which he believes on a pragmatic 
basis are more effectively dealt with through a united European response. 
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Conclusion 
The Thatcherite Nationalists and the pro-European Conservatives fundamentally 
disagree on whether Britain should support an Atlanticist or a Europeanist foreign 
policy. The Thatcherites have carried forward Churchill and Macmillan's view of an 
Anglo-American alliance with Britain in a trusted junior role. Thatcher and her 
followers also fear that European integration will break Europe away from US 
foreign policy leadership. The pro-Europeans believe that American power has to be 
balanced with a more assertive and cohesive European foreign policy role in the 
post-Cold War situation. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s foreign policy crises have 
only reinforced the views held by these groupings. 
Thatcher's distrust of European security instincts makes her determined to resist any 
independent European CFSP. Equally, the misgivings expressed by Lord Howe 
about US foreign policy unilateralism, make him more supportive of a stronger 
European foreign policy. The contested attitudes to Germany held within the 
Conservative parliamentary party also influence their support or opposition to 
European integration. 
The next chapter will focus on Conservative reactions to the expanding competence 
of the European institutions. It will show that the Thatcherite Nationalists believe 
that there is an integrationist dynamic in the EU institutions which has acted to take 
EU competence beyond that which they envisaged at the time of the accession 
debates and the Single European Act. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE BATTLE AGAINST THE INSTITUTIONS 
We have been cheated, swindled and mugged by the self-same institutions that this very day are 
grovelling on their knees for us to give them more of our powers (Tony Marlow MP, 20/5/92). 
Sovereignty is not an undivided thing. If it were, the only ruler who was absolutely sovereign and 
monarch of all he surveyed was Robinson Crusoe. But he was sovereign of everything and master of 
nothing (Geoffrey Howe 20/11/91). 
I am sure that it must be a federation in the sense of one Parliament, one foreign policy, one currency 
etc. So far as I can judge events on the Continent of Europe, I do not want to become part of such a 
federation (Lord Avon to Lord Chandos 30/10/62). 
Chapter Three analysed the Conservative Party's commitment to nationhood. This 
chapter argued that a central feature of the nationhood ideology within the party is a 
belief in national identity and constitutional independence. The Thatcherite 
Nationalists have a visceral attachment to Britain's constitutional prerogatives. This 
commitment is coupled with the ascendancy of Thatcherite free trade doctrines in 
the party. These two commitments are united in the conception of a Europe of free 
trading nation states. The integrationist drive within the EU in this period is in 
direct conflict with this Nationalist conception. 
Tory leaders repeatedly promised their supporters that British membership of the 
EEC would not compromise British constitutional independence. However, 
Thatcher and Major made a series of pragmatic transfers of British sovereignty in 
order to enhance the free trading nature of the EU. These transfers of legislative 
power contravened these earlier pledges to maintain constitutional independence. 
The Tory leadership has, however unintentionally, enhanced the diminution of the 
nation state and intensifed European political integration. 
In the post-1988 period the Thatcherites reacted against the strong integrationist 
push that took place after the Hanover summit. The Maastricht treaty was the chief 
product of this new phase of integration. Maastricht showed many Thatcherites how 
far the EU had moved beyond the free trading nation state conception. 
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More fundamentally, this chapter will argue that the nation state conception, shared 
by most Tories, is incompatible with the nature and direction of the European 
Union. The EU's inherent integrationist dynamics were central to the integrationist 
push which was sponsored by the leaders of the member states in this period. 
This chapter will focus on the role of the European institutions in driving forward 
this process. The Thatcherite Nationalists are now so concerned about the 
consequences of European legislation and the integrationist character of the EU, that 
they wish to restructure or "reinvent" the Union in order to meet the sole 
requirements of free trade. The Thatcherites in particular now regret the 
consequences of the SEA and wish to reverse the integration process which they 
themselves assisted. 
Leadership Approaches to Supranationalism 
The Thatcherite Nationalists were infuriated by the fact that the Government's 
rhetoric did not match the substance of Government policy in this area. Major 
stridently declared his opposition to a federal Europe but in practice extended 
qualified majority voting, gave the European Parliament blocking powers and 
increased the powers of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Both Thatcher and 
Major were prepared to increase the supranational powers of the European 
institutions in order to pursue market liberalisation. 
This contrast between actual European policy and the political rhetoric can be 
compared to the blandishments and token gestures made by Tory leaders in the 
1950s about the empire, when in reality a Conservative Government was embarking 
on rapid decolonisation. Bernard Jenkin MP argues that this type of disjuncture 
between policy and rhetoric is typical of the Tory leadership statecraft (Jenkin 
1994). This conflict is apparent in other policy areas but it is particularly acute in 
European policy. This occurred because the leadership was only too aware of the 
conflict between its need to pacify its party constituency and the policy imperatives 
of pursuing British interests 
On the political dimension, the leadership was only to aware that its parliamentary 
party is increasingly hostile to further integration and that the rank and file of Tory 
Party members are overwhelmingly hostile to the EU. The' leadership had to pitch 
its rhetoric in order to mollify its own political constituency. However the 
leadership believed that in some areas supranational solutions could assist British 
interests and objectives. The leadership had to reconcile this analysis with the 
demands and fears of its domestic constituency. After the ratification battle and the 
bitterness which it caused, these conflicting pressures were even more difficult to 
reconcile. 
The leadership's attitudes are best understood as comprising two conceptions of 
supranationalism. Both conceptions are united by a calculation about the securing of 
British interests. There is a pragmatic conception in evidence in the introduction of 
qualified majority voting (QMV) and the enforcement powers of the ECJ in respect 
of the single market. Here Thatcher and Major abandoned the national veto in order 
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that other member states could no longer impede the realisation of British 
commercial interests. There was a trade-off involved in the calculation which both 
leaders made. 
They were prepared to create the situation where a British Government being in the 
minority on a policy issue, such as cigarette advertising, because of their support 
for the global project of trade liberalisation. Thatcher accepted the loss of the veto 
in the completion of the single market because she feared that other countries, like 
Greece, would use the veto to block single market directives. Here the leadership 
supported supranational provisions in order to pursue anticipated policy gains. 
Another example of this pragmatic attitude to supranationalism is agricultural 
policy. The Government has encouraged the use of QMV for agriculture in order to 
overcome French resistance to reform of the CAP. Even John Whittingdale MP, a 
Thatcherite Nationalist concedes the usefulness of majority voting in this area 
(Whittingdale 1994) 
The same calculations were evident in Major's preparedness to empower the 
European Court to fine member states which did not implement European 
directives. Major supported this supranational power for an institution greatly 
mistrusted on the Tory backbenches. Major and Hurd accepted this at Maastricht 
because they recognised that only a supranational actor would have the impartiality 
to police the single market. Hurd made the following point during the ratification 
debate: 
Let us take the single market, for example. Left to themselves . member states are hardly likely to 
blow the whistle on illegal aids or other breaches of common rules that give their companies an unfair 
advantage over the companies of their partners. That is why so much of the pressure for Community 
action comes from our companies and interests. Britain gains from the existence of strong institutions 
that can enforce the disciplines of the single market (HC Debates, 11/3/93, Vol. 220, Col. 1153). 
The other aspect of the leadership's view of supranationalism is a rejectionist 
policy, exemplified by their social chapter opt-out. On issues like a common foreign 
policy and the social dimension, the Government rigidly opposes majority voting or 
EU competence. On these issues the Government seeks to protect its existing policy 
interests. On foreign policy the Government is defending its prerogative to deploy 
troops in pursuit of an independent policy. On social policy, the Conservatives wish 
to have autonomy to maintain deregulated labour markets. 
In these policy areas there is no trade-off to be made with other member states - 
either Britain possesses the unqualified right to send troops to Hong Kong or it does 
not. In many of these areas the Government anticipates that it will disagree with the 
majority position on the Council of Ministers and so wishes to ensure its right to 
pursue an independent policy. Chapter Four discussed the Conservative concerns 
about the disagreements on security issues like Bosnia and the Gulf. These 
differences have made the Tory leadership determined not to cede the veto in these 
areas. 
In both the pragmatic and rejectionist attitudes to European policy the leadership's 
stance is dictated by perceptions of policy interest. If a policy interest is served by 
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supranationalism, then the leadership will recommend it; if a policy interest can 
only be maintained by the national veto, then the leadership will refuse to yield in 
this area. The political problem which the Conservative leadership has is that their 
rhetoric has become so hostile to federalism that it is even more difficult for them to 
make pragmatic concessions in areas like QMV. The hostility of the leadership's 
rhetoric is a direct consequence of the hardening anti-integrationist mood in the 
Conservative parliamentary mainstream. Many Tories are so resentful of the scope 
of EU powers, that their desire for policy independence is beginning to override the 
attractiveness of specific supranational proposals, such as the introduction of QMV 
in setting the objective for the structural funds. 
These feelings are reflected in the Sheffield survey of Tory backbenchers. Twenty 
percent of Tory respondents wished to abolish QMV altogether. A majority wished 
to restore the blocking minority under the QMV rules to 23, thereby making it more 
difficult for the British Government to be defeated in the Council of Ministers 
(Baker et al 1995: 229). This growing mood of "Euro-minimalism" is likely to 
mean that at the 1996 IGC, the leadership's substantial policy positions are much 
more in accordance with their rejectionist political rhetoric. The Conservative Party 
wished to see anti-federalist words and deeds. 
The Conservative Backlash Against the EU's Powers 
Given the Conservative Party's instigation of all the major advances in European 
integration, the backlash against European political integration is difficult to account 
for in superficial terms. However the Tory Party's willingness or acquiescence in 
past integrative steps presupposes that all Tory MPs appreciated and were informed 
of the full implications of Government European policy. Throughout the course of 
the European controversy Tory MPs have claimed to have been misled by their 
party leaders about the commitments entailed by Britain's membership. They insist 
that they supported the EEC as a free trading organisation. 
The Maastricht treaty's ratification saw a mood of distrust and suspicion evident 
amongst the mainstream of the party and not just the diehard Euro-rebels. 
Maastricht was the key stage in the new integrationist drive in the EU and therefore 
it stimulated a growing sense of alarm about the extension of EU competence. 
The central criticism was that the Conservatives had supported membership of free 
trading organisation and instead had discovered that the Community was becoming 
more and more like a federal state, exercising competence over a wide area of 
economic, social and even foreign policy. At the second reading of the Maastricht 
treaty, Tony Marlow, a leading Euro-rebel, expressed this resentment most 
pungently: 
For example, we were told, as we have been told tonight, that the rights of workers ..... was a matter 
of unanimity, eventually a matter that could be decided in this House.... Nor did we imagine that a 
domestic matter such as cigarette advertising would be other than under our control..... Having lost 
our innocence and our wallets, does it not seem a little perverse to venture again so soon to the dark, 
back streets of Brussels (HC Debates, 20/5/92, Vol. 208, Col. 344). 
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This perception of a Union gaining ever greater powers led to the Prime Minister 
attempting to banish these fears by claiming that the Maastricht treaty reversed 
integrationist trends: 
The Maastricht treaty marks the point at which, for the first time, we have begun to reverse that 
centralising trend. We have moved decision making back towards the member states in areas where 
Community law need not and should not apply (HC Debates, 20/5/92, Vol. 208, Col. 265-6). 
At the beginning of the Maastricht ratification process Hurd tacitly acknowledged 
the expansion in Community powers but insisted that the treaty represented a 
reversal of federalist aspirations: 
The point I am trying to make is that the climate is changing. Those who believe, quite genuinely, 
that there should be a steady. inexorable movement towards a single Executive and single Parliament 
are now on the defensive rather than on the offensive (HC Debates, 4/11/92, Vol. 214, Col. 374). 
Tory MPs' fears about the nature of the EU are long established. From the outset, 
Tory leaders knew that they had to address fears about European supranationalism 
and insist that the nation state conception was compatible with British membership. 
At the very outset of Britain's negotiations to join the EEC in 1961, Edward Heath 
dismissed the idea that the Community was likely to develop into a federalist 
organisation: 
Will it (the EEC) lead to some other form of organisation? In the Treaty of Rome itself, there is no 
commitment either explicit or implicit leading to any particular form of constitutional development 
above the Treaty of Rome HC Debates, 3/8/61, Vol. 645, Col. 1677). 
Divisions on the Political Nature of the European Union 
The Thatcherite Nationalists consistently claim that they endorsed the EEC as an 
economic enterprise but instead Britain has been faced with a political organisation. 
However Howe has argued that this distinction between an "economic" and a 
"political" conception of the EEC is ahistorical and invalid. Howe has pointed to the 
founding principles and idealist aspirations which influenced the setting up of the 
EEC went beyond narrowly commercial plans: 
Underlying the debate, a number of ancient fallacies have begun to re-emerge in this country and 
elsewhere. One that keeps recurring is that the Community to which we still belong remains an 
economic community, devoted only to economic objectives. That was never its purpose. It was one of 
the great post-war institutions whose central purpose was political - to put an end to frightful 
nationalistic quarrels (HC Debates, 20/11/91, Vol. 199, Col. 306). 
In the past the Conservative Party has embraced enthusiastically other types of 
international organisation which have clear political roles. These organisations are 
also ones which have involved transfers of sovereignty. The best example is British 
membership of NATO. The Conservative parliamentary party accepted NATO 
membership even though it involved a British Government commiting itself in 
advance to defend another state 
if that state were attacked by a third country. Peter 
Luff MP argues that given the transfer of sovereignty involved in NATO, it is 
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astonishing that NATO membership was not even controversial when the treaty was 
debated (Luff 1994). 
There are two possible explanations for this apparent contradiction. From the 
beginning of the European enterprise Conservatives feared that the EEC would have 
a comprehensive reach across a whole series of economic, social and foreign policy 
areas, which had traditionally been the preogative of the nation state. Tories knew 
that many of the founders of the EEC aspired to eventual federal union. Whereas an 
organisation like NATO confined integration to one sphere only - that of defence 
and military matters. Tories have always been concerned about the extensiveness of 
Europe's reach compared to other international organisations. Even a pro-European 
Tory, like Macmillan feared that the British people would not consent to a 
supranational body intervening in contentious domestic issues: 
Our people are not going to hand to any supranational authority the right to close down our pits or 
steelworks (Macmillan quoted in Home 1988: 321). 
Nicholas Ridley, in his infamous Spectator interview, also used a variant of 
Macmillan's argument. Ridley argued that depressed regions, like the North East 
would not accept that a British Government would be unable to relieve their 
economic plight if Britain joined a single currency area. Ridley argued that if 
unemployed shipworkers in Jarrow were told to take their complaints to a European 
Central Bank, then this could be a recipe for "bloody revolution" (Ridley 1990). 
Tory MPs also fear that their leaders have acquiesced in moves towards a federal 
Union because they fear the consequences of taking a firmer line. The Euro-rebels 
believed that Major is unwilling to give other member states an ultimatum because 
he wishes to "stay on the train. " 
However pro-European Conservatives are opposed to the party framing ultimatums 
to give to other EU member states. Howe argued that Britain had to remain a full 
participant in European institutions -"to stay on the train" in order to influence 
policy decisions which would affect British interests. Essentially Howe is arguing 
for Britain to continue to negotiate from within the EU. Chapter one noted that 
Howe feared that Britain risked a repetition of the consequences of Britain's refusal 
to join the EEC at its inception. Howe argued that crucial issues, like the CAP, 
were decided to the UK's disadvantage due to her non-participation. Britain's 
original failure to join the EEC has often attracted metaphors associated with modes 
of transport. Britain was described as "having missed the bus. " 
Tory leaders have consistently advocated their party's endorsement of integrationist 
legislation on the basis that Britain would lose influence unless she was fully 
integrated into European institutions. Macmillan was the first to deploy this 
argument: 
By remaining outside, we could be faced with a political solution in Europe which ran counter to our 
views and interests but which we could 
do nothing to influence (The Times 8/10/62). 
Heath made the same appeal in his winding up speech in the EEC entry debate: 
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That the Prime Minister would be saying to the House, in effect that he was prepared to accept the 
situation in which vital decisions affecting all of us were taken in circumstances over which we had no 
control and little influence (HC Debates, 28/10/71, Vol. 823, Col. 2206-7). 
Hurd used this argument in his appeal to Tory MPs to back the Maastricht treaty 
during the Paving Motion debate. In his appeal Hurd did not emphasise positive 
provisions in the treaty but merely argued that without its ratification Britain would 
be excluded from influence: 
But one does not stop the debate by refusing to ratify the treaty. If we did that we would merely 
ensure that in the debate the voice of Britain was muted and that the opinions of Britain carried less 
weight. We would increase the possibility of combinations forming on the continent which would 
deeply affect the prosperity and security of these islands but in whose policies we would have no say 
(HC Debates, 4/11/92, Vol. 199, Col. 376). 
Tory leaders have concentrated on their commitment to the nation state conception 
and have failed to make an assessment of the ambitions of other member states. The 
Euro-rebels argued that while the Government had an understanding of European 
commitments which was contrary to that of its European partners. Tory leaders 
have repeatedly argued that integrationist legislation represented something which 
was at variance with the perceptions of Britain's European partners. Thatcher and 
Heath were keen to give the impression to their backbenchers that the British 
understanding of European agreements or treaties would be the one which would 
prevail. The Rome treaty clearly committed the organisation to an "ever closer 
union. " Nevertheless Heath argued that other member states had set aside their 
federalist ambitions in order that Britain could become a member of the 
Community: 
There will be no blueprint for a federal Europe .... What is more, those members of the Community 
who want a federal system, but who know the view of Her Majesty's Government and the Opposition 
Parties here, are prepared to forego their federal desires so that Britain should be a member (HC 
Debates, 2512/70, Vol. 796, Col. 1221). 
Michael Welsh accepts that Tory leaders have unintentionally created a 
misapprehension amongst their MPs about the real implications of European 
legislation. He argues that Tory leaders refused to accept that other European 
leaders actually believed in the commitments and declarations of principle contained 
in the treaties. Welsh argues that this misapprehension stems from the fact that 
because Tories themselves were so viscerally opposed to supranationalism, they 
could not believe that other member states would not share their feelings (Welsh 
1995). Welsh's view is supported by evidence from Sir Michael Butler, Britain's 
former EU Ambassador. Butler is dismissive of the declaratory sections in the 
treaties, saying "rhetoric is cheap" (Butler 1995). He basically argues that federalist 
aspirations contained in the treaty need not be taken too seriously because they do 
not commit a British Government to any course of action. It is precisely this view of 
which Welsh is so critical. 
One illustration of the Conservatives' refusal to take seriously the declarations of 
principle contained within the treaties which they signed is the SEA's reaffirmation 
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of the goal of the realisation of monetary union. During the treaty's negotiation at 
the Luxembourg summit in 1985, Lawson says that he urged Thatcher not to allow 
a reference to EMU to be included in the Single European Act. He feared that such 
a declaration would return to haunt the Government at a later date because it would 
allow the Commission to revisit the issue (Lawson 1992: 893-4). Thatcher allowed 
the reference to EMU to go unchallenged. She found that just two years later, the 
German Presidency committed itself to this goal. 
Lord Tebbit from the nationalist side of the argument also agrees with Welsh, that 
the Conservative leadership has failed to properly appraise the attitudes of its 
partners to treaty agreements. Tebbit also argues that this insular view meant that 
the Government did not anticipate the signal which the SEA would give to 
integrationist governments in other member states: 
The Cabinet considered the issue of the Single Market and the SEA only from the British point of 
view, never seeing that the signal it gave to our partners was wholly different to those intended by the 
Prime Minister (Tebbit 1991: 46). 
The most significant section of the treaty in this sense was the inclusion of QMV to 
implement the single market (see chapter three). Other member states saw the 
introduction of QMV as an opportunity to intensify EU integration. Ten years after 
the signing of the SEA at Luxembourg, the majority of EU decisions in most policy 
areas are taken by majority voting. 
The European Institutions and Integration 
It is widely understood that the EU institutions have a vested interest in further 
integration as this creates the basis for an expansion of their power. The 
Commission and the Court are not impartial actors in the EU legislative process. 
Instead during the Delors Presidency of the Commission the institutions played a 
very partisan role in seeking to extend the competence of the central institutions. 
pascal Lamy, Delors' chief of staff, has admitted that the Commission saw the SEA 
as a crucial building block for a federal Europe. After the passing of the SEA, the 
Commission saw an increase in its resources and credibility. Delors fully intended 
to exploit this situation in order to move on from the market unification phase of 
integration to what Ross calls "state building" (Ross 1995: 39). Delors' approach in 
this next phase was to take a series of strategic actions in order to seize upon the 
political opportunity structure provided by the SEA (Ross 1995: 39). Lamy called 
this the "Russian doll" strategy. The two key "dolls" which Delors produced 
beneath the single market casing were the social dimension and EMU. Delors 
claimed that the SEM needed complementary social protection for reasons of equity 
and efficiency. He also argued that EMU was necessary for the proper functioning 
of the single market. 
The proposition that a single currency was necessary for a single market was highly 
contestable. Nevertheless it was advocated by the Commission on the basis of a 
clear political rationale. Delors knew that social and monetary harmonisation would 
greatly increase the competence of the Union and therefore the institutions. For 
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Delors, the passage of the SEA provided a political means to extend integration 
across a much wider range of sectors. Therefore the British Government faced a 
situation in which the Commission was conspiring to use the political and legislative 
opportunities provided by the single market in order to build a more united Europe. 
Iain Duncan-Smith says that he would have opposed the SEA at the time of its 
passage through parliament because he would have been afraid that it would be used 
by the European institutions to intensify political integration (Duncan-Smith 1995). 
The Single Market's Impact on European Integration 
It is certainly the case that the removal of internal barriers as part of the single 
market programme meant that a series of policies would have to be harmonised 
(Mutimer 1989: 86). Freedom of movement means that once goods or persons are 
within Europe, they will be able to move freely between member states. The logical 
result of this policy is that the de facto policy governing the movement of goods, 
services or people, becomes the policy of the least restrictive state if one state can 
unilaterally lower standards then this will have an impact on all the others. The only 
means to harmonise standards at a high level is through central action (Mutimer 
1989: 86). The logic of harmonisation in other areas brought about by the creation 
of the SEM substantiates the notion of spillover. 
The best application of this principle can be seen with reference to the single 
market's impact on Britain's jealously guarded frontier controls. The freedom of 
movement of citizens of member states inside the SEM was part of the removal of 
internal barriers within the single market. The removal of these barriers meant that 
a series of national policies were in need of harmonisation or at least close 
coordination. The British Government had argued that this harmonisation in areas 
like illegal immigration and drug trafficking could come about through 
intergovernmental means. Both Thatcher and Major were determined to retain 
control of Britain's frontier controls and not to yield to a supranational immigration 
policy. Britain had obtained a side deal during the 1985 SEA negotiations to retain 
its own frontier controls. 
However, a large group of the Northern member states formed the Schengen group, 
dissolving all border controls within their membership. The European Parliament 
pressured the Commission to bring forward a challenge to Britain's separate frontier 
controls. If Britain loses in an appeal to the ECJ then single market integration will 
have eventually brought about integration in another policy sphere and against the 
wishes of the Conservative leadership. 
The SEM has also created a dynamic towards the erosion of member states' fiscal 
prerogatives. Once a single market is set up, variations in the level of indirect 
taxation between member states will become increasingly untenable. Otherwise 
states charging high value added tax (VAT) rates would see business and capital 
switch to states which levy lower rates. Market forces would eventually allow only 
small differentials between member states. Peter Luff MP agrees that market forces 
are likely to harmonise VAT rates at a uniform level (Luff 1994). Despite this, the 
Conservative Government at the time of the SEA's negotiation resisted the 
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Commission and Lord Cockfield's attempts to harmonise VAT rates in the internal 
market. Nevertheless Howe admitted that fiscal competition might yield the same 
outcome anyway (Howe 1994: 457). 
On the border controls and VAT questions further integration is on the agenda 
because of the consequences of the SEA. However, in the case of employment 
protection, the Commission took the initiative in an area in which action was not 
necessary for the smooth functioning of the single market. Through a creative use 
of the treaties, the Commission proposed regulating working hours in another move 
which would have increased its power. 
The Social Dimension and European Integration 
In the social dimension the institutions sought to extend integration over the heads 
of British ministers. The 1992 Working Time Directive was initiated by the 
European Commission. The Commission brought proposals for a maximum Europe- 
wide 48-hour week under the health and safety provisions of the SEM. These 
provisions allowed for majority voting. The Government and Tory MPs, such as 
Tony Marlow and Sir Teddy Taylor, were outraged at what they saw as an abuse of 
the QMV procedures. They argued that these procedures had only been intended to 
enact the SEA but were now being cynically used to drive through social legislation 
against the opposition of the British Government. 
Some pro-Europeans acknowledge that European integration has gone beyond some 
of Parliament's original intentions. Tristan Garel-Jones concedes that the 
Commission's actions in this regard have caused understandable resentment (Garel- 
Jones 1994). However, Howe takes a relaxed view about this "creeping 
competence" phenomenon. He argues that it proved difficult to ruthlessly confine 
QMV to the single market measures because majority voting changed the culture of 
the European institutions (Howe 1994: 457-8). Thatcher was predictably far less 
forgiving about this development. She noted that the European institutions were 
politically adept in the issues which they chose to bring into Union competence: 
When Commissioners issued directives outside their competence they were careful to choose popular 
causes which had support among pressure groups in member countries, thus presenting themselves as 
the true friends of the British worker, pensioner and environmentalist. This made it politically difficult 
to resist the creeping expansion of the Commission's authority (Thatcher 1993: 743). 
It is this tendency of the European institutions to stretch treaty bases in order to 
increase supranational decision-making which has left Tory MPs deeply suspicious 
about any further increases in QMV. Thatcher expressed this feeling well when she 
said that "we got our fingers burned" by the unintended consequences of the QMV 
concession (see chapter three). Francis Maude also believes that some of these 
powers have been abused by the institutions: 
Well the Treaty of Rome and the SEA were intended to be primarily about a single market and yes 
some people have tried to subvert 
it in that way, which is highly undesirable and that has undoubtedly 
had an effect on the attitude of a lot of people, myself included. I would certainly have reservations 
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about agreeing to future extensions of QMV, in the light of the way it has been used and I would say 
abused (Maude 1994). 
Emerson argues that the SEA established a precedent for constitutional amendment 
and new institutional powers to be inserted into the European system (Emerson 
1988: 298). The SEA added an impetus to the integrationist project which Thatcher 
did not intend and failed to appreciate when she sought ratification of the Act. 
Subsequently, Thatcher has accepted that ceding powers to the EU is likely to have 
much wider institutional consequences: 
Any powers conceded to the Commission by agreement are likely to be widened in practice and 
extended into areas that we do not envisage (HC Debates, 20/11/91, Vol. 199, Col. 293). 
Thatcher also believes that Major's opt-out provisions on the social chapter and 
monetary union could be subverted by the same process of creeping integration. She 
argues that Major's exemption clauses ultimately depend on goodwill and fair 
dealing from people whose purposes are different from Britain's (Thatcher 1995: 
484). 
European Law and Integration 
European law has been a major agent in extending European integration. The Court 
has often extended European integration in the face of strong Conservative 
objections. 
The legal relationship between the Community and the member states is based on 
the attribution (or delegation) of state powers to the Community institutions. Within 
the specific domain of the Community the institutions are provided with exclusive 
authority. Once delegated, these powers cannot be withdrawn and where the 
Community has acted, member states must refrain from taking concurrent action. 
This is known as the doctrine of the occupied field. European law ultimately has 
supremacy over the law of the member states. The 1972 European Communities Act 
gave European law ultimate supremacy over British law if in any case a conflict 
occurred. The supremacy of European law has led to a British Act of Parliament - 
the Merchant Shipping Act 1988- being repealed because it conflicted with 
European law. 
The Conservatives problem was that European law is derived from two sources. 
The primary source over European law is contained in the treaties of the Union. 
This is the source which the Conservative Government had most control. However 
because Britain did not participate in the framing of the Rome treaty in 1957, they 
had to accept at the time of accession various provisions and declarations in the 
treaties about which they were unhappy. These include the broad declaration of 
intent and objectives of the Community, such as "ever closer union". 
More serious for the Government is the impact of the secondary sources of 
European law. These sources derive from the rulings of the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) which are binding on member states. The Court has now become one 
of the principal demons of the anti-federalist Right. The ECJ has often acted as a 
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promoter of European integration through its rulings. The principal reason for the 
integrative power of the Court is what is called the doctrine of "direct effect". This 
doctrine arose from a landmark ruling by the Court in the Van Geld en Loos case. 
Here the ECJ ruled that the Community confered rights as well as obligations on 
individuals. This ruling was the basis for individuals being conferred rights by 
European law which they could then enforce through the courts of member states. 
The effect of the Van Geld decision was that the ECJ was able to legislate through 
its rulings. Direct effect has been employed by the ECJ in a wide variety of fields, 
such as the movement of goods, services and people. The Court is in a unique 
position in that it has had no parliament to look to as a source of law and has to 
interpret treaties which comprise general policies alongside precise rules of law. 
The vagueness of some of the treaty language has given the Court more discretion 
than would be appropriate for the Law Lords in Britain for example. 
Lord Howe has also argued that because the Rome treaty does not state that all 
undelegated powers are automatically the domain of the member states, the ECJ has 
been placed in the invidious position of making rulings which affect the competence 
of the states and Brussels (Howe 1994a). Given the ambiguity of its constitutional 
position, the ECJ has adopted a teleological means of legal interpretation which 
takes into account the conditions prevailing at the time of the judgement. 
The Court has often ruled according to what it believes are the principles underlying 
treaty statements. Tristan Garel-Jones argues that this judicial approach is not 
radically different from some of the decisions by the British High Court in recent 
years. He cites the example of marital rape rulings to argue that British courts have 
also taken into account the mood of the society at the time of their judgements 
(Garel-Jones 1994). However Francis Maude does not see the ECJ's teleologic 
interpretative style as legitimate: 
The definitions have been stretched well beyond what most people would regard as an ordinary use of 
language. The European Court is very much a purposive court which interprets the spirit and it sees 
the whole spirit of the regime in which it is adjudicating, to extend the process of European 
integration and European union (Maude 1994). 
One notable example of the impact of the doctrine of direct effect and the Court's 
style of interpretation is the SABENA versus Defrenne 1976 ruling on equal pay. 
The Court drew upon the principles in Article 119 of the Rome treaty in order to 
rule in favour of a woman's right to equal pay. This ruling was directly effective in 
the courts of member states. The Court drew upon the broad principle of fair 
competition outlined in article 119, in the Defrenne case and made a ruling which 
legislated for the whole Community. The No Turning Back Group complained 
about the continental judges often interpreting abstract principles instead of using 
precedent (Duncan-Smith et al 1994: 29). Thatcher in her memoirs records her 
dismay and fatalism about the ECJ's role in expanding Union competence: 
The advice from the lawyers was that in relation to questions of Community and Commission 
competence the ECJ would 
favour 'dynamic and expansive' interpretations of the treaty over 
restrictive ones. The 
dice were loaded against us (Thatcher 1993: 743). 
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During the committee stage of the Maastricht bill on 20 January 1993, Iain Duncan- 
Smith MP argued that the Government social chapter opt-out could be subverted by 
the same interpretative rulings of the Court. He argued that the social objectives and 
principles contained in the main body of the treaty could be used by the ECJ as a 
basis for ruling that Britain should accept European social measures: 
I now believe that the social chapter is no longer relevant. The treaty covers a series of open doors 
through which many of the intentions of the social chapter may well be introduced (HC Debates, 
20/1/95, Vol. 217, Col. 410). 
Duncan-Smith cited the Defrenne case to argue that the Court had recourse to treaty 
bases and provisions which could supersede the Maastricht opt-out. He argued that 
a legal conflict over the British opt-out might arise because other member states 
would wish to eliminate Britain's competitive trading edge which had been 
contributed to by the UK's exemption from the social chapter. 
After establishing the political rationale which might prompt the Commission or 
other member states to challenge Britain's position, Duncan-Smith then argued that 
the Maastricht treaty contains a legal route for such a challenge. The treaty 
incorporates general social objectives which Duncan-Smith claimed could nullify the 
effectiveness of the social chapter opt-out. He argued that Articles 2 and 3 of the 
Maastricht treaty, which commit the Union to "social cohesion and solidarity 
amongst member states, are alternative treaty bases which the ECJ could cite in 
order to rule that Britain had to accept specific social measures. 
He also feared that the Commission would again bring forward a challenge to the 
UK's position by citing Article 118a of the SEA, as the Commission did over the 
Working Time directive. Article 118a allows for majority voting on some areas of 
social policy. Here the Commission would seek to cite a legal authority which 
facilitates an increase in the Union's power and the power of the European 
institutions. The MP feared that if Britain lost an ECJ appeal it would have no 
longer be exempt from social measures and in addition might find that these were 
imposed on a British Government by a majority vote. Duncan-Smith's specific fears 
about the possible consequences of the language in Articles 2 and 3 of the treaty 
supports the proposition of Welsh that the Conservative leaders have often failed to 
take seriously declarations in the treaties, only to find that these words come back to 
haunt them. 
Subsidiarity 
The Tory leadership, reacting to the fears of its backbenchers, sought to confine 
European integration to market liberalisation by pushing the principle of 
subsidiarity. By 1991 Major and Hurd were successful in getting subsidiarity 
incorporated into the Maastricht treaty. Subsidiarity has enabled the Tories to put 
their opposition to extensions of the EU's competence in areas like social and 
environmental policy, 
into a coherent intellectual framework. The Government 
posed the question, "which areas of policy 
is it necessary and efficient for the Union 
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to be involved in? " Ministers have argued that on some issues the EU clearly can be 
a more effective actor than member states. 
Putting Government objections about the widening scope of EU powers into this 
intellectual framework enabled ministers to achieve two tasks. Domestically, it was 
designed to reassure Tory MPs that the Government would not simply allow itself 
to be dragged along by an integrationist ratchet and that the leadership had a 
strategic view of which powers it was and was not prepared to transfer to Europe. 
Subsidiarity was also a device which could allow ministers to sound less negative at 
Council of Ministers meetings and present British objections in a consistent and 
reasonable manner. 
Francis Maude cites the environment as one area of policy where European 
involvement is appropriate. Maude says that environmental policy is "inherently 
international" (Maude 1994). On other issues, especially social policy, the 
Government argued that the real issue was not the desirability of new social 
measures but whether these ambitions could not be achieved within the member 
states. Michael Welsh has argued that given the widely differing industrial relations 
cultures of the member states, it is impracticable and undesirable to impose 
harmonisation and common standards in this area (Welsh 1995). Subsidiarity as a 
principle enabled the leadership to respond to the feelings of their MPs that the 
Union was legislating in areas which should be the exclusive prerogative of member 
states. 
At the Maastricht IGC, Major and Hurd were at last successful in entrenching a 
legal provision in the EU treaties to make subsidiarity operational. Article 3b of the 
treaty asserts that: 
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states and can therefore by reason of the scale 
or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. 
Article 3b thus contained a general principle and did not seek to define in policy 
area by policy area, where common action was necessary or appropriate. Teasdale 
has argued that the subjectivity of the language in the article and the failure to set 
objective standards to judge the issue of "sufficiency", indicates the absence of 
agreement amongst member states about the scope of EU action (Teasdale 1993: 
191). Despite the legal ambiguity about the definition of subsidiarity in the treaty, 
Tory ministers gave prominence to this clause in arguing why the Maastricht treaty 
was such a good deal for Britain. The clause is damned with faint praise by Francis 
Maude: 
Oh I think it will be a bit of a check and it may well be that it will be more than that and there is a 
case for arguing that over the next 
5-10 years there will be a removal of the intellectual hegemony 
that we have seen in favour of 
federalism (Maude 1994). 
Predictably, Hurd is much more optimistic in presenting 3b than his Conservative 
colleague. The subsidiarity clause was cited as a dynamic in the treaty which would 
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curtail further extensions of EU competence. Bold claims have been made about the 
potential effectiveness of the new clause: 
Once the treaty has been ratified article 3b will be in it. It will be a powerful expression of the 
purpose and intentions of the treaty - to reduce the scale and intensity of legislation (Douglas Hurd 
MP, col. 1157 Hansard 11/3/93). 
In a letter to The Sunday limes, Hurd said that subsidiarity was: 
An important binding constraint on Community action (The Sunday Times 22/11/92). 
Hurd has argued that the Commission's undertaking, given at the Edinburgh 
European Council, to justify all measures on the basis of subsidiarity, is evidence of 
the effectiveness of this new precept in EU decision making. A Government insider 
argues that the operation of 3b has repatriated a number of powers back to the 
member states. He says that the 1996 IGC will review the effectiveness of the 
clause but so far the number of Commission proposals is sharply down (Interview 
1994). However Thatcher criticised the Major Government for pretending that 
subsidiarity is a liberalising rather than a centralising measure. She again sees the 
past behaviour of the European Commission as providing no reason to believe that 
3b would constrain that body's activities (Thatcher 1995: 482). 
Given the flimsy nature of the legal provision in the treaty these claims are curious. 
The explanation for the impact of subsidiarity is not legal: it is political. Due to the 
first Danish referendum and the belief in the Chancellories of Europe that the EU 
was perceived as excessively interventionist by European citizens, the political 
mood in Europe has swung against further increases in European competence. It is 
this political mood which is the context for the operational effectiveness of 3b, 
rather than the justicability of the clause itself. Bernard Jenkin argued that this 
political mood was the real reason why the Commission has placed self-restraints on 
its actions since the Danish and French referendums: 
The Commission is a political institution which is anxious, like any other Community institution, to 
see that the Maastricht treaty is ratified. Therefore, it is doing all it can to avoid rocking the boat in 
the member states while the treaty goes through. I do not believe that its current behaviour can be 
taken as a guide to its future behaviour once that process is completed (HC Debates, 8/3/93, Vol. 
220, Col. 742). 
Tristan Garel-Jones concedes that the prevailing political mood in Europe is the 
decisive factor behind the new mood of restraint in the Commission: 
All I can say is that so far the operation of article 3b has been pretty effective. If you look at the way 
it has trawled over past legislation, I don't think it has been up and running long enough to know how 
deeply it is going to bite in the future. You know, you have to suck it and see a bit. So far it looks 
pretty promising. But I agree with you, the 
ECJ like all courts is influenced by the climate of the 
society in which it is operating. 
It is debate which I would suggest is turning slightly away from the 
more centralising aspects. 
But if that debate were to swing back again it could influence the 
court(Garel-Jones 1994). 
The last sentence in the above quotation concedes that if the political mood in 
Europe alters then it is feasible that European competence could expand again. 
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federalism then subsidiarity would only have deferred the problem of creeping 
competence (Maude 1994). However the nationalists have realised that despite their 
misgivings about subsidiarity's legal effectiveness, they can exploit the political 
impetus behind the concept, in order to repatriate powers back to the Westminster 
Parliament. The No Turning Back Group argued that: 
Even if subsidiarity's legal implications may have been oversold, the emphasis on subsidiarity has 
transformed the principle into a potent political tool with which to force Community leaders to deliver 
substantial benefits (Duncan-Smith et at 1994: 24). 
The Leadership's European Strategy for the 1996 IGC 
The Government's European strategy for the forthcoming IGC centred on the 
impact of the enlargment of the EU. The Government hoped to use the prospective 
accession of central European countries as the basis for arguing that the flexibility 
that these new entrants will need, should be extended to all existing member states. 
Chapter Two noted that during the 1994 European Parliamentary election campaign, 
Major articulated the notion of a multi-track/multi-speed Europe. Multi-speed 
became central to the presentation of the Government's European policy. The 
Government also argued that on many institutional and policy issues, the new 
entrants will be allies for British policy preferences. 
Anthony Teasdale attributes the development of the multi-speed conception of the 
EU to Michael Maclay, who wrote a pamphlet entitled, Multi-Speed Europe? 
(Teasdale 1994). Maclay subsequently became Douglas Hurd's Special Adviser at 
the Foreign Office. Maclay argued that the Maastricht treaty was but a stage in the 
gradual loosening of the existing Union. Maclay argued that the combination of the 
Schengen agreement, the British dual opt-outs in monetary and social policy and the 
"pillared" structure of the EUT, gave the EU, a much more complex and variegated 
structure than anyone would have anticipated just five years ago (Maclay 1992: 2). 
This structure is based on member states choosing to opt-in or out of different 
policy areas. It also enables member states to work towards common goals, like 
monetary union, but at different speeds. The convergence criteria included in the 
EUT accept that EMU would only be viable as a multi-speed project. Multi-track 
thus describes the objective developing reality of the EU post-Maastricht. 
politically, it allows the Conservative leadership to put its European policy into a 
context which makes Britain seem less obdurate and more in the mainstream of 
European institutional developments. 
Maclay's key argument is that the main impetus behind multi-speed is the future 
enlargement of the EU to the East. He says that because prospective entrants to the 
Union will not be able to accept the full rigour of the acquis communautaire, the 
Union has found new ways of making them full partners in areas where they can 
stay the course. Maclay argues that the obvious area where the Union is pursuing a 
multi-speed approach is in relation to the convergence criteria for monetary union 
(Maclay 1992: 25-28). 
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Major and Hurd argued for multi-track in order to counteract this general case for 
further deepening of the Union. They argued that a wider Union can operate more 
effectively if member states cooperate or integrate at their own speeds and only in 
areas which they deem it appropriate so to do. As it is accepted that the new 
entrants will need a separate policy track to accommodate their particular needs, 
why not extend this principle to all member states? Major and Hurd essentially 
called for a universalisation of the "opting-out" principle established at Maastricht. 
The existing multi-tracking in the EU provided legitimacy for the leadership's 
argument that all the member states of the Union do not need to advance together 
towards the same objectives and at the same pace. 
Although Major put this case in his Ellesmere Port speech he did not specify which 
policy tracks the Government wished to abstain from. The only example where the 
Government precluded British involvement in a policy track is social policy. Multi- 
track did not answer the key question of whether the Government intended to 
participate in the monetary track and at what date? Multi-speed instead served a 
dual political purpose. Firstly, it made Britain's opt-outs looks in tune with the 
Union's current and likely future development. Like subsidiarity, multi-speed also 
sought to reassure Tory MPs that the Government had an alternative constitutional 
visions for the EU which did not involve the relentless increase in the Union's 
supranational powers. A Government insider admits that multi-speed was a 
presentational device and that it was designed to allay "some of the nightmares" 
about European integration (Interview 1994). 
The view that the new member states will be allies for Britain has been subject to 
more critical comment from both wings of the Conservative Party. Tristan Garel- 
Jones admits that the overall calculus of the impact of enlargement is a mixed one - 
with possibilities of conflict as well as opportunities for cooperation: 
The point about the EU of course is that there is no country whose views are entirely coincidental 
with our own and there is no doubt for example that all those countries you mention will compound 
rather than diminish the problems of the common agricultural policy. They will have a view on the 
environment that is different to ours. They will certainly make 1999 and the single currency a more 
viable proposition. Two of them, Austria and Finland are in the top quartile and two are at least 
average. So all of that is true. 
But one mustn't be naive about this, no country is going to coincide with us on every single point of 
view, being a net contributor on the budget or a net recipient, is fundamental to your attitude on 
everything. Secondly, all of them are 
"proper countries" ie. they know what a nation state is .... I 
think that while they would wish to work for an ever closer union. I don't think the Finns would want 
to join the European Union if they thought Finland was going to be subsumed into some wider 
sovereignty (Garel-Jones 1994). 
Bernard Jenkin is dismissive of the case that the enlargment of the Union will bring 
allies for the Government. He agrees with Garel-Jones that the Scandinavian 
member states will make reform of the CAP more difficult. More fundamentally, 
Jenkin argues that every time the Union has expanded in the past, the acquis has 
expanded (Jenkin 1994). 
However many pro-Europeans argue that enlargement will necessitate further 
supranational reform of the 
Union. Peter Price argues that the ability of a small 
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country, like Hungary, to block the progress of the other nineteen member states in 
this scenario, is unacceptable (Price 1994). The Commission would like to see 
QMV further extended in order to prevent this occuring. 
European Integration and the Conservative Party's "Executive Mentality" 
This chapter has discussed _the antagonism shown 
by Conservatives to the increasing 
competence of the European institutions. In response to these anxieties the party 
leadership has attempted to legally restrict the competence of European institutions. 
They have also hoped to build coalitions with other member states which they hope 
will be supportive of British preferences. Tory dislike for the expansion of 
European supranational power stems from fundamental Conservative characteristics. 
It is also related to the nature of the British state. The Tory leadership's refusal to 
fully democratise the EU institutions is also symptomatic of these party and 
constitutional influences. 
Chapter Four argued that the fight against the European institutions was partly 
motivated by Major and Thatcher's desire to uphold the a strong British executive 
within a centralised state. The executive supremacy enshrined in the British state 
complements the elitist character of the Conservative Party. It is this combination 
which is a major factor in encouraging the party to resist European integration. 
These party and constitutional influences have discouraged Conservative leaders 
from responding to the challenge of the European integration by calling for greater 
democratisation of the European Union. For example Tory leaders are opposed to 
an extension of the co-decision making powers of the European Parliament. Major 
has dismissed calls for the European Parliament to become a co-legislator with the 
Council of Ministers. In his William and Mary lecture at Leiden University in 
September 1994, Major ridiculed the pretensions of the European Parliament to 
assume the role of a truly representative body, expressing the will of the Union's 
citizens: 
The European Parliament sees itself as the future democratic focus for the Union. But this a flawed 
ambition, because the EU is an association of states, deriving its basic democratic legitimacy through 
national parliaments. That should remain the case.... The European Parliament is not the answer to 
the democratic deficit, as the pitiably low turn out in this year's European Elections so vividly 
illustrated (Major 1994: 8). 
Judge cites John Biffen's evidence as Leader of the House of Commons in 1989, to 
illustrate his argument about the Conservative approach to the EU. Biffen said that 
he preferred a loose and ad hoc form of parliamentary accountability to a systematic 
means of parliamentary scrutiny of European legislation. However Biffen said that 
it would greatly strengthen the hand of Conservative ministers if they could indicate 
to other member states that a British negotiating position was backed by a strong 
feeling in the House of Commons. This expression of parliamentary feeling could 
come from scrutiny proceeedings. 
Judge argues that Biffen's evidence showed that if the choice were between greater 
democratisation of the EU and stronger national parliamentary scrutiny, then Tory 
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ministers would opt for the latter (Judge 1993: 192). Ministers could see the 
advantages of having parliamentary reinforcement of "the British national position" 
within the Council of Ministers. The party leadership support for Westminster 
scrutiny in this context is use Parliament to reinforce the lead taken by the 
executive. Major and Thatcher did not wish to see either the British or the European 
Parliament taking the lead themselves and initiating legislative changes in the EU. 
The Thatcherite Nationalist Policy Prospectus for the IGC 
In their intital campaign against European policy the nationalists took a negative and 
reactive stance on Government policy. However throughout 1994 the nationalists 
refined their positions and developed a more coherent and proactive alternative 
European policy. The nationalist position became much more ambitious. They not 
only campaigned against further integration but proposed substantial repatriation of 
powers back to Westminster. The nationalists cleverly appropriated the 
Government's multi-track approach to argue for the repatriation of powers back to 
the British Parliament. Such a course of action, if adopted by any British 
Government would lead to a confrontation between the UK and other member 
states. The rebels are anticipating such a confrontation. 
They now wish to repatriate power back to Westminster in order to entrench their 
free trading conception of Britain's membership of the EU. The nationalists' goal of 
repatriation of powers back to Westminster, was first raised in the No Turning Back 
Group pamphlet (Duncan-Smith et al 1994). They have now placed this objective 
into a new constitutional framework, redefining the relations between the EU and 
member states. This new framework is outlined in the proposals of the European 
Research Group, which published its recommendations in February 1995 (European 
Foundation 1995). The Research Group's document contained a friendly foreword 
from the Prime Minister, indicating the extent to which anti-federalist policy 
priorities are influencing Government policy. 
At present the EU is based upon the legal doctrine of the acquis communautaire and 
the occupied field, which has already been discussed. The "acquis" refers to the 
Union's authority in the totality of the policy areas where it has claimed 
jurisdiction. Member states have to accept this jurisidication as the domain of the 
Union. This means that new entrants to the EU have to accept the Union's policies 
and legislative authority in a number of policy areas which had previously been of 
domestic concern. Previously, member states wishing to become EU members have 
had to accept "the whole package" of Union competence in policy areas. So for 
example, the EFTA countries had to accept that the CAP would henceforth become 
their agricultural policy. Since the foundation of the EEC the acquis has gradually 
expanded, particularly after enlargements of the Community. It is the acceptance of 
the totality of the Union's authority in legislative affairs which is so offensive to the 
anti-federalists. 
The Nationalists identified with the European Research Group wish to break up the 
acquis communataire into a number of separate and autonomous policy communities 
or "tracks". These policy tracks would cover distinct and confined areas, such as 
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transport, fisheries, agriculture and energy. It would then be up to member states if 
they wished to opt-in to these tracks. The principle that member states are free to 
choose which policy areas they participate in, figured prominently in Major's 
Ellesmere Port speech on 31 May 1994. Both the leadership and the nationalists 
used the prospective accession of Eastern European countries to give legitimacy to 
the creation of a looser "a la carte" Europe. 
The difference is that the Nationalists were determined to pin down the Prime 
Minister by insisting that he specify which policy tracks Britain should not 
participate in. Spicer's Prague speech (see chapter two) argued that Britain should 
only accept membership of the core single market and commercial tracks but opt-out 
of involvement in the monetary and social policy tracks of the EU. Their conception 
of a multi-track EU would enable them to fulfill their desire for Britain to opt-out of 
vast tracks of European policymaking. Thatcher has also called for a multi-track 
Europe, building on the Schengen precedent (Thatcher 1995: 490). 
As an additional safeguard against European authority in non-single market policy 
areas, the Research Group want the EU treaties and British statutes to specify a 
number of areas which are exclusively of national concern. At present Britain's 
commitments under the Rome treaty give European law supremacy over national 
law -a commitment made at the time of Britain's accession in 1972. The 
nationalists wish to overturn this position and write into the treaties and British law 
that the British Parliament should have legislative supremacy in an extensive 
number of areas. 
Top of this list of course is social and employment policy. By demanding a clear 
division of powers exercised by the European institutions and by member states the 
anti-federalists are urging that subsidiarity become a clear, defined and operational 
legal provision. In addition the Research Group proposed an American-style 
constitutional ruling, whereby all powers which have not been claimed by the 
centre, are automatically the prerogative of member states. In her memoirs, 
Thatcher proposes that the European Communities Act be amended in order to 
restore the supremacy of British law. She proposes powers to prevent specific EU 
laws from coming into effect in the UK (Thatcher 1995: 503). 
The consequence of a redistribution of powers between the EU and the British 
parliament along the lines proposed would be a substantial repatriation of power 
back to Westminster. The University of Sheffield survey shows that there is 
majority support for such an ambitious agenda. Fifty-six percent of backbench 
Tories agreed with the statement, An Act of Parliament should be passed to 
establish explicitly the ultimate supremacy of Parliament over EU legislation (Baker 
et al 1994: 7). Ending the supremacy of European law would strike at the heart of 
the European Union. 
By seeking to allocate powers between the member states and the EU and through 
the opting out device, the nationalists are determined that the European institutions 
should have no ability whatsover to extend the scope of European competence. 
They are proposing a constitutional counter-revolution which would restore the 
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Union to the commercially confined organisation which many Tory MPs insist they 
desired at the outset. Lord Parkinson stresses that he voted for a European 
Economic Community (Parkinson 1995). John Wilkinson MP says that he did not 
appreciate what the impact of European legal supremacy would be on the power of 
the Westminster Parliament (Wilkinson 1995). Thatcher also admits that she did not 
realise the full implications of European legal supremacy at the time of the 
accession debates: 
Many of us, including myself, paid insufficient regard to the issue of sovereignty in consideration of 
the case for joining the EEC at the beginning of the 1970s (Thatcher 1995: 497). 
Iain Duncan-Smith argues that the Union should only legislate in those areas where 
member states have agreed that there is a common interest so to do (Duncan-Smith 
1995). The demand for repatriation has also gathered force because the EU has been 
perceived to have failed in a number of key policy areas where it has exclusive 
competence. This has increased Tory calls for Westminster to reassert its control. 
The most infamous example is the CAP. The Sheffield survey found that 72% of 
backbenchers agreed that agricultural policy should be repatriated to the national 
level (Baker et al 1995: 226). 
The Nationalists also wished to neuter the European institutions in order to inhibit 
them from again playing a partisan role in European integration. The paper 
proposed that the Commission should lose its right to initiate legislation and become 
a secretariat. The Research Group paper argued that the ECJ should be confined to 
a role policing the SEM. However Peter Luff MP argues that if the Commission 
were stripped of its proactive role then big projects, like the single market, might 
never get on track (Luff 1994). 
The Nationalists pushed for the adoption of a radical multi-speed policy agenda by 
their frontbench. A leak of a paper prepared by the Fresh Start Group showed that 
the rebels recommended that the Government provoke a crisis at the IGC, in order 
that Britain can gain leverage to push for the repatriation of power. The paper 
obtained by Patrick Wintour and Michael White of The Guardian, says that the 
Fresh Starters hope to make: 
Proposals so as to create the necessary crisis after which serious hard-headed negotiations may take 
place which would secure at least for Britain, a different relationship with the EC(The Guardian 
26/5/95). 
Bernard Jenkin argues that Britain would be able to use its net contribution as a 
bargaining lever in this scenario. He also anticipates that the threat of withdrawal 
would ensure that Britain was given a separate policy track within the EU. Jenkin 
says that this brinkmanship would succeed because the French Government would 
not wish to be left on their own with the Germans (Jenkin 1994). Michael Welsh, 
however believes that Jenkin's strategy would backfire. He believes that the other 
member states would not wish to been seen to reward a member state for using 
obstructionist tactics. Welsh believes that other member states would be too mindful 
of the precedent which might be set for another country to adopt this kind of 
behaviour (Welsh 1995). 
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Conclusion 
Nineteen eighty-eight was the turning point in the re-emergence of the European 
controversy. After this point it became clear to Conservatives that European 
integration was intensifying. Delors alerted Thatcherite MPs to the cumulative 
impact of Europe's powers and the ambitions of some of its member states. It was 
at this point that Tory instincts for national identity and the preservation of British 
governing institutions were reawakened. It is for this reason that there seems to be 
majority Tory support for a radical restructuring of the EU, one which would 
involve the almost complete evisceration of the Treaty of Rome. When Thatcher 
and her allies supported British membership of the EEC in 1972, they willed the 
means for the European institutions to erode British policy independence but they 
were not prepared to support the likely outcome. 
The European institutions, the aspirations of other member states and the spillover 
consequences of the single market programme, in areas like border controls, have 
extended the EU's competence beyond what many Tory MPs originally envisaged 
and desired. The Tory leadership has sought to redefine the EU's nature and 
direction, through devices like mulit-track and subsidiarity, in order to convince its 
MPs that their desire for a more limited constitutional relationship; is obtainable 
within the Union. Major is still distrusted by the nationalists because they fear that 
he is too concerned to negotiate from inside the existing European institutions, 
rather than set down an ultimatum for their reform. Major's reassurances have 
fallen on deaf ears, as MPs remember how his predecessors misled them about the 
nature and implications of Britain's membership of the EEC. 
The developing Nationalist multi-track agenda seeks to repatriate a raft of powers 
back to Westminster and prevent the institutions ever being able to exercise 
competence in a number of areas, like social policy. Although Tories have 
acquiesed in specific supranational powers for the EU, like QMV, they are now 
recoiling from the process they set in train. 
Increasingly, the Thatcherites regard the EU as no more than the sum of the 
conflicting interests of its component member states. Lamont argued that the EU 
internalised and institutionalised conflicting preferences of states, like France and 
Britain. He argues that Britain's free trading preferences are drowned out by 
France's protectionism during the GATT negotiations. As the EU expands, the 
Thatcherites fear that Britain will irrrevocably lose the ability to secure its favoured 
policies. The CAP is an example of an EU policy where many Tories feel that 
another member state's vested interests (France) have been institutionalised in the 
Union at Britain's expense. The Thatcherites' desire to reclaim British policy 
prerogatives is driven by their 
belief that Britain will be freer to pursue its own 
interests. 
Pro-European Tories believe that the EU is still able to generate a set of common 
interests and rules which are capable of transcending the sectional or vested 
interests of individual member states. The most obvious example is the single 
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market and its enforcement mechanisms. They can argue that all states have realised 
that it is in their individual and collective interest to penalise protectionist behaviour 
by any member state. European law, the integrationists would argue, is an example 
of an institution which creates and sustains common interests unobtainable by 
national sovereign action. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THATCHERISM IN ONE COUNTRY? 
Compared to the rest of the world, Europe is a high tax, high spending area, burdened with 
government regulation and consequently with high unemployment. In 1979 Britain elected a 
government dedicated to reducing the role of the state in the economy and reducing the burden of 
taxation. The impulse in Europe is in the opposite direction (Norman Lamont 11/10/94). 
There seems to be little possible doubt that the scope for regulation of economic life will be much 
narrower for the central government of a federation than for national states (F. A. Hayek, 
Individualism and the Economic Order, 1949). 
A single currency would be a natural complement to the European Single Market(Sir Leon Brittan, 
The Europe We Need, 1994: 39). 
It was originally proposed, somewhat disingenuously, as an economic proposition, the argument 
being that it eliminates both the transaction costs and exchange rate uncertainties inherent in having 
national currencies (Nigel Lawson, The View From Number Eleven, 1992 p. 1028). 
The single currency project has led to a split in the Thatcherite grouping. Chapter 
one identified the division over monetary policy between the Thatcherite Nationalists 
and the Neo-Liberal Integrationists. 
The Thatcherite Nationalists believe that EMU would sweep away the British state. 
They believe that a single currency would lack the cultural prerequisites to 
command legitimacy in Britain. However the Neo-Liberal Integrationists see EMU 
as a contribution to the enhancement of free market reforms and the best response to 
the globalisation of the economy. 
The neo-liberal integrationists have encouraged the interventionist integrationists to 
unite with them around a belief that a monetary discipline conducted through 
European structures will have a better chance of maintaining price stability. 
On industrial policy and the social dimension, the Conservative parliamentary party 
enjoys near unanimity but 
it faces opposition from other centre-right European 
governments. The Conservative 
Government commmited itself to fight for a 
143 
deregulated Union against the interventionist preferences of other member states. 
Some Thatcherite Nationalists go further and advocate a radical break with the 
institutions of the EU in order to carve out a niche for Britain as a deregulated 
offshore island. 
Monetary Policy 
The debate over the ERM and EMU has become entangled with a dispute over 
which monetary discipline would be more effective in securing price stability. 
Tories agree on the objective of low inflation but diverge on the means to achieve it. 
The neo-liberal integrationist Tories have become advocates of external disciplines 
to manage the British economy, whilst the nationalists continue to back internal 
monetary policies. 
In the early 1980s Howe and Thatcher were both united in supporting the British 
monetarist experiment and were determined that the Medium Term Financial 
Strategy (MTFS) of using monetary targets was the means to curb inflationary 
pressures. The harshness of the discipline and the ensuring 1980-81 recession was 
directly attributable to the government's monetarist measures and consequently 
ministers took the political flack for pursuing this policy. In addition, the monetary 
indicators on which the MTFS was based, behaved unpredictably and unexpectedly 
during this period. Many Tory MPs found the MTFS approach esoteric and 
tortuous. So this form of internal monetary discipline maximised political 
responsibility and yet was uncertain in its methods and outcomes. 
By 1982 political imperatives meant that the monetary targets became increasingly 
malleable and were no longer applied as binding commitments. The original MTFS 
"mission statement" said, there would be no question of departing from the money 
supply policy (HMSO 1980: 19). By 1982 the Treasury decided to revise the targets 
in the light of circumstances. The new target range was adjusted upwards from the 
old 5-9% range to 8-12%. With the impending general election the Treasury 
adopted a new pragmatism (Whiteley 1990: 186-7). 
The epitaph for monetarism was pronounced in the 1985 Mansion House speech 
when Lawson formally abandoned the M3 target range. By this time M3 growth was 
14%, easily exceeding the original targets. From the start of 1986 the government 
presided over a rapid rise in the money supply which represented a substantial 
reflation of the economy. The main factor behind this expansion was the 
deregulation of consumer credit. The original aim of the government's monetarist 
counter-inflationary policy was to establish credibility amongst wage bargainers and 
the public sector that inflationary wage claims would not be underwritten. However 
the political pressure to which the MTFS was subjected ensured that this form of 
internal monetary discipline was overidden. It is this reality which forms the 
background for the divisions over European financial policy. 
Lawson and Howe recognised that in effect the MTFS had collapsed under political 
pressure. They wished to 
institutionalise a new discipline which would prove both 
more effective than 
internal disciplines and more politically robust. In his memoirs 
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Lawson describes the evolution in his thinking on monetary policy towards support 
for targeting the exchange rate. The political decision to adopt an external monetary 
discipline was motivated by presentational expediency. Setting interest rates by 
targeting the level of the pound against the deutschmark deflected responsbility away 
from the government. For advocates of external monetary discipline of the British 
economy, the remoter the source of the discipline the better for elected politicians. 
In principle the discipline was essentially the same. As Willetts has argued, the 
government instead of running its own domestic monetary rules, which it had done . 
so unsuccessfully, tied itself to German monetary rules instead (Willetts 1992: 174). 
The difference was that unlike the MTFS, harsh disciplines could be blamed on the 
rigours of German monetary policy. Major adopted this line when Tory 
backbenchers called for big cuts in interest rates in 1990-92. Secondly, the ERM 
tied monetary discipline to a European institution. Treasury ministers hoped to be 
able to marshall more political support for their policy through this conjunction: 
As there was now substantial support for ERM membership within the Conservative Party in the 
House of Commons, it would be helpful in future arguments about spending and borrowing if our 
backbenchers in effect faced a discipline of their own choice (Lawson 1992: 488). 
Thatcher argued that joining the ERM was an admission of defeat in the battle 
against inflation (Thatcher 1993: 700). She also stressed that institutional structures 
of themselves could not secure low inflation and that only sustained political could 
ensure this. Spicer draws a historical parallel between the ERM and the Gold 
Standard, to show that fixed exchange rates have previously been seen as a means 
for the Treasury to shield itself from political pressures while it conducts monetary 
policy; 
On that occasion (1925) Lord Bradbury, one of Churchill's two Permanent Secretaries at the 
Treasury, talked of the Gold Standard being "knave proof". It could not be rigged for political or 
even more unworthy reasons (Spicer 1992: 99). 
Given the political pressure that built up to devalue sterling in the run-up to Black 
Wednesday in September 1992, Thatcher's argument would appear to be vindicated 
in this respect. She also argues that from the beginning Europe had been seized 
upon as a device to gain compliance for tough economic medicine: 
I had heard the arguments about external discipline before. I recalled that Ted Heath had claimed in 
the early 1970s that European Community membership would help discipline the trade unions. But 
this had not happened; and the attempt to use ERM membership to influence expectations of 
management and workers would 
be an equal failure (Thatcher 1993: 700). 
The desire to resist political pressures in order to pursue price stability is a key 
factor in bringing together pro-European support for a European Central Bank. The 
ECB outlined in the Maastricht treaty is politically independent and is mandated to 
pursue price stability. The combination of an external institution imposing monetary 
discipline and the institution's imperviousness to political pressures, has led many 
neo-liberal integrationists to support an 
ECB as the ultimate guarantor of sound 
money policies: 
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One conclusion must be that bankers, not politicians are better at deciding monetary growth and 
consequent interest rates. It is not necessarily that they have better brains than we have, but that they 
do not have to operate within the same electoral cycles as we do (Tim Renton MP, col 413 Hansard 
20/5/93). 
Sir Peter 'Tapsell MP has focused on the independence of the ECB in order to argue 
that a single currency would have profound deflationary effects for participating 
member states. For him the imperviousness of the ECB from political pressure is far 
from a virtue but is potentially dangerous. Tapsell fears that the ECB's obligation to 
pursue price stability as its overriding objective would lead to an excessively 
deflationary policy. Tapsell is concerned that the Bank's independence would 
impede politicians from preventing such an ECB monetary policy: 
Those on the Labour Front Bench must understand that in supporting the financial provisions of the 
Maastricht treaty, they are voting for permanent high unemployment in Britain. I am not making a 
party political point; it is my profound conviction that that is the certain consequence of the policy 
(HC Debates, 24/3/93, Vol. 221, Col. 973). 
Economic and Monetary Union 
EMU is integral to the pro-European support for external discipline on the British 
economy. As was discussed in chapter one, the neo-liberal integrationists see EMU 
as a more effective monetary discipline than the MFTS and more watertight than the 
ERM. As was noted in chapter one, this new group of pro-Europeans are now most 
strongly associated with hard money arguments. Some longstanding monetarists like 
Renton and Hordern now believe that monetary discipline can only be effectively 
pursued from the European level. Equally, other monetarists, such as Budgen, 
strongly oppose a single currency and are identified with the Nationalist grouping. 
The Thatcherite Nationalist Case Against EMU 
It is the Thatcherite Nationalists who oppose the establishment of a European 
Central Bank and point to its alleged deflationary consequences. This "deflation" 
critique of the Right is very significant. During the monetarist experiment of the 
early 1980s many of these same individuals, such as Spicer and Thatcher, were 
supporters of tight monetary disciplines which undoubtedly led to higher 
unemployment and a deflation of domestic demand. When sterling was inside the 
ERM, Tories like Ridley and Budgen were bitterly critical of the harshness of the 
monetary squeeze on the British economy and called for devaluation. 
The Maastricht treaty's convergence criteria for EMU, with their stress on 
budgetary disciplines and price stability, encapsulate traditional Thatcherite 
objectives. EMU, if it takes place will do so on these Bundesbank-inspired 
"monetarist" terms. Yet the nationalists reject EMU in principle. Tristan Garel- 
Jones has pointed out that any Conservative Government ought to be aiming for the 
objectives laid down in the convergence criteria because of their own worth, 
irrespective of attaining EMU (Garel-Jones 1994). 
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The Thatcherite nationalists are in fact still advocates of hard money but they only 
regard these policies as legitimate if they are domestically derived and accountable 
to British political institutions. In other words they are in favour of British but not 
European monetarism. They favour British rather than European monetarism 
because they believe that Europe would lack the cultural prerequisites for a 
monetary union to be stable. 
Chapter One argued that the neo-liberal integrationists see monetary union as a 
means of institutionalising free market objectives. The typology in this chapter also 
identify the grouping of interventionist integrationists, the old wet critics of 
Margaret Thatcher, who are also committed pro-Europeans. The interventionist 
integrationists have been previously critical of monetarist policies at a domestic 
level. 
However on the issue of the single currency, the interventionists do not apply their 
criticisms of monetarist policies. The interventionists have joined with the neoliberal 
integrationists in supporting the principle of British participation in EMU. The 
interventionists and the neo-liberals both advocate the single currency as a means of 
institutionalising `hard money' policies throughout Europe. Neo-liberal 
integrationists can point to the fact that the single currency stability pact provides for 
fines to be levied on EMU states which run budget deficits of more than 3% of 
GDP. 
The conflation of the economic discourse of these two pro-European groupings is 
exemplified in a letter to The Times signed by both neo-liberals, such as Ray 
Whitney and Quentin Davies and by interventionists, like Hugh Dykes and Sir Jim 
Lester. The letter argued that EMU would: 
Have recreated the regime within which we operated very happily during the heyday of the gold 
standard before 1914, when an objectively determined monetary policy, not subject to political 
manipulation, imposed a natural framework of fiscal discipline on governments (Davies et al 1996). 
The central case supported by the Tory advocates of EMU, is that national monetary 
policies are ineffective. The typology in chapter one outlined Howe's arguments 
about the implications for monetary policy of the internationalisation of capital. The 
integrationists accept Howe's case that the globalisation of finance makes national 
monetary policies increasingly ineffective. They believe that the single currency will 
enable sovereign governments to exercise greater effective monetary sovereignty 
over the global markets. John Stevens MEP describes EMU as part of a process 
where "politics are put back in charge over markets" (Stevens 1994). In addition 
there are specific macroeconomic benefits which the integrationists believe will 
accrue from a single currency. 
Howe argues that EMU would have two distinct advantages which would enhance 
the European single market. He argues that EMU would provide more currency 
stability than existed under either floating exhange rates or the ERM. Both Heseltine 
and Brittas have argued that a single market cannot exist without a single currency 
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(Heseltine 1989: 91 & Brittan 1994: 39). Ian Taylor, the Industry Minister, has 
argued that a single currency would provide a strong alternative to the dollar and the 
yen, would combat price discrimination across the single market and end the 
instability of currency speculation (Taylor 1993: 21). 
The pro-Europeans argue that after the breakup of the ERM, member states may be 
tempted to undercut their competitors by devaluations within the single market. Sir 
Edward Heath has spoken of floating exchange rates enabling member states to 
"cheat" in European trade. The other benefit cited by the pro-Europeans for EMU, 
is the removal of currency transaction costs. Peter Luff MP argues that market 
pressures will eventually make EMU inevitable and that the politically motivated 
Franco-German drive for EMU has obscured these trends (Luff 1994). 
Sir Peter Hordern is an example of a monetarist Tory who sees EMU as the ultimate 
guarantor of monetary disciplines after the failure of both the MTFS and the ERM. 
He even argues that Britain should seek to return to the Gold Standard tradition of 
hard money. Hordern believes that the advocates of free floating national currencies 
forget that in practice sterling has depreciated since Britain abandoned the Gold 
Standard and Bretton Woods. Hordern says that market expectations of a 
depreciating currency will mean that Britain will continue to pay a premium in the 
bond market (Hordern 1995). For Hordern an independent monetary policy has too 
high a price attached to it. Hordern argues that EMU will ensure long term low 
interest rates which will provide the foundation for sustainable economic growth, 
just as cheap money powered Britain's industrial renaissance in the nineteenth 
century (Hordern 1995). 
The Armaments Between Thatcherite Nationalists and Neo-Liberal Integrationists 
Ov r EMU 
The Thatcherite Nationalists argue that, even putting aside the sovereignty issue, the 
benefits outlined by Howe would be purchased at too high a price. Their case 
centres on the fact that EMU would remove the ability of individual member states 
to use currency devaluations in order to reduce unemployment and boost 
competitiveness. Nicholas Ridley argued that the devaluation option was an essential 
safety-valve: 
With a single currency and economic management confined to Brussels, there are no economic 
weapons left in the hands of national governments 
if their economies become uncompetitive. 
Devaluation is no longer possible and interest rates are decided centrally (Ridley 1992: 147). 
For classical monetarists, the price of a national currency, like any other price is the 
most effective tool for responding to market pressures. John Biffen and Nick 
Budgen made this case in respect of the ERM (see chapter two). Margaret Thatcher 
argues that if countries differ 
in their rate of development and inflation rates then 
floating exchange rates are the best method of adjustment (Thatcher 1995: 493). 
Nationalists argue that without the flexibility provided by national currencies, EMU 
would exacerbate existing regional wealth disparities. Iain Duncan-Smith describes 
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the devaluation option provided by possession of separate national currency as a 
"shock absorber" (Duncan-Smith 1995). Jenkin has said that in the absence of the 
devaluation route EMU would mean a "permanent boom in Northern Europe and a 
permanent recession in Southern Europe. " Lord Parkinson believes big business has 
only focused on the gains from eliminating currency transaction costs and not the 
wider macro-economic ramifications of the proposal (Parkinson 1995). In her 
memoirs, Thatcher argued that EMU would be likely to cause large regional 
variations in economic activity, industrial decline and heavy migration across 
borders (Thatcher 1995: 486). 
Whereas for Sir Peter Hordern, the foreclosing of the devaluation option is 
positively desirable. He observes that over the period of his parliamentary career, 
sterling has fallen in value from being worth 12 Marks to the Pound to two Marks to 
Pound. Hordern argues that the only loss of sovereignty involved in EMU is the 
sovereign right to devalue the currency and to borrow excessively (Hordern 1995). 
It is because Hordern wishes to preclude both devaluation and fiscal deficits (even in 
a recession) that he is happy to embrace a single currency. 
Thatcherite Nationalists believe that the absence of the devaluation option would 
necessitate fiscal measures to protect poorer European regions and states and as a 
safeguard against economic shocks. Jenkin argues that EMU would necessitate huge 
fiscal transfers, via the cohesion funds, from Northern to Southern Europe (Jenkin 
1994). The Nationalists' arguments about fiscal transfers are predicated upon one 
economic assumption. The assumption is gleaned from that fact that within existing 
currency unions, like Italy or Belgium, large transfers of resources are made from 
the wealthier to the poorer regions. At present the EU's budget is only 1% of GDP. 
Whereas the transfers made by currency unions, like the US, are of far greater 
proportions than this. The Nationalists therefore have some strong evidence to 
substantiate their case that cohesion funds would substantially increase if a European 
monetary union were formed. lain Duncan-Smith MP argues that even in an inner 
core monetary union, consisting of highly convergent states like the Benelux and 
Germany, there will be quite considerable transfers (Duncan-Smith 1995). Howe 
simply says that he does not envisage large transfers taking place inside EMU and 
believes that the tighter the inner core of a single currency zone, the less likely that 
such transfers will be necessary (Howe 1994a). Lord Parkinson argues that the 
precedent of German monetary union in 1990 indicates the extent of the fiscal 
transfers which could be necessary to sustain EMU. 
The Nationalist economic argument against EMU ties directly into the Powellite 
argument about political legitimacy. Chapter Three noted that the Thatcherites have 
adopted Powell's arguments to support their general case against European 
federalism. However the Thatcherites specifically apply Powells' argument in 
respect of the economic consequences of EMU. They argue that the absence of a 
European identity would make large fiscal transfers under EMU impossible. 
Oliver Letwin argues that the cultural heterogeity of a currency union could lead to 
political conflicts. Lawson also supports these concerns (Lawson 1992: 1030), 
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Letwin envisages a fierce competition between poorer regions for EU cohesion 
funds, as they endeavour to offset the impact of EMU. Letwin fears that because of 
the absence of a cohesive European identity stressed by Powell, the competition for 
regional aid will take on an increasingly antagonistic and divisive character, with 
regions and ethnic groups vying with one another for regional aid (Letwin 1995). 
Jenkin argues citizens of wealthier member states would not acquiesce in paying 
higher levels of tax, in order that poorer countries, whose nationalities they would 
not share, could be subsidised (Jenkin 1994). Whereas Duncan-Smith argues that 
within the United Kingdom the shared identity of "Britishness" ensures there is 
popular consent for substantial transfers (Duncan-Smith 1995). Central to Letwin 
and Jenkin's argument is their belief that there are insufficient cultural affinities 
across Europe to be able to generate equivalent consent. Other opponents of a single 
currency outside the Conservative Party have also argued that there are cultural pre- 
requisites for a stable monetary union (Conolly 1995: 361). 
Lord Howe himself concedes that there are cultural preconditions for EMU. He says 
that the economic and regional divergencies within the US currency union are 
mitigated by a common American identity, enabling a state like West Virginia to 
experience almost continuous recession, whilst Texas booms (Howe 1994a). Howe 
notes that the unhappy experience of the ERM in 1990-93, where other ERM 
participants blamed Germany for not loosening its monetary policy, showed that 
these cultural factors might not apply in Europe. 
David Willetts MP has also used the differences between America and Europe to 
stress another cultural impediment to a single currency. Willetts highlights the facile 
nature of the comparison made by some pro-Europeans, between the USA currency 
zone and a European single currency. Willetts points out that the key difference 
between America and Europe is the existence in the US of a common language. This 
common language enables unemployed Texan oilworkers to seek alternative 
employment in Delaware for example. Whereas unemployed Aberdeen oilworkers 
are far less likely to be able to seek jobs in Dusseldorf within a single currency zone 
(Willetts 1992: 176-7). Willetts' argument about labour market inflexibilities in 
Europe goes some way to undermine the neo-liberal integrationist free market case 
for EMU. 
Letwin argues that if EMU does occur, then it is imperative that European 
politicians endeavour to create cohesive transnational European parties. He believes 
that only transnational parties can aggregate demands across the continent and 
prevent these latent tensions from becoming manifested in ethnic and regional 
insurrectionist movements or separatist parties. He draws the analogy with the 
strains within the Italian state and the emergence of the Northern League as a major 
political force. Once a fiscal/monetary union has taken place, Letwin believes that 
political leaders must act on the 
basis that the EU is a single state and that national 
politics will be over. 
Lewin also has a partisan concern about the scenario he develops on EMU. He is 
far more optimistic that European Socialists will be able to form such an effective 
150 
pan-European party grouping than will the European Right. Letwin argues that by 
their very nature, the European centre-right parties are national rather than 
European insitutions, such as the Gaullists and the British Conservatives. So once 
the nation states are effectively dissolved post-EMU, Letwin argues that many of the 
parties of the right will lose their raison d'etre. In addition he notes that due to the 
divisions on economic policy between the British Tories and other Christian 
Democratic parties, it would be far more difficult for a pan-European centre-right 
grouping to coalesce on a common policy agenda than it would for the European 
Left (Letwin 1995). 
A small group of anti-federalists oppose EMU because they do not believe that a 
European monetary policy would be rigorous enough. Although the big majority of 
anti-federalists expound the deflationary critique, a small number oppose it because 
they fear that the ECB would be under pressure to run a loose monetary policy. 
These Tories know that the French are particularly keen to displace the D-Mark and 
use the single currency to push for a more expansionary monetary policy. They fear 
that instead of Europe-wide deflation there would be a Europe-wide resurgence of 
inflation under such a regime. Frank Vibert argues that it is a danger that the 
balance of forces on the governing board of an ECB could dilute the monetary 
rigour of the German Government (Vibert 1994). 
Some pro-Europeans refute the suggestion that EMU would necessitate divisive 
demands for regional aid. Peter Price, Sir Peter Hordern and John Butterfill MP 
argue that Southern European countries might actually gain from a single currency 
and would not need large subsidies. Price, Hordern and Butterfill put forward a free 
market and competitiveness route by which the poorer European countries could 
safely join a single currency. This highlights the extent to which the European 
dispute is between free marketeers within the party. Peter Price (MEP London SE 
1984-94) argues that EMU would enable states like Spain and Portugal to exploit 
their low social cost attributes in order to attract greater inward investment. 
Hordern argues that Spain's present attraction of inward investment indicates that 
regional aid will not be needed to offset EMU's impact (Hordern 1995). Price says 
that once the currency transaction costs are removed then the Mediterranean states 
will have a competitive advantage compared to other European countries. He says 
that it is logical as "night follows day" that these states will be able to improve their 
economic position by exploiting this advantage (Price 1994). John Butterfill also 
argues that free market improvements in these regions will enable them to adjust to 
a single currency: 
In fact, the lot of the poorer regions has improved only when they have the wit to abandon some of 
the restrictive practices imposed by trade unions, to embrace free markets and to encourage inward 
investment. It is the encouragment of inward investment into the poorer parts of the Community which 
will ultimately be their salvation (HC Debates, 24/3/93, Vol. 221, Col. 993). 
Letwin and Duncan-Smith respond to this argument by pointing to the non-wage 
element of regional economic performance. They argue that the ability of 
impoverished areas to attract regional investment is not just dependent upon low 
social costs but on the level of skills available in these regions. Letwin says that the 
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areas which tend to possess the most highly skilled work forces are also those which 
are in the most industrialised and prosperous areas. It is less likely that highly 
skilled labour will be available in economically peripheral areas on the scale that 
would be necessary to attract inward investors (Letwin 1995). 
Tory opponents of EMU who stress the problem of large fiscal transfers to mitigate 
the impact of a single currency, argue that a fiscal union would have to come into 
being if EMU were established. In other words they believe that economic union 
would be followed by political union. Peter Luff and Bernard Jenkin from opposite 
sides of the argument, agree that there are no examples of currency unions which do 
not have a supporting central fiscal authority (Jenkin and Luff 1994). However 
Kenneth Clarke asserted that a political union would not necessarily come into being 
after a monetary union (see chapter one). Hordern agrees with Clarke and says that 
a European political union would be one in which member states would have ceded 
their right to pursue national foreign and defence policy prerogatives (Hordern 
1995). 
The Nationalists objected to the validity of Clarke's citing the Austrian and Irish 
examples to substantiate his case. They argued that currency unions, such as the 
Irish one, were made between sovereign governments on the same basis as the ERM 
was established. Bernard Jenkin argues that this type of currency union was 
revocable, unlike EMU from which participating states would not be able to escape 
(Jenkin 1994). Sir Michael Butler argues that in reality any member state could not 
be coerced into staying within a single currency against its will. However, he 
concedes that the price likely to paid by a government taking such an action would 
be very high because of the reaction of the financial markets (Butler 1995). 
The Maastricht treaty contains a stipulation that participating states should "avoid 
excessive deficits" in article 104c. The original Delors report supported binding debt 
ceilings for member states inside EMU. The German Government successfully 
fought for EMU states to be obliged to follow much more convergent budgetary 
policies through the stability pact in the December 1996 agreement. 
This merely recognises that the macro-economic situation of the whole union would 
be affected if one member state, such as Greece, borrowed enormously and as a 
result forced up interest rates for other states. Tim Renton has acknowledged that a 
country such as Greece might wish the ECB to run a much more expansionary 
policy than the Northern European states would want (Renton 1994). 
In addition, even though direct subsidies to impoverished regions may be small, 
there are other means by which fiscal stabilisation can take place to offset a single 
currency. In the US, a state which has experienced an economic shock, such as an 
oil price fall in Texas, will then be granted a remittance on its indirect taxes to the 
US Treasury. Tax remittance is an alternative measure to a direct regional subsidy 
but it would still involve the creation of a central fiscal authority or fiscal union. 
Butler insists that formal fiscal controls on participating member states would not be 
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necessary because any state which looked likely to default on its debts would be 
subject to tough informal sanctions by other governments (Butler 1995). 
The decisive consideration behind the Macmillan application was a determination to 
be at the heart of Europe. and to be perceived to be in this position, in order to 
maximise Britain's global influence and stature. The notion of influence and status is 
more intangible than the specific costs and benefits which are contested between 
Tory protagonists in the economic debate over a single currency. However, the 
desire that Britain is able to "punch above its weight", to use Douglas Hurd's phrase 
was a consideration behind Thatcher's commitment to the special relationship and it 
lives on in the arguments of many pro-Europeans. 
Some pro-Europeans argue that if Britain remains outside EMU it will be 
increasingly perceived in Washington and Tokyo to be semi-detached from Europe 
and as a result Britain's diplomatic influence will diminish. Tristan Garel-Jones 
argues that membership or non-membership of a single currency does not 
automatically effect whether Britain remains at the top table in international affairs. 
He says that in 1999, the most realistic date for the formation of a currency union, 
the Conservative leadership would need to know not as a matter of hypothesis but of 
fact, which countries were convergent and joining an EMU and how many there 
were. Garel-Jones however concedes that if in general terms Britain were to be 
perceived as being outside a European inner core, then this could be damaging to 
Britain's diplomatic stature (Garel-Jones 1994). 
Oliver Letwin is dismissive of notions of "being at the top table". He argues that in 
areas where Britain's interest coincides with other countries, it will be able to work 
with them. However in areas where there is a difference between British foreign 
policy and other European countries, Britain will not be bound by their preferences 
and will retain freedom of action (Letwin 1995). A Government Insider however 
accepts the validity of the basic argument that Britain could lose diplomatic stature if 
she remained outside a single currency. Nevertheless he puts the counter-argument 
that if EMU failed, then conversely Britain's stature would be enhanced as a result 
of non-participation (Interview 1994). 
Contested political Realities and the Single Currency 
The Tory protagonists no longer share the same assumptions about Britain's position 
in the international economy. The Nationalists argue that sterling and the UK 
economy could survive outside a single currency zone and indeed prosper. Whereas 
the pro-Europeans argue that such a state of affairs would be illusory and that 
eventually sterling would 
be dragged along into a single currency's gravitational 
pull. This section will further explore these contested perceptions of political reality 
and attempt to identify why these conflicting perceptions have arisen. The arguments 
are of course only based upon predictions about what might happen if Britain was 
outside EMU, even though they are often presented as conclusive arguments. 
The 
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significance is that the gulf between these perceptions makes it far more likely that 
the Conservative Party will split. 
Bill Newton Dunn puts forward the classic pro-European case that British 
membership of EMU is inevitable. Newton Dunn argues that sterling would 
depreciate outside a single currency zone and that this would lead to higher British 
interest rates, stifling economic growth (Newton Dunn 1994). This argument rests 
on the premise that the sheer size of the ECU zone would lead to speculative 
pressure on weaker currencies like sterling, outside the bloc. Howe has spoken 
about Britain "limping in afterwards" if a single currency was formed without our 
participation (Howe 1994a). 
The debate over a single currency focuses on whether the financial markets will take 
a retrospective or prospective view of Britain's currency and the British economy. 
For the Nationalists, Duncan-Smith and Jenkin argue that sterling will continue to be 
viable alongside the Euro because of the underlying strength of the UK economy. 
Jenkin asserts that what gives a currency strength is not the extent of transactions in 
which it is used but how it is managed. He cites the weakness of currencies like the 
dollar during 1994, as evidence of poor monetary management by the US 
authorities, despite the dollar's status as the largest currency area in the global 
economy (Jenkin 1994). 
From this premise Jenkin is able to argue that as long as Britain pursues a strong 
anti-inflationary discipline, it will become a strong currency. Jenkin's view assumes 
that the markets will make prospective judgements about the prospects for long term 
strength in the British economy and that consequentially sterling will strengthen. 
Whereas Hordern argues that the markets will make retrospective judgements and 
focus on the secular depreciation of sterling and act accordingly. He believes that 
currency dealers will demand an interest rate premium in the expectation that 
sterling will again fall in value (Hordern 1995). 
Other nationalists make more ambitious claims about the macro-economic and 
industrial strategy which Britain should pursue if EMU occurs. Letwin argues that 
states like Canada and Hong Kong show that currencies can exist comfortably 
alongside a large currency zone, even if these states do the bulk of their trade with 
the country controlling the dominant currency. Letwin cites Sir Alan Walters' 
research which seeks to argue that a peripheral state outside a large currency zone, 
may even gain an advantage from its status. The thesis argues that the peripheral 
country cannot be complacent and always seeks to increase its competitiveness. As a 
result this country's economy can be equally prosperous. Letwin cites Singapore's 
trade strategy as an example (Letwin 1995). 
John Stevens MEP, a neo-liberal integrationist, counters Letwin's case by arguing 
that it is predicated upon a static view of the financial markets. He believes that the 
ECU would displace the dollar as the internationally denominated currency. Stevens 
believes that the creation of a single currency would lead to a rise in the volume of 
financial transactions which Britain would not be able to take advantage of if she 
were a non-participant (Stevens 1994). Sir Michael Butler, British Ambassador to 
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Brussels 1980-85 and a leading member of the Action Centre for Europe (ACE), 
argues that if Britain were outside EMU, then she would face informal 
discrimination from banks which were part of the Euro clearing system (Butler 
1995). 
Stevens also retorts that comparisons between Britain and Hong Kong or Singapore, 
show the poverty of the geo-political ambition of the Nationalists. Stevens finds it 
ironic that the Tory Right have traditionally argued for empire and a global British 
role and yet are now prepared to envisage a diminished role for Britain as an 
offshore island (Stevens 1994). Nevertheless Letwin says that he is happy to 
contemplate such an "offshore island" role for Britain where she is as wealthy as 
Switzerland and freer than Hong Kong (Letwin 1995). 
The contested realities are of particular importance to the position of the City of 
London and financial services in relation to the single currency. Francis Maude, 
Financial Secretary to the Treasury 1990-92, is insistent that the City of London's 
long term position would be secure if Britain opted out of a single currency: 
Well the bulk of the ECU is in the City of London at the moment. There is absolutely no reason why 
that should change. The Euro-dollar market operates in Europe. There is absolutely no reason why 
the bulk of a market - liquidity, would not exist outside the country where the currency is mainly 
used. 
Deutschebank has its capital market HQ not in Bonn but in London..... There's absolutely no reason 
why London shouldn't continue to be the pre-eminent financial centre of Europe in those 
circumstances. Zurich is a very important financial capital outside the EU but doing business very 
much more important than just Swiss business (Maude 1994). 
Whereas Lord Howe argues that British non-participation in EMU would threaten 
the City of London: 
If the pound sterling stood alone outside the single currency, it would be uniquely exposed. We would 
have to pay high transaction costs for exchanging our currency, we would have high volatility in our 
exchange rates and high interest rates, and face a threat to inward investment that would threaten the 
City of London (HC Debates, 20/11/91, Vol. 199, Col. 310). 
The contested political realities about the single currency centre on conflicting 
beliefs about the power of British Government policy relative to the power of the 
international financial economy. The neo-liberal integrationists are more pessimistic 
about the effectiveness of a "go-it-alone" British policy and give greater weight to 
the constraints of the global economy. The nationalists are optimistic that a 
"virtuous" British policy will ensure a viable position for the UK. The only 
constraints which they recognise in the financial economy arise from imprudent 
economic policies which they insist Conservative Governments will not follow. 
Howe, Stevens and Hordern believe that the single currency will become so 
powerful that its existence will place tremendous constraints on the effectiveness of 
an independent British monetary policy. They stress Britain's insecurity outside a 
larger economic unit which will set the parameters for foreign economic policy. 
Whereas Tories like Jenkin, Duncan-Smith and Letwin, believe that if Britain 
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continues to pursue neo-liberal monetary and economic policies, then the UK will be 
able to prosper in the global financial economy. 
The integrationists' concerns about the weakness of national governments in the face 
of international financial forces which are a key factor behind their positive support 
for EMU. They argue that a single currency would re-empower member states 
whose monetary policies are at present constrained by the dominance of the D- 
Mark. Integrationists argue that Black Wednesday occurred because other ERM 
members had no ultimate control over Bundesbank policy, even though this policy 
had a direct effect on all European economies. Whereas a European Central Bank 
(ECB) would give all participants in EMU a say in the formulation of monetary 
policy. This pro-European argument was made by both Tim Devlin and John 
Butterfill during the ratification debate in the House of Commons: 
The point about the European market is its fundamental interdependence.... We have a choice at this 
point and crossroads in our history of having a Deutschemark dominated continent where European 
currencies are at the whim of the Mark, or a truly independent currency with a truly independent 
central bank operating in the interest of all European economies (HC Debates, 18/1/93, Vol. 217, 
Col. 127). 
Under the proposed system, the Bundesbank would represent but one equal vote in the operation of a 
central bank and would to a large extent be giving up its control of what happens in the European 
economy. That is recognised in Germany where there is now considerable resistance in many 
quarters to the very idea of giving up the power that it has through the present operations of the 
market. It therefore seems that we have a great deal to gain, and certainly nothing to fear from 
German domination, under the system proposed in the treaty (John Butterfill MP, HC Debates, 
24/3/93, Vol. 221, Col. 992). 
The Nationalists argue that states like Britain would be unable to exercise a decisive 
influence over European monetary policy via the ECB. They argue that the size of 
Germany's economy would give it a disproportionate weight in monetary decision 
making. Therefore Germany would never be just a single voice amongst thirteen 
others on the governing board of the ECB. Lord Parkinson argues that irrespective 
of whether the Bundesbank continues to operate or whether an ECB is set up, the 
Germans will pursue monetary rigour. Hordern is less sure that the Bundesbank will 
succeed in perpetuating German monetary rigour. He hopes that Germany's hard 
money policy will live on in the ECB's stance but raises the following concern: 
I do think that an ECB with French representation on it is likely to be a less stringent affair than the 
Bundesbank is (Hordern 1995). 
Parkinson believes that the Germans are quite happy to impose their monetary 
policies on other member states, such as France but they will not countenance any 
attempts to dilute Germany's traditionally anti-inflationary monetary policy. 
Essentially Parkinson argues that EMU will only take place on German terms 
(Parkinson 1995). This is an economic example of the nationalists' belief that 
European federalism would actually augment rather than constrain German power. 
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The other key factor which is integral to the party leadership's approach to EMU is 
the attitude of the British business constituency. Ever since the publication of the 
Delors report, business across Europe has given the proposal for a single European 
currency a favourable response. EMU offers clear benefits to multinational and 
European trading businesses in terms of currency transaction costs savings and 
exchange rate stability. Originally business was attracted to the ERM for many of 
these same considerations.. 
The business community is by no means united on this issue but a clear majority 
exists which is supportive of a single currency in principle. For example the 
Institute of Directors' leadership is opposed to British participation in a single 
currency. However a 1994 CBI survey of 200 senior managers showed that 46% of 
respondents saw EMU as beneficial for the single market. Twenty-six percent of 
respondents wanted EMU by 1999. A MORI survey of 100 finance directors from 
Britain's largest 500 companies for BBC's The Money Programme showed that 46 % 
of respondents believed that the government "was not doing a good job in handling 
the single currency issue". Sixty percent of respondents said that EMU would be 
good for their companies (The Financial Times 13/2/95). 
The Tories thus face the possiblity of confronting one of their core constituencies if 
they exercised Britain's opt-out of EMU. The extent and intensity of the Tory 
Party's divisions on Europe have clearly alarmed many big business interests, 
including financial interests. Big business mobilised strongly in favour of European 
membership during the 1975 referendum campaign and funded the "Britain in 
Europe" campaigners. It is quite possible that a large section of business would put 
strong financial backing into a pro-single currency campaign. 
The involvement of City interests in ACE has already been mentioned but other 
lobbies are also being organised on this issue. Chief among these is the Association 
for the Monetary Union of Europe (AMUE). The AMUE is a pan-European 
business lobby group strongly committed to a single currency. The AMUE's 
membership includes key City players like Barclays, NatWest, Paribas and S. G. 
Warburg, conglomerates, such as BAT Industries and multinationals, such as 
Unilever, Fiat, British Telecom, Volkswagen and Nissan. Over two hundred 
companies are members of the AMUE. The AMUE's manifesto is clear on what is 
argues are the benefits of a single currency: 
The exchange rate instability which disrupted the ERM in the Summers of 1992 and 1993 is still a 
potential threat to the single market. It will not fully develop as long as there is the danger of random 
exchange rate fluctuations and the fear of competitive devaluations which only attainment of EMU 
can remove (AMUE 1994). 
Sir Patrick Sheehy, BAT Chairman and a member of the board of AMUE, puts the 
two arguments which have probably been decisive in Major's refusal not to rule out 
British membership of EMU. At the same time Sheehy makes clear big business' 
fears about the consequences of Tory divisions over Europe: 
If the single currency goes ahead without Britain, the pound will face damaging speculation, the City 
will lose business to continental rivals and 
American and Japanese firms will turn away from us to 
locate inside the new currency area. 
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Investment projects are increasingly mobile, and there is a trend for firms to centralise European. 
Union production. The danger that factories would move away from the UK, to a member of the core 
group..... is plain. The economic centre of gravity would move inexorably further into the heart of the 
continent (Sir Patrick Sheehy in The Observer 12/2/95). 
Ever since the late nineteenth century the Conservative leadership has been able to 
make an appeal to nationhood and be sure that Big Business interests will be 
alongside the party at the same time. However on EMU it is quite possible that a 
Tory leader would oppose a single currency on the grounds of nationhood and 
national independence and find that British capitalists opposed the Tory Party-on this 
issue. It is conceivable that the leader of the Conservative Party could reject a single 
currency and be opposed by the Chairman of the CBI and other business leaders. 
The AMUE's membership indicates the number of British multinationals and foreign 
multinationals which invest in Britain, which support EMU. This shows the extent 
to which there is a potential for divorce between international capital and a 
Conservative Party campaigning on a nationalistic platform of opposition to 
European integration. 
Industrial Policy and the Single Market 
The Conservative Government found itself increasingly in conflict with the 
industrial policies operated by other member states within the single european 
market (SEM). On industrial and social policy in the single market, pro-Europeans 
and nationalists are able to agree on the need for Britain to maintain its deregulated 
regime. 
Thatcher's Bruges speech was most memorable in that it raised the spectre of a 
European superstate overturning the UK's free market reforms. As was discussed in 
chapter one, the Thatcherites anticipated that the SEM would promote the hegemony 
of free market policies on a European scale (Howe 1994: 456). The ideological 
debate over industrial policy has now become refocused on a European level. The 
Conservative Party's rhetoric on this issue reflects this. The 1994 Conservative 
party European election manifesto made its central plank as stark choice between a 
"Europe: Right or Left? " (CCO 1994: 56). 
However this Thatcherite expectation was dashed when member states reasserted 
their own industrial policies or in some cases sought to negate the impact of the 
SEM programme, by reimposing non-tariff barriers to trade. The resistance by other 
member states to full-blooded free market Europe has proved to be more tenacious 
than the domestic opposition which the Conservatives faced from bodies like the 
trade unions and local authorities. Thatcher's support for a non-interventionist free 
trade area alongside floating exchange rates was philosophically opposed to the 
interventionist and managed exchange rate conception of both Delors and Mitterand 
(Connolly 1995: 77). 
Both the commission and other members states have also committed themselves to a 
strong EU social dimension. 
The Conservatives are united in seeing a social Europe 
as a threat to their deregulatory ambitions to reduce social costs in order to compete 
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with emerging Asian economies. Conservatives see the social dimension of the EU 
as a protectionist device designed to extend Franco-German high social costs to the 
Southern Mediterranean member states, thereby protecting the competitiveness of 
France and Germany. 
Many Nationalists express fatalism about the obstacles to free markets inside the 
Union. They see the UK. as in a minority of one on deregulatory issues in the 
Council of Ministers. They believe that member states created non-tariff barriers to 
trade in order to nullify the impact of the SEM (Spicer 1992: 61). Nicholas Ridley 
saw deep-seated differences between Britain's free market orientation and 
continental interventionism lying behind other member states desire to negate the 
impact of the SEM: 
The continental nations tend to be half-hearted, too, in their approach to free trade. Their history is 
riddled with cartels, monopolies, protective barriers and tariffs. Most them traditionally trade 
internally, or within the continent, rather than being world-trading nations. Although they pay lip 
service to open markets and the Single European Act, it is suprising how many exceptions and 
derogations they cling to, or reinvent, each in their own different way (Ridley 1991: 137). 
Two of the Euro-rebels cite a number of sectoral examples where member states 
industrial policies impede free market practices and are closed to British companies. 
Cash argues that German insurance markets are closed to British companies (Cash 
1991: 20). Spicer argues within the EU that there is one law for a private company 
and another for a state-owned one (Spicer 1992: 68). The Nationalists also argue 
that the EU is not in fact a free trade area but a protectionist trading bloc, which 
excludes external trade. Here they have revived Powell's chief economic criticism 
of the Community at the time of accession. Cash has argued that the European 
federalists see Europe almost as a multinational company, competing with Japan 
Inc. and America Inc (Cash 1991: 26). 
Lord Parkinson, as a former participant in Council of Ministers' negotiations, is 
equally fatalistic about the interventionist predilictions of other member states. From 
his own experience he is highly dubious about whether Britain is "winning the 
argument" on economic issues: 
The difficulty with the Union is that it is always lowest common denominator politics. It is not a very 
principled organisation, so there will always be an opportunity to close your eyes to the French 
stuffing billions of francs into Lufthansa... 1 lost track of the number of times I went to Council of 
Ministers meetings and the French would propose some way of getting round some aspect of the 
single market and the Germans would always start by saying, 'this is unacceptable' and then they 
would say, 'well on this one occasion and for the last time. ' But when the next time came along they 
do it again, exactly the same thing (Parkinson 1995). 
When I went to the Transport Councils, to give an example, the British, we were the only people 
there who didn't own a loss-making national airline. We were interested in what was good for the 
passengers. They were only interested in protecting their loss-making national airline (Parkinson 
1995). 
Some of the Nationalists are prepared to concede that the EU institutions have 
actually been allies of Britain in curbing interventionist policies which infringe the 
SEM. The Commission has long been empowered to take action against state aids to 
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industry. In November 1989, the Commission revoked its approval of a state aid 
package to Renault financed by the French Government because Renault had broken 
its undertaking with the Commission. Sir Leon Brittan as Competition 
Commissioner, settled with Renault at the price of the company agreeing to repay 
£1.26 billion. Ironically, the British Government was embarrassed when it was 
instructed to recover 44 million pounds worth of subsidies given to Rover when it 
was acquired by British Aerospace. Under article 93 of the Rome treaty, state aids 
must be referred to the Commission for its inspection. 
Parkinson acknowledged that the EU institutions have "tried quite hard" to curb 
state aids but believes that the problem will continue unabated because of the attitude 
of member states. The Government's desire to ensure that anti-competitive practices 
were curbed led them to again to recommend an increase in the power of the EU 
institutions. Major and Hurd successfully secured the power of the ECJ to fine 
member states who refuse to comply with EU laws, in the Maastricht treaty. The 
EU institutions have also sought to expand their own competence within this area. In 
1987 the Commission instigated proceedings against airline monopolies with the 
objective of forcing the Council of Ministers to act. Brittan has sharply attacked the 
degree of state subsidisation of industries practised by other member states. 
Although Brittan is a bitter opponent of the nationalists on monetary integration, his 
sentiments on this issue are entirely akin to their own: 
Governments have tended to give in to those that shout the loudest, usually large companies in crisis- 
ridden sectors, thus enabling them to put off the inevitable painful restructuring they need in order to 
secure their future (Brittan 1994: 86). 
Brittan claims that Commission ' whistle-blowing' has reduced subsidies from 41 
billion ECU in 1986 to 34 billion in 1990. Francis Maude says that while subsidies 
are acceptable in the short term, they must be terminal. Companies must not be 
allowed to continue coming back to government for state subsidies (Maude 1994). 
Yet while nationalists like Parkinson and Maude are prepared to acknowledge the 
effectiveness of the Commission and the Court's policing of the SEM, they are 
hostile to its ambitions in the social sphere and on the issue of a strategic trade 
policy. 
The conflict over strategic trade policy has been particularly associated with the 
Presidency of Jacques Delors. Europe's relative economic decline has been an 
obsession with Delors. Delors strongly believed that Europe needs fewer and larger 
companies if it is to hold its position (Grant 1994: 155). Martin Bangemann in 1990, 
the Industry Commissioner, supported a 'horizontal industrial policy', which meant 
funds should be directed at training, infrastucture and research, rather than specific 
sectors or companies. Both Delors and Bangemann were identified with the notion 
of building up European champions capable of competing with American and 
Japanese players. It is this conception which Cash criticises above. 
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Ever since Delors' crusading speech to the TUC in 1988, the Commission has 
placed its full weight behind social measures to accompany European deregulation. 
This dovetailed neatly with the structural and vested interests of the economies of 
Northern European member states, particularly France and Germany. These 
economies have traditionally institutionalised a system of high social costs of 
production. The French state has always been extensive in its use of public power in 
the economy and for forty years has included within its remit a high level of social 
benefits, even though French trade unions are relatively weak. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, a collaborative industrial tradition and the 
weight which this has given to large industry-wide trade unions, like IG Metall, has 
entrenched a system of high social costs and restraints on the exercise of ownership 
and control in the economy. One clear example is the system of dual boards within 
German public companies, where trade unions are represented in the strategic and 
management decisions of the company. These countries' high social costs have been 
brought into being and sustained by powerful interest groups and social 
constituencies within these member states. 
Within the SEM these countries were aware that they could be vulnerable to 
competition from low cost Southern European countries, like Portugal: The French 
and German Governments determined to maintain their social costs and backed by 
supportive domestic interest groups, strongly promoted the idea of a common social 
space across the SEM, in order to impede the Mediterranean countries from 
exploiting their competitive edge and taking markets from the French and Germans. 
Thatcher attempted to bring this to the attention of the Portugese and Spanish, 
arguing that the Germans wished to use common social standards as a form of 
protectionism (Thatcher 1993: 751-2). 
Bernard Connolly, a former leading Commission economic official, also argues that 
the social dimension was designed to stifle low-cost competition from the EU's 
periphery (Connolly 1995: 76). Connolly also argues that the social dimension, 
fixed exchange rates and the single market, were conceived by Delors and Kohl in 
order to nurture and protect "European industrial champions" (Connolly 1995: 76- 
77). Connolly's view sees fixed rates making as making more price competition 
between Northern and Southern European companies much more difficult. For 
Connolly, floating exchange rates were a necessary complement to an untrammelled 
free market in order to allow uncompetitive regions and companies to respond to 
movements in industrial and financial markets. 
Thatcher was also concerned about the impact of a social Europe on the UK 
economy. In Britain the Conservative Governments from 1979-94 had sought to 
deregulate labour markets and remove supply-side immobilities, such as trade union 
immunities. As a result Britain has quite low social costs of production relative to 
other EU member states. Britain's labour costs are lower than Germany, Belgium 
and Denmark (McKie 1993: 
83). Both Thatcher and Major were determined to 
maintain this competitive edge and resist social harmonisation across Europe bidding 
UK costs up towards the Franco-German level. This desire was reinforced by the 
belief that Britain's success in attracting inward investment was in the main due to 
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labour market deregulation. Some neo-liberals indeed urged the Conservatives to go 
further and move towards the Asian economic model: 
The Prime Minister should state as boldly as he can his intention to turn Britain into the Hong Kong 
of Western Europe by the end of the decade -a low cost, high productivity, low-tax, high tech off- 
shore island whose great growth and dynamism would be in marked contrast to the recession and 
sclerosis of the other major European economies (The Sunday Times leader on 6/6/93 quoted in 
McKie 1993: 81). 
Thatcher's rejectionist stance on the 1989 Social Charter was therefore continued 
and indeed intensified by Major in relation to the social chapter of the Maastricht 
treaty in 1991, as was outlined in chapter three. Major flourished the opt-out on his 
return from the IGC as safeguarding Britain's cost competitiveness. In the 23 July 
1993 Social Protocol/Confidence debate Major even quantified what he anticipated 
would be the deleterious effects of British participation in the chapter's provisions: 
The working time directive originally would have cost British industry 45 billion; the part-time 
directive originally would have cost up to £150 million .... If the social chapter came into being, 
those costs would be added to for every single business in this country with the inevitable effect on 
jobs (HC Debates, 23/7/93, Vol. 229, Col. 626). 
Social policy is the one consistent area of the party's European policy. Indeed Tory 
opposition to the social dimension goes back as early as 1980, with the Conservative 
Government's hostility to the Vredeling directive proposals for employee 
consultation. This is also the one area which commands support across the party and 
from those who are bitter opponents on the issue of monetary integration. 
The typology in chapter one identified that the neo-liberal integrationists are as 
hostile to EU interventionist policies and the social dimension as the Thatcherite 
nationalists. In the Sheffield University survey of Conservative MPs, only 3% of 
respondents supported Britain "opting in" to the social protocol. Howe has described 
the social chapter as "objectionable". For example Ian Taylor MP has argued that 
the EU must be competitive against low cost producers elsewhere in the global 
economy: 
If the Community is to become more competitive there must be a review, not just of the Protocol but 
of all arrangments which impose heavy costs and rigidities on employment in Europe in a competitive 
world. It is not just a question of one country in the Community losing jobs to another. It is the 
danger of an exodus of jobs from the Community as a whole (Taylor 1993: 48-9). 
The breadth of Tory opposition to the social dimension and chapter is also evident 
from ACE'S views. Like other neo-liberal integrationist Tories, Welsh is adamantly 
opposed to what he calls the "social engineering" represented by the social chapter. 
He says that the Conservative Government's stance on European social policy is 
long standing. He argues that the social chapter should have been confined to 
matters necessary for the free movement of labour and not to general working 
conditions across widely 
differing national employment and industrial relations 
practices (Welsh 1995). 
Only a handful of interventionist integrationists, like 
Andrew Rowe and Sir Edward Heath will entertain aspects of European social 
policy. 
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The prevailing view across the party, of the social chapter as a "job destruction 
package", is at first sight curious. In fact the chapter contains nothing of any 
substance and is merely a framework through which member states can legislate for 
social provisions. The only thing to which it commits participating countries to is a 
number of broad objectives in Article 2 of the chapter, such as working conditions, 
the information and consultation of workers and equality between men and women 
in labour market opportunities (EUT 1992: 118-9). The chapter provides for the 
Council of Ministers to adopt directives to meet these objectives. However in all the 
politically sensitive areas and the ones featuring in Tory rhetoric on the issue, such 
as industrial relations and employment law, the chapter only enables the EU to 
proceed on the basis of unanimity. 
Given the preservation of the national veto in the areas cited in article 2(3) of the 
chapter, the ferocity of Conservative opposition to this aspect of the treaty seems 
almost irrational. However clear political and policymaking calculations lie behind 
the enthusiasm shown by ministers for the social protocol which exempts Britain 
from participation in the social chapter. In political terms, Peter Luff MP has 
conceded that the social chapter is not as demonic as "we say it is" (Luff 1994). 
Luff says that the opt-out is a powerful political symbol which the Government has 
chosen to create in order to express its determination to defend British deregulation. 
Luff says that the chapter is symbolic of the sort of Europe Conseratives do not 
want (Luff 1994). Luff cites his personal opposition to the paternity leave directive, 
made under the chapter, as an example of a measure which is integral to the Tories' 
hostility to what the chapter represents. A Government insider says that the social 
chapter issue is useful for the party leadership because it is an issue where there is 
unity (Interview 1994). Welsh even argues that if the Government had not 
negotiated the opt-out at Maastricht then it would have failed to secure Tory support 
for ratification of the treaty and rightly so (Welsh 1995). 
In policy terms, the opt-out enables the Government to deflect attention from the 
extent to which employment and social provisions can be imposed on Britain 
through other institutional mechanisms, such as the ECJ's rulings on the rights of 
part-time workers. The Government's decision on 23 July 1993 (see chapter three) 
to threaten a dissolution in order to overturn Labour's social chapter victory, 
indicates the value which the Government places on perpetuating the impression that 
the social protocol safeguards Britain from EU social measures. 
Since the ratification of the Maastricht treaty the Government took heart from 
developments elsewhere in Europe which indicated that they "were winning the 
argument" on the social dimension and 
industrial policy. Policy in the key states of 
France and Germany seemed to be moving in a direction much closer to the British 
neo-liberal approach. German 
Economics Minister Gunter Rexrodt, had begun to 
reappraise his country's high social costs of production and the corporatist structure 
of German industry. The new 
Conservative French Government led by Edouard 
Balladur resumed the privatisation programme initiated by the 1986-88 Chirac 
Government. 
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In this climate of "new realism" the European Commission published its White 
Paper, Growth, Competitiveness and Employment in December 1993. The 
Government seized on the paper as reflecting the increasing convergence between 
the Europe's economic thinking and the British Government. The paper did accept 
much of the free market analysis of Europe's economic malaise in relation to high 
levels of structural unemployment. 
The White Paper adopted the Government's language of labour market flexibility. It 
conceded that social protection schemes have - in part at least - had a negative 
impact on employment and called for greater flexibility in the organisation of work 
(Commission 1993: 124). In the House of Commons debate on the White Paper, 
Kenneth Clarke and Douglas Hurd respectively, struck an almost triumphalist tone 
in their remarks: 
We now have a document that bears the stamp of this Government's policies .... People in Europe 
are listening to the British and the Conservative experience. They are privatising, they are 
deregulating, they are going for competitive open markets (Kenneth Clarke MP, HC Debates, 
9/12/93, Vol. 234, Col. 581-83) 
The Commission has moved a long way in the past year or so. It has moved well beyond the British 
Labour Party in analysing why Europe has failed to create jobs to the same extent as the United 
States and Japan, let alone the new Asian competitors (Douglas Hurd MP, HC Debates, 9/12/93, 
Vol. 234, Col. 507). 
In the discussions that followed the publication of the White Paper, Britain found 
that the German Government was an ally on the issue of faster deregulation within 
the EU. Rexrodt argued in May 1994, that a taskforce of experts should be formed 
to root out unnecessary Euro-legislation. The German Minister's remarks provoked 
a strong counter-attack from Delors, who accused him of wishing to gut the 
Maastricht treaty of the social chapter (The Financial Times 17/5/94). 
The Re-emergence of the Anti-Marketeer Position 
Some Thatcherite Nationalists are following through the logic of their own fatalism 
about the EU's hostility to free markets and are calling for effective withdrawl from 
the Union or a retreat to a minimalistic free trading relationship with other member 
states. They have resolved the dilemma between a desire to have access to Europe's 
markets and repulsion from member states' industrial policies. Norman Lamont's 
Selsdon speech in 1994 was the first anti-marketeer public appeal by a leading 
member of the party (see chapter two). Most nationalists, especially leading Tories, 
such as Portillo and Redwood, will still not publicly entertain such options but they 
are emerging prominently amongst sympathisers of the Euro-rebels. 
The Nationalists' European Foundation regularly makes the case that Britain is non 
dependent upon European trade and that there are richer pickings available in Asian 
markets. As Gorman has argued, 
The EEC is yesterday's story. The journal notes 
that Britain's invisible exports surged outside the EU between 1992-3 (European 
Journal 1994: 20). The point that Britain should turn its attention to Asian markets 
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and away from Europe, was made forcefully by Lord Young of Graffham, the 
former Trade and Industry Secretary: 
We should do our part by going back to our traditional markets, the Far East and India, and use our 
increasingly competitive economy to build an expanding export-driven revival. Then and only then 
will our Commission in Brussels perhaps begin to realise that all their talk of a two-speed Europe 
will have come and we will be in the fast lane (Young quoted in European Journal 1994: 4-6). 
In her memoirs, Thatcher also argues that the EU's relative importance will 
diminish. She argues that British politicians should be less concerned with European 
markets and should refocus on the Far East and Latin America (Thatcher 1995: 
498). The Nationalists also see the EU's commitment to developing the social 
dimension as de facto protectionism. They argue that the only way that Europe can 
maintain its high social costs is if it gradually and then systematically places barriers 
to trade around the new industrialising Southeast Asian economies. They sense that 
the EU is developing into an insular trading bloc, seeking to intensify integration 
amongst existing member states, principally through monetary union, in order to 
restrict competititors from outside Europe. 
The nationalists are also assailing the argument which was at the centre piece of 
Heath's case for accession in the early 1970s - that Britain needed to be part of a 
trade bloc in order to advance its interests and to extend global free trade. Two Tory 
pro-Europeans, Ray Whitney and Michael Welsh, have argued that in a world 
dominated by regional trading groupings, like NAFTA, an isolated Britain would be 
at the mercy of trading policies formulated by others (Whitney and Welsh 1995: 7). 
However lain Duncan-Smith argues that the days of the large trading blocs are over. 
Rodney Leach, director of Jardine Matheson, supports this view: 
They say you have to be part of a trade bloc to negotiate with Japan and the USA - but if that were 
true you would have to add Switzerland, Scandinavia and Austria to the list of failures (Leach 1994: 
4). 
Welsh directly responds to Leach's argument that Britain could achieve more in 
GATT if it were outside the EU: 
What does Rodney suggest the impact was, that Austria actually had on the GATT negotiations.... 
Austria in no sense was even a player in the GATT negotiations, Austria was, if you like sitting in the 
waiting room and wondering what the Europeans and Americans were getting up to . Had the British 
not been able to use the Community to persuade the French to agree to some reduction in protection 
of agriculture, there would have 
been no GATT agreement period. Whose influence does Rodney 
think was actually counting? (Welsh 1995). 
Some nationalists are now advocating that Britain negotiates membership of the 
European Economic Area (EEA) in order to enjoy the benefits of the SEM without 
the costs of the social dimension and other undesirable EU policies. Spicer in his 
1994 Hungarian speech (see Chapter Two) advocated British membership of the 
EEA. The EEA was set up in 1993 in order to incorporate 6 of the 7 EFTA states 
within an EU structure 
but short of full membership. The EEA provided the ability 
of these states to participate 
fully in the SEM but without needing to contribute to 
the Union budget or join in the CAP. The EEA was policed by a separate court, the 
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Surveillance Authority and the EFTA states were not required to erect the Common 
External Tariff (CET). However the Scandinavians were only allowed consultation 
rights on EU directives effecting the SEM via a Joint Committee and so had to 
eventually accept the package as a whole. Subsequently, the Swedes and Finns 
decided to join the EU at the end of 1994. 
Lord Parkinson is reluctant to argue that Britain should join the EEA at this stage. 
He says that Britain "owes it to her friends in Europe to argue for more sensible 
policies" (Parkinson 1995). Peter Luff as a pro-European, goes even further and 
dismisses the EEA option. Luff says that EEA membership would isolate Britain 
from the whole history of Europe because Iceland and Norway would be the only 
other ones there (Luff 1994). He says this isolation would outweigh the absence of 
obligations to the CAP and the cohesion fund. Frank Vibert argues that the Foreign 
Office dislikes the EEA option because it would entail an even greater loss of 
diplomatic stature than that entailed by non-membership of EMU (Vibert 1994). 
Duncan-Smith does not rule out backing EEA membership if Britain fails to secure a 
multi-track approach at the 1996 IGC (Duncan-Smith 1995). He believes that when 
the process of economic revisionism underway in other member states, such as 
Germany, intensifies, then these countries will begin to move towards Britain's 
conception of a Europe des Patries and repudiate the federalist project. Like other 
nationalists, Duncan-Smith believes that ultimately global competitive pressures will 
ensure that other member states follow the Thatcherite economic model but he is not 
prepared to wait indefinitely for them to converge with Britain's position. Thatcher 
also indicates that the EEA is a possible option for consideration (Thatcher 1995: 
505). 
Conclusion 
The ideology of nationhood has clearly been influential in the central debate over the 
single currency. The Thatcherites reject EMU because they argue it would not be 
based on a cohesive sense of national identity. For them the issue is not whether a 
European Central Bank would operate a more effective monetary policy than the 
British Bank of England. They argue that only the Bank of England has the 
legitimacy to conduct UK monetary policy. It is here that we see the strongest 
expression of the link made by Thatcherite Nationalists between economic policy 
and national culture. 
They are also increasingly attracted to an independent deregulation strategy, where 
Britain exploits its low cost industrial attributes in order to gain global 
competitiveness in newly emerging markets. They believe that ultimately the EU 
will neuter Britain's competitive edge. They do not have the patience to wait for the 
EMU to embrace British deregulatory ambitions. This desire for monetary and 
industrial policy sovereignty is gradually shifting the Thatcherites into a position 
where they can only logically argue 
for British withdrawal from the Union. 
pro-European Conservatives focus on EMU as an economic proposition. Many 
former monetarists, now identified with the neo-liberal integrationist grouping, see 
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EMU as a way of locking Britain into hard money policies; they believe that 
European monetarism will prove more effective than Britain's own internal 
monetary discipline. However other pro-Europeans are more concerned about the 
political ramifications of EMU. Tories like Kenneth Clarke fear that if Britain 
excluded herself from the formation of a single currency, Britain would be outside a 
major European power bloc. They envisage that this EMU-grouping would exercise 
such power that this would. reduce the value of Britain's independence. Although the 
pro-Europeans are increasingly weak within the parliamentary party, they still have 
strong support from within big business, much of which has an international 
perspective on monetary policy and sees EMU as potentially a boost to 
competitiveness. 
The dispute over industrial policy within the EU is particularly frustrating for the 
Conservative leadership because of the success of the Thatcherite domestic 
revolution against the extended state. Just as the Conservatives succeeded in 
unwinding the coils of British interventionism they see that British companies are 
increasingly subject to the interventionist policies of other member states. Some 
Thatcherites are more prepared to contemplate withdrawal because Europe's 
position in the global economy has changed so profoundly since the time of the 
Macmillan application. In the 1960s, Britain was a slow-growth country outside the 
dynamic high-growth EEC. In the 1990s, Europe has higher unemployment and 
lower growth than either Asia or North America. 
They can now argue that GATT's international free trading mechanisms are a viable 
alternative to a stagnant and protectionist European trading bloc. The early anti- 
marketeers had no alternative economic project with which they could credibly 
oppose British membership of the EEC. The Thatcherites now have the self- 
confidence to argue that a multinational free trading strategy refocused on Asia 
makes withdrawal not just viable but desirable. They believe that the economic 
terms of the European debate have turned in their favour. However the 
integrationists believe that the future lies with a world which is coalescing around 
regional trading groupings, like NAFTA and APEC. They believe that Britain can 
only achieve open markets by negotiating from within its own European regional 
grouping - the EU. 
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CONCLUSION 
THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE IDEALS 
Some of the Tory Right have made it increasingly clear that they are much less interested in achieving victory at 
the next election, than in winning control of the party's agenda (Extract from leading article in The Daily 
Telegraph 3/7/95). 
Abolition of the Pound is not something which Conservatives should be doing (John Redwood MP, 26/6/95). 
I am a coalition government all on my own (Reported remarks of John Major from a conversation with Helmut 
Kohl at the 1995 G7 summit). 
The European controversy in the Conservative Party has proved so divisive because it 
concerns unresolved conflicts over the Anglo-American alliance, the future of Thatcherite 
economic policy and the centrality of nationhood within the Conservative tradition. The 
fundamental character of these issues for Conservatives has led to the sustained and 
disciplined parliamentary dissidence seen throughout the Maastricht ratification battle. 
The Euro-rebels' predecessors never had the active support of sections of the party 
leadership. Thatcher's support for the nationalist cause gave the rebels a greater legitimacy 
and authority in the party. Major's centrist efforts at party management of the European issue 
became as imperilled as those attempted by Balfour over the tariff reform issue in the early 
years of the century. 
Major attempted to straddle a growing party divide, in which both the protagonist groupings 
within the Conservative Party have set up rival organisations. The dispute went right up to 
Cabinet level. Major's agnostic stance on a single currency was designed to prevent a 
catastrophic party split. Nevertheless Major's opt-out created a political vacuum, within 
which party groupings could campaign for their leadership to accept or reject British 
participation in EMU. 
The European controversy has created new political alignments in the parliamentary party. 
The conflict over the role of the state in the economy has now been replaced by a conflict 
over supranational power. The conflict 
has spawned three distinct groupings. The Thatcherite 
Nationalists are determined to defend national identity. They also see European integration as 
representing a challenge to 
domestic deregulation and the free trading Anglo-American 
alliance. 
The pro-European Conservatives 
include two groupings - the old wet critics of Thatcherism, 
the interventionists and also a number of neo-liberals. The neo-liberals and interventionists 
have united around a series of of economic and foreign policy arguments in support of 
European integration. In particular, the Neo-liberal Integrationists have successfully secured 
the adoption of hard money policies 
by the interventionists. 
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The convergence of the two pro-European groupings shows how the European debate has 
superseded the sharp ideological disagreements over the role of the state in the economy 
between individuals have now become political allies. Sir Edward Heath and Edwina Currie 
now find themselves as unlikely allies in supporting further European integration, in the face 
of nationalist hostility. The interventionists and the neo-liberals now form a cohesive pro- 
European bloc within the parliamentary party, working through the Positive Europeans and 
ACE. 
The Thatcherites are not prepared to let European integration challenge national identity and 
the authority of Britain's political institutions. The Thatcherite reverence for British 
nationhood was first given primacy in the Conservative ideological tradition by Benjamin 
Disraeli. Disraeli could see that the Tories could cease to be a party of government unless 
they articulated an appeal which transcended class divisions in Britain's industrial society. 
Nationhood was deployed as a means of berating the Liberal and Labour parties. It was at this 
juncture that nationhood became embedded in the party's self-image and also its psyche, 
particularly as a form of electoral populism. Conservatives in the 1990s still see nationhood 
as having a potent electoral appeal. 
Disraeli's conception of nationhood was not confined to celebrating common membership of 
a community. Conservatives used nationhood as a cult of national prestige, celebrating 
Britain's global role through the empire. Even after the collapse of British supremacy the 
appeal of global identity and the dissemination of British values and institutions throughout 
the world was tenacious enough for a group of imperialist Tories to resist Britain's retreat to a 
continental role. Europe was also an affront to nationhood because of the constitutional 
constraints which supranationalism placed on British policy independence. Enoch Powell 
argued vociferously that EEC membership was incompatible with British self-government 
and that the Conservative Party should react to the end of empire by a reassertion of Britain's 
independence as a free market island nation. 
The Conservative Party's engagement with Europe was overshadowed from the beginning by 
the Anglo-American alliance. Macmillan believed that the Anglo-American alliance was 
endangered by the prominence of the EEC. His Government's membership application was 
primarily influenced by a desire to retain diplomatic stature in Washington. However 
Macmillan also disliked Gaullist-led European ambitions for greater independence from 
America. He wished to steer the EEC back towards US foreign policy preferences. 
The conflict between a conception of a more independent role for Europe and a desire to 
anchor Europe to US leadership is a key dynamic in the current Tory divisions. The 
Thatcherite Nationalists' distrust the security instincts of other EU member states. Like 
Macmillan they wish to reinforce American leadership, with Britain playing the role of 
trusted junior partner. Their desire to maintain US leadership is driven by their conviction 
that America is more resolute than the EU in security matters and less protectionist in trade 
policy. Atlanticism has always 
had dual security and economic connotations for Thatcherites. 
It expresses their commitment to an Anglo-Saxon politico-economic order. 
The ending of the Cold War has not shaken the Thatcherites' faith in the necessity of the 
Anglo-American partnership. The problem they face is that both the Bush and Clinton 
Administration have actively encouraged further European integration, particularly in order 
to wind down Washington's 
defence commitment to Western Europe. The Thatcherites are 
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now flirting with the idea of institutionalising post-Cold War Anglo-American security and 
economic relations through the creation of an expanded North American free trade zone. 
All pro-European Conservatives have followed Heath's ideological lead in supporting a 
Europeanist foreign policy. Pro-Europeans are sceptical of America's continuing 
commitment to Western Europe and about US engagement in the world more widely. Lord 
Howe mocked the Thatcherites at the 1994 Conservative Party conference by saying that they 
wished to place Britain in the `clear blue water of the mid-Atlantic'. Howe and other pro- 
European Tories see Republican ascendancy in Washington as evidence of growing 
isolationism in US foreign policy. They have always sought to balance American powers 
with a greater European security profile. Pro-Europeans however wish to make constructive 
moves to develop the effectiveness of a common foreign and security policy to enable Europe 
to have foreign policy influence commensurate with its economic weight. 
Whereas Thatcher sees greater independence in European foreign policy as highly 
undesirable: 
Almost every expression of the EC's foreign policy making from the 1980 Venice Declaration to the Middle East 
to the EC s early and futile interventions in the Yugoslav war, has been designed to distinguish Europe, from the 
US, sometimes expressly so (Thatcher 1995: 476). 
Another key element in Nationalist hostility to the EU is Germany's leadership role within 
the Union. The majority of Nationalists who spoke during the Maastricht are inclined to see 
the EU as an instrument for Germany's hegemonic ambitions. They see monetary union and 
the social dimension as institutionalising German-specific interests. They see other member 
states as captive to Germany's network of patronage and clientilism and are therefore unable 
to act as a counterweight to German objectives. German influence encourages them to believe 
that the EU is not an organisation in which Britain can ever assert a leadership role. Pro- 
European Tories are more inclined to believe that the best safeguard against German 
unilateralism is to engage with Germany through closer cooperation through the institutions 
of the EU. 
Thatcherites who initially supported a conception of a European Community limited to being 
a free trade area have become steadily alarmed at the expanding competence of the European 
institutions. They see the institutions as partisans in the process of European integration. 
They are angry that Tory leaders continuously downplayed the integrationist dynamics within 
the EU, especially the impact of greater majority voting and European legal supremacy. In 
response to these integrationist dynamics, the Thatcherites are arguing for massive 
repatriation of powers from the EU to Westminster. Whereas pro-European Conservatives see 
the institutitonal development of the EU, with the extension of majority voting and tougher 
enforcement powers for the ECJ, as supportive of British commercial interests. 
The intellectual problem faced by Thatcherites is that market liberalisation is very much 
dependent upon supranational law and supranational enforcement, as Tories like David 
Willetts have conceded. So although they oppose EU competence in many areas, they 
concede a role for the Union 
institutions in the promotion of market liberalisation. These 
considerations led Margaret Thatcher to accept an extension of majority voting to create the 
single market. However, the 
Thatcherites would resist Lord Howe's argument that the 
dynamic of the free market is to erode national sovereignty. Powell's position was consistent 
in that he opposed supranationalism in principle. 
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Monetary union is the issue which the Thatcherites have invested with great significance. 
They see EMU as a constitutional outrage, which would sweep away Britain's constitutional 
prerogatives and make the UK a region of a federal Europe. They insist that economic policy 
can only be conducted within a homogeneous culture if it is to enjoy popular legitimacy. 
These considerations for them outweigh the monetarist character of European monetary 
union. The Thatcherite Nationalists have adopted Enoch Powell's argument that 
supranational institutions can never enjoy popular legitimacy. 
Tory Pro-Europeans are dismissive of such absolutist conceptions of monetary sovereignty. 
They emphasise the de facto loss of sovereignty over monetary policy due to the power of the 
financial markets. They argue that EMU would actually recover some monetary sovereignty 
from the markets. 
The interventionist integrationists have abandoned their previous misgivings about hard 
money policies in their support for the single currency. They articulate the same European 
monetarist arguments as the neo-liberals. The convergence of both groupings around a pro- 
EMU position is in fact evidence of the dominance of free market doctrines within the party. 
Few Conservatives are prepared to argue in favour of deficit financed public investment 
reflationary policies. In addition, the linkage between European integration and neo-liberal 
economic policies, shows that in practice Interventionist integrationists have made a choice to 
accept neo-liberal economic policies as a price for a continuation of European integration. 
The European controversy within the Tory Party is being fought out between two conceptions 
of Britain in the world economy. The Thatcherites see Britain as a global free trading power, 
with strong governmental institutions and a greater affinity with the United States, than any 
other industrialised state. They see the EU as a vehicle for German dominance, albeit with 
France as a junior partner, committed to interventionist industrial policies. Overwhelmingly, 
they are determined to defend British national identity and constitutional independence. Their 
economic arguments on the single currency are all subsidiary to this core ideological 
commitment. 
The Thatcherites' original conception of the single market anticipated the extension of 
Thatcherism across Western Europe. In reality, they have been exasperated by the 
commitment of other member states to the social dimension. Even though the social 
dimension of the EU is being diluted, many Thatcherites believe that British free market 
policies are irreconcilable with a Franco-German led Europe. They are now seriously 
considering breaking free from the EU in order to refocus British foreign economic policy on 
the expanding markets of Asia. 
Conservative pro-Europeans believe that joint European action is often more effective than 
national solutions. For them supranationalism 
is an opportunity and not a threat. They see 
Britain as relatively insecure in the face of a global economic market. In this context they 
believe that sterling would be adversely affected if Britain exluded itself from an inner core 
monetary union. 
These contested positions are irreconcilable. If the party leadership's view ever moves 
decisively towards either the nationalists or the pro-European view, the Conservative 
coalition could break apart. 
The most likely trigger for a split would be a decision by a future 
Conservative leader to rule out British membership of a single currency. In this scenario the 
Conservatives could become a Powellite party, advocating a vision of Britain as an 
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independent free market island nation. Such a course would very likely lead to a broader 
realignment of British politics. 
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